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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Large-scale redevelopment projects have grown in use around the world and taken 
many forms.  In São Paulo, Brazil, the previous and current mayoral administrations have 
been directing projects to redevelop the Luz neighborhood of the downtown region through 
contracts with private sector developers for plan creation and project completion.  
Additionally, community groups participate in the process through the legally mandated 
municipal council.  Redevelopment in São Paulo is therefore distinctive from other 
contemporary redevelopment project styles occurring elsewhere:  it is resulting in the 
privatization of urban planning and has a little used form of required participation through 
the municipal council structure.   
 Nonetheless, contemporary understandings of these two governance forms suggest 
they cannot function concurrently.  By examining cities as assemblages of urban policies—
from local, national, and international sources—and understanding the pathways and 
contexts from which these polices emerge, we will gain new insights on the city.  This 
reframing allows for a new understanding of public-private partnerships and democratic 
governance—one that breaks from the oppositional dichotomies present explicitly and 
implicitly in other accounts and provides for an understanding of the historical specificity 
of the two forms at this moment.   Further, the São Paulo case exemplifies a more nuanced 
understanding of the public and private logics of urban development; they are not either/or, 
oppositional forces but occur concurrently in varied ways for the same urban space and 
xvi 
project. Sometimes, they function harmoniously with consensus and cooperation, but others 
with contention and conflict.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In this research project, I am studying a large redevelopment project in central São Paulo. 
This project expands understandings of democratic governance in the privatization of urban 
planning and therefore informs perspectives on global trends in large-scale urban redevelopment 
projects.  In São Paulo, a new form of privatized urban planning for redevelopment has emerged.  
This form combines public-private partnerships and participatory planning in the form of 
municipal management councils.  Despite originating in the same historical, political, and 
economic context, the Nova Luz redevelopment project is the first instance of such a 
juxtaposition of governance structures.  Unlike conventional understandings, however, the São 
Paulo case exemplifies that these two modes are not inherently incompatible oppositional forces; 
but rather, careful attention must occur as they are brought together or “assembled” and their 
concurrence is much more nuanced.  The two forms operate sometimes harmoniously with 
consensus and cooperation, but at other times with contention and conflict.  Nonetheless, they 
both have emerged in Brazil from the same historical context and are seen as two competing 
contemporary modes of urban development.  In doing so, this research addresses the following 
questions: 
 Can participatory governance coexist with the privatization turn in urban planning? 
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 What political and governance factors led to privatized urban planning in São Paulo 
redevelopment? 
 What problems arise when democratic governance is coupled with privatized urban 
planning?   
 
Megaprojects and Redevelopment 
In recent years, large-scale urban redevelopment projects have reemerged worldwide as 
both a tool for local urban renewal and increased global competitiveness (Fainstein, 2008, 2010; 
Lehrer and Laidy, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2002; Degen, 2003).  Globalization of governance 
practices (Swyngedouw, 2002), the desire for prominence on the world stage (Degen, 2003), and 
connecting local populations and dynamics with the demands of a globalized capitalist economy 
(Jessop, 1997) have been noted as driving factors for this resurgence.  Beyond global forces, 
locally-specific forces, like land use regulations, public sector powers, and societal trends have 
been identified as playing a more prominent role in recent years, as well (Shatkin, 2008; 
Wissink, 2013; Douglas et al, 2012).   
Culture led redevelopment has taken hold as a popular form of redevelopment in large 
and small cities alike (Dundar, 2010; Degen, 2003).  What began with Bilbao, Spain’s 
reclamation of its riverfront in the late 1990s—and anchored by the Frank Gehry designed 
Guggenheim Art Museum—has been repeatedly mimicked as numerous other cities have looked 
to that city’s example and attempted to create their own “Bilbao Effect” (Knox, 2009; 
Rybczynski, 2002).   Many of these projects emphasize the use of high-profile architecture and 
cultural features (like art museums and performance spaces) as anchors of the revitalization 
process along with strategic partnerships with the private sector to achieve desired 
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redevelopment goals.   Claims of exclusion based on socio-economic class and displacement of 
existing communities, along with a lack of local cultural sensitivity and not meeting economic 
development goals are some of the most common critiques of these projects (Knox, 2009; 
Rodriguez and Martinez, 2003).   
Governance and management styles have changed across numerous cities and contributed 
to new forms of urban development, as well (Knox, 1991; Cox and Mair, 1988; Kirlin and 
Marshall, 1988).  Hall and Hubbard note that this transformation in urban politics is one from the 
traditional functions of a city: from “the local provision of welfare services to more outward-
orientated policies designed to foster and encourage local growth and economic development” 
through the provision of new agencies and institutions, along with collaboration with the private 
sector (1998, 2).  In doing so, local governments have taken on characteristics traditionally 
associated with the private sector; namely, risk-taking, inventiveness, promotion and profit 
motivation in their search to evolve into the post-industrial city (Hubbard and Hall, 1998).  This 
“entrepreneurial turn,” has allowed for many of these large-scale projects to take place (Harvey, 
1989; Judd and Ready, 1986; Ward, 2003) but are nonetheless “contextually embedded…insofar 
as they have been produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies 
of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political 
struggles” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 349).   
In their study of Hong Kong, Jessop and Sum (2000) developed a theoretically based 
definition of entrepreneurial cities.  This framework relies on the ideas of Schumpeter (1934), 
“who defined entrepreneurship as the creation of opportunities for surplus profit through ‘new 
combinations’ or innovation.  Based on Schumpeter’s ‘ideas of innovation,’ Jessop and Sum 
found five principles and strategies of entrepreneurial cities that correspond to the policies of 
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these cities.  These principles include: “the introduction of new types of urban space, new 
methods of space production to create location specific advantages, opening new markets, 
finding new sources of supply, and reconfiguring the urban hierarchy” (Jessop and Sum, 2000, 
2289; Lim, 1990, 215; Schumpeter, 1934, 129–135). 
In many of these entrepreneurial urbanism projects, elite interests often emerge that 
attempt to represent the interests of the city as a whole (Judd and Parkinson, 1990), despite the 
limited benefits to specific sections of the community (Hubbard and Hall, 1998).  However, in 
Glasgow, this configuration has taken the form of a local government focus on large-scale 
development projects rather than a local capital and government coalition emphasis on economic 
development (Boyle and Hughes, 1994).  Likewise, the idea of “place-making” and government-
led coalitions have driven Manchester’s redevelopment (Williams, 2000).  As such, Eisenschilz 
and Gough (1993) posited that perhaps the most critical component to entrepreneurial urban 
development success is the strategy’s popularity across the political spectrum.  
Entrepreneurial urbanism, however, has been subject to critique.  David Harvey (1989) is 
wary of their speculative nature and the shift away from “rationally planned and coordinated 
development.”  He observes that this produces benefits and subsidies for populations within a 
specific area, divert concern from the broader problems of the territory as a whole, and 
exacerbate spatial inequalities (Harvey, 1989).  Conversely, Robin Malloy has argued that these 
projects are inherently a departure from the traditions of governance.  These projects “encourage 
activities in locations deemed undesirable for investment by private parties,” often result in 
government ownership of prominent structures— “reducing the ability of independent private 
capital to act as a check on government power,” and “obscure market information and hinder 
individual decision making” through fund-mixing (Malloy, 1991, 125-126).   
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While in the above cases government leads the development process, many other new 
mega-projects are largely private sector driven (Fainstein, 2008, 2010; Shatkin, 2008; Pirez, 
2002).  The public-private partnerships that have provided for new development in a number of 
cities (New York, London, and Amsterdam) can provide public benefits, but are nonetheless still 
profit driven and as such, adequate government controls are the only way to guarantee the 
provision of social goals in these projects (Fainstein, 2008, 2010).  What often results in large-
scale projects is “enclave development.”  These types of projects in China and India do indeed 
exacerbate spatial segregation, but in varied ways because of new articulations of stakeholder 
groups (Wissink, 2013; Douglas et al, 2012).   
Finally, some authors have warned about the privatizing effects of these types of large-
scale development projects (Shatkin, 2008; Pirez, 2002).  Shatkin (2008) has observed growing 
perceptions among influential actors in Southeast Asia that the private sector is more apt at 
articulating the public interest than the government.  For Pirez (2002), the reduced government 
controls that have resulted from new political and economic structures have abdicated urban 
planning powers to private sector developers and eliminated democratic decision-making in 
Buenos Aires.  Likewise, because of the flexibility in land uses and diversity of actual forms of 
redevelopment, these new mega-projects restrict the powers of oppositional forces and groups 
(Lehrer and Laidy, 2008). 
Despite this identification of numerous trends in global redevelopment, the question 
remains:  How do large-scale development and redevelopment projects continue to evolve and 
vary around the world? 
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Redevelopment in São Paulo 
Over the past 20 years, city leaders have attempted a series of projects to redevelop the 
Luz neighborhood of the downtown region in São Paulo.  The two most recent mayoral 
administrations have taken these projects one-step further by pursuing unprecedented 
partnerships with the private sector for project creation and completion.  This series of projects 
culminating in privatized forms of planning is example is one such new global trend in urban 
redevelopment and serves as the basis for this research.  While many substantive features have 
changed as a result of the shift in political orientations between the various administrations, some 
basic features present in both of the most recent schemes will be introduced here in terms of the 
above literatures and discussed in detail in a later section.  Additionally, the two specific projects 
and the transition between them illustrate the complexities of new redevelopment projects. 
During the 1980s, Brazil—like the other nations of Latin America—was suffering the 
effects of the “lost decade” and seeking to enact structural readjustment and decentralization 
policies to regain control of its faltering economy thus changing the private sector’s role in 
governance and development.  In the Luz region redevelopment schemes, the resulting shift 
towards new forms governance role is apparent.  The public sector has experienced a “qualitative 
shift” (Ward, 2003) in its urban development role; instead of completely directing urban 
development, it has sought to facilitate urban plan and project development in consortium with 
the private sector, as demonstrated by the “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959) and genealogy 
of projects in the region.  This “qualitative shift” is further noted when examining the historic 
role of large scale developers, concessions, and contracts.  While historically these all factored 
significantly in the development of public housing and other infrastructure projects in Brazil, the 
form in which concessions and contracts with the private sector is much different in the Luz 
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case.  The scope, size, and lack of oversight from the public sector (in that only project 
guidelines were provided) are the most significant differences. 
In the previous administration, through public bid, the private sector developed project 
plans for the entire region. In the current administration, the private sector is drafting plans for 
punctual projects in the region, as called for by the public sector.  These configurations are 
similar to those observed in Manchester and Glasgow, where the local governments directed 
mega-project place-making efforts with significant private sector participation (Williams, 2000; 
Boyle and Hughes, 1994).  Additionally, as Eisenschilz and Gough (1993) observed, multiple 
political orientations have attempted to use similar new governance strategies in São Paulo; yet, 
the repeated attempts at redevelopment in the neighborhood do call attention to the concerns 
raised by Harvey (1989) and Malloy (1991).  The overall extent to which São Paulo’s 
redevelopment attempts fit the “entrepreneurial” concept based on the above theoretical 
definitions posed by Jessop and Sum (2000) and others warrants further research, however the 
existence of entrepreneurial urbanism is indeed present in the city’s urban planning. 
At a more abstract level, what is occurring in São Paulo can be considered an empirical 
example of the transition “from the consumerist oppressive city to the functional emancipatory 
city” (Sklair, 2009), at least in terms of redevelopment outcomes.    For her, globalization 
produces fragmented cities with “oppressive spaces” while the emancipatory city is inclusive and 
“provides for all” (Sklair, 2009, 2703).    Privatized urban planning in São Paulo connects to the 
globalizing trends of the “oppressive city.” Yet, it may have the structures in place through the 
municipal management councils to begin to break away from that form—although it is far from 
being emancipatory.  The interactions between government, public, and private interests through 
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this new form of redevelopment and required participatory planning determine the possibility of 
achieving that structural change. 
Both project formats also point to what Shatkin (2008) calls the “privatization of urban 
planning.”  Unlike his case, however, the public sector in São Paulo is still the driving force 
behind the planning process, although it has abdicated the powers of plan development to the 
private sector.  The case of redevelopment in São Paulo, Brazil is distinctive in a number of other 
ways from those discussed above, as well.  A lack of participation (Shatkin, 2008; Swyngedow, 
2002; Pirez, 2002), socio-spatial exclusion (Shatkin, 2008; Lehrer and Laidy, 2008; Harvey, 
1989), and poor integration within the project area and the city as a whole (Swyngedouw et al, 
2002) plagued many of the examples discussed above.   
Only Aarsæther et al (2011) specifically examine participatory governance forms in 
relation with new public and private sector deveopment configurations.  This case is limited to 
the Norway, however, and merits examination in other contexts.  Other authors have indeed 
explored the interplays between community groups and large-scale development projects (for 
example, see Soja, 2010; Fainstein, 2010).  These, however, have employed different theoretical 
approaches than those used herein, do not emphasize the public sector’s role in detail, and do not 
account for the coexistence of the two simultaneous forms of governance:  privatized urban 
planning (and public-private partnerships) and participatory democracy.  For example, Soja 
(2010), in explaining his theory of spatial justice, outlines the steps taken by community groups 
to negotiate community benefits agreements with real estate developers in large development 
projects in Los Angeles.  Similarly, using her theory of the just city, Fainstein (2010), in 
elaborating her theory of the just city, looked at private sector-led megaprojects in three cities 
and found that public benefits can occur through government requirements in exchange for tax 
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relief.  She noted benefits in the form of job creation, cultural facilities, and public housing; but 
that the public housing only occurred with substantial public sector financial support (ibid).   
A number of authors have taken up Fainstein’s theoretical perspective and explored the 
just city concept in more detail.  Steil and Connolly (2009) examined the experiences of 
neighborhood groups in the South Bronx in reconfiguring redevelopment of a brownfield site to 
include environmental justice concerns.  Thompson (2009) looked at the role of grassroots 
community groups in creating a counter narrative in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.  
While some government officials tried to implement policies restricting the return of blacks, 
Latinos, and the poor, some groups were able to inflict change in urban design and assist in the 
recovery and rebuilding of a few of the neighborhoods.  Maricato (2009) has explored the 
positive outcomes and limitations of the urban reform movement in Brazil. She found that the 
movement was instrumental in the passage of the city statute (discussed in later chapters) and 
fortification of participatory democracy bodies at the municipal level, but she views it has been 
unsuccessful in changing the entrenched power structures that prevent the full realization of 
other urban improvements.  Similarly, Wolf-Powers (2009) argues that “counterpublics” and 
activist planners have been and need to remain important actors in achieving socially just urban 
development.    
Lefebre’s (2002) theoretical concept of the right to the city has served as a starting point 
for investigating forms of the emancipatory city.  Uitermark (2012) outlines the history, 
achievements, and failures of Amsterdam’s urban social movements in confronting the 
modernization push by the local government. Kratke (2012) discusses the issues that emerge 
from the creative cities push (forwarded by Florida, 2002) in that this economic development 
model privileges some portions of the so-called creative class over others, and often results in 
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gentrification.  Liss (2012) discusses the growth of the right to the city grassroots movement and 
its actions in fighting for urban policy change.  Similarly, Mayer (2012) traces the trajectory of 
the right to the city movements and places its origins in earlier movements combating local-level 
neoliberal policies and practices.   Still other authors have framed their research directly as 
contesting urban neoliberalism.  Mayer (2007) examined the forms and spaces of social 
movement contestation of urban neoliberal policies in the United States and Germany.  Miller 
(2007) researched how some attempts at implementing neoliberal urban policies at a citywide 
scale in Calgary were prevented through effective community actions. 
Many of these accounts, however, create an oppositional tension between community and 
real estate development or top down versus bottom up.  In creating this opposition, they overlook 
the possibility to which the two can indeed exist together.  Oldfield and Stokke (2007) detailed 
how community based activism in local politics in South Africa breaks this dualism, but in terms 
of the social movements themselves.  This research, therefore, seeks to explore the coexistence 
and possibility of co-functionality between public-private partnerships and community 
participation in the form of democratic governance. 
Different from the above cases, Brazilian federal, state, and municipal governments have 
been innovative in creating participatory planning framework that has taken the form of 
municipal management councils, beginning in the late 1970s as a response to anti-democratic 
authoritarian rule and some early economic reforms.  This example of has now been mandated 
nationally, founded in a Lefebvrian “right to the city” and urban reform-emphasizing constitution 
that was developed from the late 1980s to early 2000s following over twenty years of military 
dictatorship rule.  Therefore, across Brazil and in São Paulo specifically, public participation in 
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the form of municipal management councils is a legal requirement in many types of development 
projects, including those proposed for the Luz region of São Paulo.   
Additionally, public housing provision has been an important feature of both 
redevelopment attempts, and is the central feature of the current administration’s project.  This 
marks a significant shift from the complete spatial segregation and enclave developments that 
resulted from many of the mega-projects discussed above.   
Similarly, while some analyses emphasize the prominence of global factors in influencing 
redevelopment practices (Swyngedouw, 2002; Degen, 2003), in São Paulo these practices are 
rooted in the interplay between local and global forces, just as Shatkin (2008), Wissink (2013), 
Brenner and Theodore (Douglas et al, (2012) note in their respective contexts.  To understand 
global trends in urban redevelopment, research must account for the local historic, economic, 
political and social features that contribute to policy and project creation. 
  
Participatory planning:  The Theory behind the Practice 
Participatory planning modes have emerged in recent years as an alternative to 
conventional top-down, rational “modernist” modes of planning.  John Dryzek (1990) suggests 
that policy analysis technocratic modes obstruct the possibility of discursive democracy.  
Specifically, he has noted that traditional forms of defining policies fix ends; neutralize value 
differences; reinforce hierarchies and bureaucracies; usurp political debate; and limit politics to 
an elite control of policy analysis and formulation (Dryzek, 1990, 115).  Achieving a form of 
discursive democracy, he cautions, will be difficult because of both the structural composition of 
contemporary liberal democracy and institutional frameworks; discursive democracy must be, 
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therefore, removed from the structures of the state and operate autonomously (Dryzek, 1990, 
119, 128).   
 Patsy Healey has formulated one vision of collaborative practice for planning.  Based on 
the work of Habermas, Healey promotes an “inter-discursive communication translation, rather 
than a superimposition of values” (Healey, 1993, 240-241).  Subsequently, the undertakings of 
planning emerge as the process unfolds, rather than through a process based on set tasks (Healey, 
1993, 240-241).  Moreover, the agreements reached are “temporary accommodations of different 
perceptions” rather than completely attained ends (Healey, 1993, 239).  Specifically, for her, 
communicative planning is a continual social learning process. That process draws on practical 
sense; searches for mutual understanding; involves respectful discussion within and between 
perspectives; constructs arenas for program formulation with minimal conflict; recognizes the 
potential validity of all viewpoints; employs reflexive and critical capacities based on moral 
respect; and has the potential for transformation and liberation (Healey, 1993, 242-244). 
 Other participatory planning forms find their basis in rationality (Forester, 1989; 1993; 
Flyvbjerg, 1998).  For them, the greatest challenge to discursive democratic planning is in power 
structures and the conceptualization of rationality.  Forester suggests that planners hold the 
power and must provide for participation through the “bounding of rationality”—acknowledging 
the social embeddedness of rationality, rather than rationality purely through technical or 
instrumental means (Forester, 1989; 1993).  For Flyvbjerg (1998), power itself holds an inherent 
rationality and to make democratic governance work, power structures’ domination of rationality 
must no longer occur. 
Finally, Amy Helling has analyzed a specific collaborative planning exercise and 
suggested that these types of processes have shortcomings, as well.   She suggests that 
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collaborative processes can be unsuccessful in cases where focus is given to process rather than 
outcomes, the role of compromise in forming consensus is overlooked, and there is a bias 
towards expert knowledge (Helling, 1998, 344-345).  However, despite her analyzed project’s 
inherent difficulties and intractable size, there is still the possibility of collaboratively addressing 
large-scale projects through “visioning.”  In it, participants come together to form an “ideal 
future state” but not the plan to arrive at said state (Helling, 1998, 335). 
Across the theoretical framings for participatory planning, two issues emerge as critical:  
timing of the meetings and open forums for all interested and relevant parties.  In Brazil and in 
São Paulo, these two issues are evident as two major impediments to the full realization of 
democratic urban governance.  As discussed below, despite the legal requirement for 
participatory planning through the municipal management council, key groups were excluded 
from contributing in it.  Likewise, the implementation of these bodies following draft project 
completion suggests a favoring of technical knowledge rationalities (and market rationalities 
through the public-private partnerships) over a collective rationality through full public 
participation at all stages of plan development. 
 
Policy Assemblages 
A growing push in the literature is attempting to understand cities, regions, and territories 
as “assemblages.” As McCann and Ward (2011) point out, “policies and policymaking are also 
intensely and fundamentally local, grounded and territorial” but at the same time “assemblages” 
of “travels and transfers, political struggles, relational connections, and territorial 
fixities/mobilities brought together to constitute urbanism” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xiv-xv; 
Farias and Bender, 2010; McFarlane, 2011).  Further, policies are “contingent on the historical-
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geographical circumstances of each city and its relationship with other regional and national 
forms of decision making” but at the same time “fundamentally territorial in that it is tied up 
with a whole set of locally dependent interests” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xv).  Therefore, 
“policymaking must be understood as both relational and territorial, as both in motion and 
simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place…the tension between policy as relational and 
dynamic, on the one hand, and fixed and territorial, on the other…is a necessary tension that 
produces policy and places” (ibid).   
 In sum, it is assemblages that create territories (McCann and Ward, 2011; Deleuze and 
Guttari, 1987).  Policy assemblages “speaks not to the static arrangement of a set of parts, 
whether organized under some logic or collected randomly, but to ‘the process of arranging, 
organizing, fitting together…where an assemblage is a whole of some sort that expresses some 
identity and claims a territory’ (McCann and Ward, 2011; Wise, 2005, 77) Assemblages also 
occur at the local level: “in relationship to the global, the assemblage is not a locality to which 
broader forces are counterimposed. Nor is it the structural effect of such forces” (Collier and 
Ong, 2005, 12).  Urban policy assemblages are, therefore, “achievements with uneven 
consequences—they involve practices and politics” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xvi).  An urban 
region is therefore “an assemblage of central, regional, and local actors engaged in a complex set 
of political mobilizations at one point in time…all are part and parcel of a regional assemblage of 
political power that is defined by its practices, not by some predetermined scalar arrangement of 
power” (Allen and Cochrane, 2007, 1171).  Thus, scholarship on policymaking “must be 
understood in terms of how, where, why, and with what consequences urban actors assemble 
elements and resources from wider geographical fields” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xvi); an 
approach that “makes room for space, since assemblages will function quite differently, 
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according to local circumstance, not because they are an overarching structure adapting its rules 
to the particular situation, but because these manifestations are what the assemblage consists of” 
(Olds and Thrift, 2005, 271).1  
 Some authors have observed these territorial tensions in São Paulo.  For Leite (2009) 
“São Paulo is the paradigm of a local metropolis in a global world.  It is simultaneously a world 
city linked to global networks and a local city with low-quality spaces that are ignored by local 
authorities” (Leite, 2009, 247).  Santos et al (2002) observe that in São Paulo, “there is a 
worsening conflict between local space—that which is shared by all of us in our daily lives—and 
global space, which represents a logic and an ideological content beyond us.  For this very reason 
the great contradictions of our time play out through the use of territory” (Santos, et al, 2002, 
15).  Finally, Peixoto (1998) suggested that in São Paulo, “we are dealing with a glocal 
metropolis, the repository of an urban area that faithfully portrays contemporary society, with all 
the contradictions of our time.” 
 I argue, therefore, that new and emerging approaches are necessary to understanding 
present-day global urbanism generally and the dynamics of São Paulo more specifically.  Even 
more precisely, however, I suggest that some of the shortcomings in understanding the dynamics 
of contemporary urban redevelopment and civil society come from an under-elaborated framing 
of how cities are formed as “static arrangement of a set of parts” as McCann and Ward (2011) 
                                                            
1 Methodologically, McCann and Ward (2011) also stress that “cities are also important nodes in a globalizing world 
and that a focus on the practices that constitute cities as sites ‘of intersection between network topologies and 
territorial legacies’ (Amin, 2007, 103) is analytically crucial” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xvii).  They caution, 
however, “scholars still do not understand in a deep and detailed way how those involved in urban politics and 
policymaking act beyond their own cities to practice or perform urban globalness and to articulate their cities in the 
world.” There is “a need for empirical detail on global political-economic relations…and more empirical accounts of 
the struggles, practices, and representations that underpin urban-global relations and that assemble or territorialize 
global flows (McCann and Ward, 2011, xvii).  To understand how cities are formed, inquiry should “remain close to 
practices, whether through ethnography or careful technical analysis,” (Collier and Ong, 2005, 4) but “not lose sight 
of the contexts and constraints within which these practices are located and constraints within which these practices 
are located and by which they are channeled” (McCann and Ward, 2011, xvii).   
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suggest is the conventional mode.  Understanding cities as assemblages also emphasizes the local 
level—the politics and practices (Olds and Thrift, 2005)—and the how, where, why and 
consequences of the assemblages of elements by urban actors (McCann and Ward, 2011).  By 
shifting our understanding to cities as assemblages of urban policies—from local, national, and 
international sources---and understanding the pathways and contexts from which these polices 
emerge, we will gain new insights on the city.  For my research project, this reframing allows for 
a new understanding of privatized urban planning and democratic governance—one that breaks 
from the oppositional dichotomies present explicitly and implicitly in other accounts.    
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
After experiencing many decades of rapid growth, São Paulo city leaders are experiencing 
problems of trying to redevelop portions of its old downtown.   
 Can participatory governance coexist with the privatization turn in urban planning? 
 What political and governance factors led to privatized urban planning in São Paulo 
redevelopment? 
 What problems arise when democratic governance is coupled with privatized urban 
planning? 
 Redevelopment in São Paulo is distinctive from other contemporary redevelopment 
project styles occurring elsewhere in the world. It is resulting in the privatization of urban 
planning and has legally mandated participatory planning requirements in the form of municipal 
councils. Political and administrative issues both lead to the privatization of urban planning and 
inhibit the full realization of democratic governance.  
 
 
17 
Following a series of other redevelopment projects in the region, the public sector turned 
to this new privatizing format to overcome the issues of large-scale project implementation in a 
highly politicized context where the changes in political orientation of administrations results in 
major program changes.  Additionally, the decentralization of the public sector—with 27 
secretariats—makes large-scale redevelopment project planning and completion difficult; 
privatizing the planning and implementation provides for a consolidated rather than fragmented 
effort where such project scales may be impossible. 
For civil society, the municipal council has provided a structured and guaranteed forum 
for collaboration with the public sector.  Yet, which parties receive seats is subject to the public 
sector’s rule-making and not all community groups are able to participate.  The council has 
therefore fallen short of its ability to collaboratively plan with all interested stakeholders, and 
forced community groups to interact with the state through the court system and political 
alliances in addition to the formal municipal council.   
 By reframing our understandings of cities as assemblages of processes and policies from 
distinct origins —from that of a static arrangement of a set of parts—and researching those 
contexts in which they emerge, the failures of democratic governance and privatized urban 
planning are not due to their inherent incompatibility or oppositional nature, but rather in the 
ways that they have been assembled together in specific urban development projects.  In 
recognizing this, these issues can be identified and provide for the future success of these to 
governance modes together. 
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Case Description 
Over the past 20 years, the public sector in São Paulo has pursued a number of 
redevelopment projects in the downtown region.  These include using cultural facilities as 
anchors for redevelopment and revitalizing historic structures through the Projeto Monumenta 
(Monuments Project) and Procentro programs; and financial incentives through Operações 
Urbanas (Urban Operations).  Recently, the City of São Paulo released new plans to redevelop 
45 blocks of the region known as “Nova Luz” in 2011.  Comprising the Bom Retiro, Luz, and 
Central neighborhoods of São Paulo, it is just north of the traditional, historic downtown region 
of the city.  Although seen as under-utilized in terms of its central location, the region currently 
consists of numerous commercial activities, including Santa Ifigênia Street (shown in Figure 
1)—one of the most important electronics-vending districts of the city, and cultural spaces—
including the Sacred Art Museum, State Art Museum, Sala São Paulo (a state-of-the-art 
symphony hall) and Portuguese Language Museum.  In addition, there are approximately 11,600 
(mostly lower income) residents, 24,000 employees, and other users in the area (Prefeitura de 
São Paulo, 2011).  Moreover, until their police-led forced removal in January 2012 as part of 
efforts to combat drug use, the region was denominated “Crackland” (Crackolândia) by the 
media, public officials, and the public—where a large portion of the city’s homeless drug-
addicted population resided. 
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Figure 1:  Busy Commercial Street in Region (image by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
 
 
A few authors have investigated some of the specific issues and dynamics of the Luz 
neighborhood.  De Paiva et al have suggested that the rehabilitation of a portion of the Julio 
Prestes Station into the concert hall (Sala São Paulo)—which was one of the initial projects in 
the area—has set off a process of gentrification in the neighborhood (de Paiva, de Castro et al).  
Similarly, Frúgoli and Sklair (2009) have discussed the extent to which the Nova Luz and related 
projects fit conventional characterizations of gentrification.  Additionally, the Funarte art 
collective has suggested ways of rethinking the neighborhood’s redevelopment through increased 
participation from a wider array of individuals, including current residents and users of the area 
(Funarte, 2008).  Francisco (2011), in his master’s thesis, also has documented the processes of 
the passage of the Urban Concessions law and Nova Luz project in the city council.  Finally, in 
an analysis of Crackolândia, Frugoli and Spaggiari (2010) have suggested that it is in fact a new 
urban modality, and social service providers must consider it as such to effectively reach this 
population. 
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Figure 2:  City of São Paulo and Nova Luz Project (depiction by Joshua Shake) 
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Projeto Nova Luz 
In an unprecedented action, the City used newly drafted legislation (Urban Concessions 
law) to contract private-sector consortiums for plan development and project execution (in two 
separate phases) through public-private partnerships for the area. The project sought to 
rehabilitate this district of nearly 500,000 square meters through the construction of new plazas, 
public housing through special zoning (ZEIS), social services and possibly new post-industrial 
commercial offices (Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2011). To do so, the city (which was to provide a 
majority of the project’s funding, along with aiding through the eminent domain of buildings and 
land) contracted a consortium made up of Brazilian firm Concremat Engenharia, British and 
Brazilian firm Companhia City, and American firm AECOM which drafted the plans for Phase I.  
Other related projects in the neighborhood include a dance theater and music school under the 
direction of the State Culture Secretariat and a technical school.  It is important to note the 
historical significance of this model of urban development. While historically large scale 
developers, concessions, and contracts all factored significantly in the development of public 
housing and other infrastructure projects in Brazil, the form in which concessions and contracts 
with the private sector is much different in the Luz case.  The scope, size, and lack of oversight 
from the public sector (in that only project guidelines were provided) are the most significant 
differences and explored more below. 
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Table 1:  Nova Luz Project Basic Information (data from Prefeitura de São Paulo; design 
by Joshua Shake) 
Project Area: 50 hectacres (45 blocks) 
Current Inhabitants:  12,000 Proposed Inhabitants: 12,000 
Current Jobs: 24,000 Proposed Jobs: 19,400 
Total New Housing Units: 4986 New Public Housing Units: 2193 
      
Costs 
Design Phase:  R$ 13.7 million 
Preliminary Infrastructure and Streetscape 
Improvements (completed): R$ 12.5 million 
Implementation Phase (5 stages, 15 years): R$ 1.1 billion 
Implementation Cost to Municipality: R$ 370 - R$ 621 million 
 
 
 
Due to the large scale of the project, numerous city government bodies participated, 
including the Housing, Urban Development, and Social Assistance Secretariats, along with the 
contracted consortium that completed the plans.  Table 1 summarizes basic information about the 
project scope and costs.  In Phase II, the city government would have contracted the entire 45-
block project area (depicted in a typical street scene in Figure 3) to a single consortium for 
project completion.  During that construction phase, current landowners would have been able to 
choose to participate according to the pre-existing plans or cede their property to the construction 
firm for completion.  This, and issues regarding public housing provision, led to the formation of 
numerous groups opposing the project, including two residents’ associations and an association 
of commercial interests.  Housing interest groups directly participate in the process, as the city 
and federal regulations require a Municipal Management Council for the public housing portion 
of the project.  This forum, however, only has purview over housing; thus, restricting the 
commercial interest association’s participation in these discussions.  This has resulted in two 
intersections between civil society and the city government:  a federally and municipally 
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required participatory forum (Municipal Management Council) wherein groups have been 
attempting to change specific features of the project, and court battles led by the commercial 
association and intent on having the entire project declared unconstitutional.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Streetscape Adjacent to Estação da Luz (image by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Demise of Nova Luz and New Proposals 
In late 2012, during the waning months of the now previous city administration (Gilberto 
Kassab, formerly DEM now PSD, both aligned with PSDB) that drafted the above-described 
planning mechanism, issues of participatory planning and politics became very apparent.  (Note: 
The PSD (Partido Social Democratico or Social Democratic Party), DEM (Democratas or 
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Democrats), and PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira or Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party) are commonly viewed as being right-center oriented Brazilian political parties and often 
aligned.  Gilberto Kassab was José Serra’s vice-mayor and became mayor in 2006 after Serra 
stepped down to run for Governor of São Paulo State.  Kassab was then reelected in 2008.  
Because of term limits, he was not eligible for reelection in 2012; however, Serra ran for mayor 
again). Numerous court stays prevented the city government from beginning the public bid 
process for Phase II because of a lack of adequate participation in the project’s elaboration.  
Based on interviews with city officials, they were still attempting to release the documents and 
sign a contract with firms for Phase II completion even in the final weeks of the elected term.  
Community groups, however, realized that if they were able to cause one more delay in the 
process, the city would not have enough time to meet the required bid period window.  At the 
same time, community groups obtained an agreement with three of the four mayoral candidates 
to “renegotiate” the project.  Only the former mayor (José Serra, PSDB), who came up with the 
initial idea for the Nova Luz project, did not sign.  
Fernando Haddad (PT) was elected mayor in a second round run-off with Serra in late 
October 2012 and took office in January 2013.  (Note: The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores or 
Workers Party) is widely considered to be the major left-center party in Brazil). Although it is 
too early to obtain more specific details, Haddad and the Secretariat of Urban Development have 
suggested that they will be following the courts’ suggestion that there was not sufficient 
participation in the plan elaboration process and draft a new project for the area.  Instead of using 
the one consortium model for project construction and completion as proposed in the previous 
administration, they are to pursue a more conventional public-private partnership format where 
the city creates numerous contracts for site/building/sub-project specific completion.  They 
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intend to maintain many of the components and directives of the previously created plan, 
however.  A leader of one of the housing associations has suggested that this new direction 
already shows a great relationship with the Haddad administration.  Additionally, the city 
government is pursuing large-scale redevelopment not in the downtown region, but instead in a 
neighboring region along the river in the Arco Tiete (Tiete River Arc) Project; public-private 
partnerships will direct this project, but their form and the specific project details have not yet 
taken shape.  Interestingly enough, however, Haddad, while working in the Federal Ministry of 
Planning drafted Brazil’s public-private partnership legislation. 
The one action taken in the region by the Haddad Administration that has been 
implemented is the Braços Abertos program.  This program seeks to depart from previous 
policies addressing the area’s crack-addicted population.  Instead of a confrontational approach, 
this new approach attempts to provide supportive housing, job opportunities, counseling, 
medical, and rehabilitation services and has been recognized internationally for its innovative 
approach.  
While the above-mentioned projects represent the continuity of urban planning actions in 
the Luz region of the city, they nonetheless were of a much smaller scale and scope than Projeto 
Nova Luz and most have not progressed significantly beyond planning stages.  In this sense, the 
urban megaproject attempts for the region have at least temporarily ended.  Early in Haddad’s 
administration megaproject attention shifted to the Arco do Tiete development project.  This 
sought to redevelop a large area of the city along both banks of the Tiete River, which bisects the 
municipality near the Luz region but not including it.  An open competition for design 
conceptualizations was held in 2013, with a number of proposals publicly presented.  Since then, 
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however, the current political and economic crisis has deepened in Brazil and halted any further 
progress on this project. 
Finally, São Paulo plays a pivotal role in influencing urban policies across Brazil.  
Although the public housing special zoning (ZEIS) exists in other municipalities and in other 
parts of São Paulo, this case will be the first to construct that form of housing in the downtown 
region of a Brazilian city.  São Paulo’s urban policies also often influence both national urban 
policy and policies enacted in other Brazilian cities.  One example of this is the aforementioned 
Urban Operations, which were in use in São Paulo for many years before their 
institutionalization nationally with the passage of the City Statute (discussed below).  Finally, 
even within São Paulo, among the various redevelopment tools, this was the only one that has a 
municipal management council connected to it, albeit only for the public housing portion.   
 
Methodology 
 This research used a mixed-methods, critical case study format, following Ragin and 
Amoroso’s (2010) presentation of methodologies in the social sciences.   The series of 
redevelopment projects in downtown São Paulo served as a yet-underexplored example of 
democratic governance in conjunction with the emergence of privatized urban planning.  
According to Yin’s (2008, 13) definition, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  Therefore, the case study format functioned 
best to understand the complexities and intricacies of the new style of redevelopment in São 
Paulo and mandatory participatory planning in the privatization of planning. 
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As Yin (2008, 45) also points out, a single case study allows research to “uncover very 
complex dynamics of one setting of interest than to look less deeply at more settings,” which will 
allow for my profound examination in this research project.  Therefore, my overall research 
design will take the format of a “linear-analytic case study” emphasizing exploratory and 
descriptive purposes (Yin, 2008).  Generalizability can also be possible, following Yin’s (2008) 
classification that case studies are generalizable to theoretical positions rather than populations or 
universes.  In this sense, I seek to theorize about both new forms of urban redevelopment and the 
ways in which democratic governance interacts with the privatizing urban planning which results 
from it. 
 Additionally, this research employed a strategy used by Shatkin (2008) in his research 
into the privatization of planning practices in Southeast Asia.  He uses both an actor-centered 
approach “that focuses on how actors, both internal and external to localities, shape urban space 
in response to forces of change operating across different scales” (Markusen, 2004; Olds, 2001; 
Yeoh, 1999; Shatkin, 2008, 2); and an emphasis on “the historical development of a city, which 
shapes the context in which local actors act” (abu-Lughod, 1999, Shatkin, 2008, 2).  Researching 
the historic emergence of specific urban governance strategies in São Paulo, along with 
understanding the roles and configurations of private, public, and civil society actors and 
institutions through interviews, meeting attendance and document analysis sought to understand 
the case of urban development in the city through the above lenses.  Additionally, it offered the 
ability to recognize the complexities of politics, development, and institutions in contemporary 
Brazilian urban development. 
 Specifically, throughout my research project, I primarily relied upon interviews and 
participant observation of meetings and deliberations.  Additionally, I employed analysis of 
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official and unofficial documents.  I conducted a preliminary phase of data collection and 
analysis periodically from 2010-2012 in order to inform this dissertation research project. 
However, the research protocols followed those presented herein.   
During my primary phase of data collection, I conducted a range of interviews with city 
officials, planners, real estate developers, municipal council participants, local residents, 
shopkeepers, and individuals involved with NGOs active in the neighborhood.  Interviews were 
semi-structured, to allow new ideas to emerge based on the respondent’s comments, to provide 
depth of content through single respondents, and to allow for comparisons across the individual 
responses (Weiss, 1994).  These were 60-90 minutes in length, to provide for scheduling 
flexibility and minimize respondent fatigue (Weiss, 1994).  I used a snowball sampling approach 
(Weiss, 1994) to identify respondents.  Initially, I identified those city officials and planners 
directly involved with the redevelopment projects through the attendance lists provided in the 
municipal council meetings minutes.  Similarly, the community groups that sit on the municipal 
council served as the point of departure for that set of interviews.  Internal government 
documents, like public bid contracts and lists of firms that responded to requests for proposals, 
identified private-sector developers.  From all of these initial groups of respondents I used the 
snowball technique to identify further interviewees. 
In order to analyze these interviews, I coded them based on thematic subject areas 
(Weiss, 1994).  These categories included collaboration with other community groups; plan 
components/demands; participation between community groups and public sector; relationship 
between public sector and private sector firms; and community group actions outside of the 
municipal council.  I analyzed the various meetings following the ethnographic field notes 
format (Emerson et al, 2011); that is, meeting notes focused both on substance and the 
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interactions between individuals and were coded according to the same categories as the 
interviews.  In order to generate evidence, provide for confirmability, and credibility (Groat and 
Wang, 2002), I also triangulated my findings across the various types of data sources examined.   
In the table below (Table 2), I summarize the various methodologies; data sources; evidence 
produced; and how these relate to other data generated through triangulation. 
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Table 2:  Breakdown of Research Methodologies and Types of Evidence (design by Joshua 
Shake) 
Method Data Source Evidence Yielded Relation to Other Data 
(“Triangulation”) 
Interviews, 
60-90 
Minute, 
Semi-
structured 
City Officials Rationale for plan formats; 
perspectives on role of 
participation in process 
Confirmed through interviews with 
other groups and through official 
statements in media 
Planners Insights into plan 
development process; 
perceptions of interactions 
with community groups, 
municipal council, and 
developers; planner’s role 
when private sector 
contributes to plan 
development 
Confirmed through analysis of plan 
documents and internal government 
documents; through interviews with 
the other parties and through 
municipal council meeting 
attendance and minutes 
Real Estate 
Developers 
Perspectives on 
opportunities provided by 
redevelopment projects; 
specific forms of 
participation in drafting 
plans 
Confirmed through plan 
documents, interviews with 
planners, and internal government 
contracts and request for proposals 
documents  
Municipal 
Council 
Participants 
(leaders of the 
three housing 
community 
groups) 
Collaboration between 
specific groups to achieve 
collective goals; 
perceptions of 
redevelopment projects and 
specific interests; 
perceptions of interactions 
with the government and 
with developers 
Confirmed through interviews with 
planners and commercial group; 
internal group documents and 
meeting attendance; and through 
municipal council attendance and 
minutes 
Commercial 
Interest Group 
Leader 
Collaboration between 
specific groups to achieve 
collective goals; 
perceptions of 
redevelopment projects and 
specific interests; 
perceptions of interactions 
with the government and 
with developers 
Confirmed through interviews with 
planners and housing groups; 
internal group documents and 
meeting attendance  
Local Residents Perspectives on 
redevelopment projects; 
perceptions of 
representation by housing 
community groups 
Confirmed through interviews with 
housing groups, NGOs, and any 
statements made in public hearings 
Shopkeepers Perspectives on 
redevelopment projects; 
perceptions of 
representation by 
Confirmed through interviews with 
commercial interest group and any 
statements made in public hearings 
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commercial community 
group 
NGO Leaders 
with Activities 
in 
Neighborhood 
(Tenement 
Housing, 
Homeless 
Organizations) 
Perspectives of other 
interested parties not 
included within municipal 
council but directly 
impacted by redevelopment 
in neighborhood 
Confirmed through involvement 
within public hearings; interviews 
with planners confirm 
receptiveness to their perspectives 
and issues 
Participant 
Observation 
Municipal 
Council 
Meetings 
Structure and format of 
legally-mandated 
participation; collaboration 
between community groups 
and city planners 
Participation adequacy, 
collaboration, and decision making 
powers confirmed through court 
documents and interviews with 
planners and municipal council 
participants 
Public Hearings Perceptions of publics not 
part of municipal council 
Confirmed through media coverage 
of redevelopment projects 
Community 
Group Meetings 
Varied forms of activities 
within municipal council 
means and other direct 
actions pursued  
Confirmed through interviews with 
community groups; through media 
coverage of direct actions/public 
activities; and through municipal 
council meetings and minutes 
Content 
Analysis of 
Documents 
Municipal 
Council Meeting 
Minutes 
Collaboration between 
community groups and 
government; decision-
making and project 
definition powers granted 
to them 
Participation adequacy, 
collaboration, and decision making 
powers confirmed through court 
documents and interviews with 
planners and municipal council 
participants 
Redevelop. Plan 
Documents 
Specific components of 
plans to determine how 
different from other styles 
of redevelopment 
Confirmed through conversations 
with planners, officials, and 
developers to determine roles and 
rationale in plans 
Internal 
Government 
Reports 
Procedures for municipal 
council structure; contracts 
with private sector; requests 
for proposals from private 
sector 
Municipal council structure 
confirmed through interviews with 
participants; private sector 
interactions confirmed through 
interviews with those parties 
Internal 
Community 
Group 
Documents 
Varied forms of activities 
within municipal council 
means and other direct 
actions pursued 
Confirmed though community 
group meetings and interviews with 
leaders 
Court 
documents 
Legal perspectives on 
redevelopment projects and 
participation within them 
Confirmed through interviews with 
planners and community groups 
discussing participation 
Content 
Analysis of 
Archival 
Materials 
Newspaper 
Articles/Other 
Media Coverage 
Background information; 
election information to 
determine role of politics in 
defining projects 
Confirmed through interviews with 
planners and community groups 
discussing project changes with 
political party changes 
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Following data collection and analysis of the materials and information gathered through 
interviews, meeting attendance, and internal planning and community group documents, I then 
organized the data as it pertained to the redevelopment and participatory proceedings, 
respectively.  These categories then formed the basis for the information presented in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, in which I reconstructed the Nova Luz planning and participation process 
bringing together both the outcomes and the perspectives of those involved from municipal 
departments, community groups, and the consortium development team.  In many instances, 
interview subjects and documents referenced other documents, laws, and precedent projects.  
These were therefore consulted in a second phase of background research in order to fully 
establish the origins of the Nova Luz redevelopment attempt, privatization in urban planning, 
and participatory planning requirements, which helped inform Chapter 2 directly, as well as 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Comparisons with Other Cases 
Finally, since understanding how redevelopment in São Paulo is distinctive from other 
contemporary forms of redevelopment is an essential part of my research project, I completed 
brief comparisons with projects in other parts of São Paulo.  For this, I will rely on accounts 
provided in the literature on redevelopment and other government documents available on 
official websites.  Following recent methodological developments in conducting urban 
comparisons, whereby urban policies, contexts, and outcomes serve as basis for the comparison 
(Robinson, 2011; Gough, 2012; McFarlane and Robinson, 2012), my principal secondary 
comparison was a series of redevelopment projects conducted in São Paulo throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  This project sought to stimulate growth and development in an emerging new 
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centrality in São Paulo.  Therefore, this too is representative of yet another form of privatized 
urban planning.  Some differences do exist from my primary case in the structure of the public-
private partnership format, role of public housing, and specific forums for public participation; 
nonetheless, the privatizing outcomes, Brazilian context, and similarities across the various urban 
policy instruments provide for a compelling comparison. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Dissertation Concept Diagram (design by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
Structure of this Dissertation 
 In order to explore these interplays between the competing logics of public and private as 
clearly expressed in the São Paulo case, this dissertation is divided into six chapters and 
graphically displayed in Figure 4.  Following this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the social, 
political, economic and governance histories—as well as the urban planning trajectories in São 
Paulo—that led to the assemblage of public-private partnerships and participatory democracy 
institutions in Nova Luz.  Chapter 3 explores the structure of the Nova Luz Project in greater 
detail, showing how it is a new form of privatized urban planning.  In Chapter 4, this dissertation 
details how this new configuration of urban governance forms resulted in different forms of 
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participation—in both collaborative and combative practices.  Chapter 5 returns to urban 
assemblages of spatially specific and contextual policies, places Nova Luz in the wider São 
Paulo perspective, and considers the intramunicipal competition that stemmed from this 
assembling of various redevelopment projects, tools, and instruments.  Finally, Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions about how the São Paulo case exemplifies a more nuanced understanding of the 
public and private logics of urban development; reframing our understanding of these two urban 
governance modes through urban assemblages rather than static arrangements of parts, it 
becomes clear that the public and private logics are not either/or, oppositional forces. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Brazilian Urban Planning and Redevelopment after Modernism:  Participatory, 
Privatizing, and Culture-led 
 
 
 
Although the Nova Luz project occurred during recent mayoral administrations, it 
followed a series of other redevelopment attempts in the region, which successively increased the 
scope and scale of project efforts.  Similarly, the project’s structure and goals fit within the 
evolving role of the Brazilian state in shaping urban policies and form.  Likewise, the increased 
role of social movements following the collapse of the military dictatorship, along with 
economic and state restructuring that occurred during the same period, greatly influenced the use 
of public-private partnerships and the role of participatory planning in Nova Luz.  That is, to 
understand this project’s structure, scope, and failures, it must be situated within larger historical, 
economic, and political contexts. 
 Throughout much of the 20th century, a strong central state in the form of a military 
dictatorship shaped urban planning in Brazil.  Upon its collapse—which was benefited by an 
increasing role of social movements—urban planning found itself in a vacuum.  As restructuring 
of the government and governance, occurred, both neoliberal policies and social movements 
found institutional holding in new laws, programs, and regulations.  I argue that both the shift to 
privatized urban planning (through public-private partnerships and increased roles for the private 
sector) and participatory planning emerged from this same historical moment.  Today, urban 
planning in both São Paulo and Brazil is both participatory and has traces of neoliberal or 
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entrepreneurial approaches to urbanism.  These structures are both benefited and hindered by a 
restructuring of the technocratic role of planners—in which master plans hold a central role, but 
the top-down model is no longer that of modernism.   
 
Economic Functions, Spatial Form, and Centrality in São Paulo 
 Today the city of São Paulo has a population of almost 12 million inhabitants (and the 
region about 20 million), represents about 12% of the national GDP, and is the 10th richest city in 
the world.  However, the roles of changing centralities and economic functions in São Paulo is 
critical to understanding its current spatial form and national and international prominence (Pinto 
& Galvanese, 2009).  Rolnik (1997) has argued that São Paulo’s changing centers has been a 
direct result of the concentration of wealth, power, and public investments—all part of the larger 
process of catering to elite interests; that is, her highly politicized argument is that of a changing 
of elite centralities within the city at distinct periods.  Frugoli (2000) argues against this point, 
suggesting that each of the centralities within São Paulo has been and is subject to distinctive 
historic, power, real estate, and especially social dynamics and processes that make such analysis 
incomplete.  Although those dynamics may be at play, one must also consider the changing role 
of São Paulo in larger economic systems to understand how its centrality regionally and 
nationally has changed, along with the changes and emergence of new centers within the city 
itself.  This, in turn can further inform the processes behind the redevelopment attempts of the 
old downtown region. 
  
 
 
37 
 
Figure 5:  São Paulo and Metropolitan Region (depiction by Joshua Shake) 
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Today, the city of São Paulo is the largest city in South America and has the largest GDP 
in the entire Southern Hemisphere.  It was first settled in 1554 as a Jesuit community.  However, 
for much of its history it was nothing more than a sleepy and poor trading post on the frontiers of 
the Portuguese colonies.   Nearly 2000 years later, in 1711, it reached city status, with the 
discovery of gold in neighboring states and the creation of connecting trails between the city’s 
strategic location between the interior and the coast.  The 1800s saw the foundation of a law 
school in the city (1827), strengthening the still small city’s role nationally as an educational 
center.  Figure 5 shows the city of São Paulo, the São Paulo region, and the location of the Nova 
Luz project. 
Later in the century, as coffee moved from the productively-exhausted plantations in Rio 
to new areas in São Paulo (first to the east of the city and later to the north), the city’s centrality 
became ever-more important in its development.  In 1869 the railroad connecting the city down 
the escarpment to the port of Santos, less than 100 kilometers away, solidified this role.  Soon 
after, other railroads connecting São Paulo with the coffee producing regions and other smaller 
cities in the interior of the state were completed.  Thus, São Paulo became the commercial and 
cultural center for the state and region as a whole.  Finally, in 1888, Brazil became the last major 
country to abolish slavery, creating a significant labor deficit in the country, as slavery was the 
primary source of manpower on the vast coffee plantations.  To confront this, the federal 
government passed laws promoting European immigration primary from Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain.  São Paulo was the principal center for this immigration receiving hundreds of thousands 
of people disembarking in Santos and passing through the city and its Hospedaria dos 
Immigrantes (immigrant temporary housing and inspection station) before either staying in the 
city or heading off to the agricultural regions near the city. 
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Coffee was indeed the heart of the economy, accounting for 63% of the country's exports 
in 1891, and 51% between 1901 and 1910.  And this production, largely in the agricultural 
hinterlands near São Paulo, provided for the agglomeration of services, stores, and commercial 
activities in São Paulo.  Singer (2004a) notes that in this form the principal factor markets 
(capital and labor, both due to coffee) were formed for the industrial development of the city of 
São Paulo.  During this period, an ever-growing portion of social production was converted to 
money and capital for later investment.  During the coffee boom years, excess capital from 
coffee production profits began to be invested in new industrial activities within the city. 
Additionally, due to coffee a significant number of workers were attracted to São Paulo, ready to 
offer their labor to whomever offered better remuneration.  He points out that it was also directly 
due to coffee that the dense railroad network was developed with São Paulo at its heart, 
connecting it to a large region and potential markets (Singer, 2004a). 
Singer (2004a) further notes that as a result of these structural changes—replacement of 
subsistence agriculture with an external market, substitution of slave labor with free labor, and 
urbanization and centrality—an internal market supplied principally from imports was created.  
Thus, “the industrial centralization process in São Paulo did not result from formal actions, but 
rather the blind actions of market forces” (Singer, 2004a, 208).  These forces also went unnoticed 
and unchecked for a significant amount of time, resulting the “national Brazilian economic 
distortions” seen today—where São Paulo still accounts for about 12% of the national GDP 
today (Singer, 2004a, 208; IBGE).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
Table 3:  Economic Activities of São Paulo in 1976 and 2001 (data from IBGE and PNAD; 
design by Joshua Shake) 
Sector 1976 2001 
Industry 37.7% 18.9% 
Commercial 12.2% 16.5% 
Services 16.6% 23.8% 
Social 6.8% 11.3% 
Other Activities 16.7% 20.0% 
 
 
 
The consolidation of São Paulo as an industrial center occurred with the collapse of the 
coffee markets in the 1920s-1930s and continued through the 1960s-1970s.  Many of these 
industries found themselves concentrated along the railroad corridors crisscrossing the city.  
Over the past 40 years, however, São Paulo has become less an industrial center and a center for 
services.  The first of these centers developed even as coffee was losing ground as an economic 
activity.  For much of the 20th century, the most important center for services was the actual 
center or downtown of the city, which concentrated a large part of the wholesale commercial 
activities, including foodstuffs, household goods, and clothing, along with banking headquarters 
and other related public and private services.  In the 1970s, the substation of industrial activities 
for services became more noticeable, but was nonetheless facilitated by the previous 
concentrations of activates in São Paulo.  Biderman (2004) notes that it this longstanding trend of 
concentrations nationally that continued São Paulo’s central role in the new economy based on 
service sectors.  Singer (2004b) has noted this as well: “São Paulo, as the largest national 
metropolis, has a larger market for the new services derived from technological innovations or 
the emergence of new needs than other urban centers (230).  Specifically, this shift is noted in 
the 25-year period between 1976 and 2001.  In 1976, industry comprised 37.7% of economic 
activities in the city, commercial 12.2%, services 16.6%, social 6.8%, and other activities 16.7%.  
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While in 2001, industry had declined to 18.9%; commercial had grown to 16.5%; services had 
grown to 23.8%, social had grown to 11.3%, and other activities had grown to 20.0% (Singer, 
2004b, data from IBGE and PNAD).  It should be noted that the final four categories: 
commercial, services, social, and other, all typically comprise the denominated “services” sector.  
This information is summarized in Table 3. 
 The coffee production and related factors and industrial growth resulted in São Paulo’s 
centrality and agglomeration of activities at a macro scale and the concentration and 
concentration of these activities in the historic downtown at a micro scale.  Two factors 
influenced the shift from this historic center to two new centralities within the municipality along 
the latter half of the 20th century.  Nationally, the 1960s and 1970s brought about new legislation 
and restructuring of banking and financial services.  São Paulo was an early financial center, but 
this solidified São Paulo as the national center.  In 1964, São Paulo had less than one-third of 
national bank headquarters and most banks were regional with 328 in total (Luna, 2004).  By 
1980—following the legislative changes, concentration of banks, buyouts and end of regional 
banks— only 111 banks remained and São Paulo headquartered six of the ten largest banks 
(ibid). 
 It was precisely the resulting shift in real estate needs, coinciding with larger trends in 
urban planning and public investment directions in the city, which resulted in the emergence of 
the new centrality of Avenida Paulista in the 1970s.  Cordeiro (1993), however, argues that this 
process actually reflects the global shifts from Fordist regimes to flexible accumulation modes of 
production.  Whichever the forces at play, at the local level planning actions—beginning in the 
1930s with residential developments—were slowly moving São Paulo’s economic center to the 
southwest.  Inspired by the garden city movement in Europe, Companhia City (interestingly 
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enough one of the companies making up the Nova Luz project consortium) created the Jardins 
neighborhoods drawing elites away from the old center in the 1930s.  At the same time, major 
public works under the direction of influential mayor Prestes Maia in his Plano das Avenidas 
(Avenues Plan) opened up new means of circulation to the growing neighborhoods.  Rolnik 
(1997) attributes these shifts to the exhaustion of profitability within the first/inner ring of São 
Paulo urban development.  During the 1960s and 1970s, Avenida Paulista, which until then was 
the symbol of wealth during the coffee boom and lined with the mansions of coffee barons, 
began to take new form.  The old houses began to be demolished and replaced with bank 
headquarter towers, communications antenna, and large corporations thanks to new land use laws 
permitting office buildings averaging 30 stories, real estate speculation and valorization.   
 Frugoli (2000) and Rolnik (1997) point out that, continuing into the 1990s and the 1993-
1994 municipal budget under Mayor Paulo Maluf, 85% of funds were destined in this southwest 
axis, mostly in road construction in already valorized areas like the Ibirapuera tunnel, the 
extension of Avenida Faria Lima and connections with the new office complexes along the 
Pinheiros River.  That new complex, referred to as the Faria Lima/Berrini region, is the newest 
centrality to emerge in the city.  The first complex completed in the area was in 1977, just as the 
Paulista region was realizing its full potential as a new center.  Most of the redevelopment 
activities in this region, however, have occurred during the 1990s-2000s.  It is worth noting here, 
however, that research into the origins of investment capital in the region found that almost half 
of the business headquarters calling it home are international or multinational groups (Frugoli, 
2000).  Thus, this consolidation of this region as the new economic center of São Paulo coincides 
with larger economic shifts and the globalization of service sector activities (see Sette Whittaker 
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Ferreira, 2007 for a deeper debate about the role of global capital in the Berrini/Faria Lima 
region). 
 
Shifting State Powers:  Brazilian Urbanism since 1960 
Since the 1960s, Brazilian urbanism can be divided into three phases:  authoritarian, 
technocratic high modernism; post-military dictatorship planning and urban development with 
the emergence of the Urban Reform Agenda; and, the period following the Urban Reform 
Agenda. 
 
High Modernism 
Brazilian Modernism’s most visible example is the planned capital of Brasilia.  Holston 
(1989) has noted the problems of competing developmentalist and social reform goals of 
modernism and the extremely hierarchical Brazilian society in its construction.  Like Nova Luz, 
Brasilia attempted to create mixed-income/class residential buildings; however, in Brasilia this 
was unsuccessful in that it did not fit the norms for residential development nor Brazil’s highly 
socially segregated society (Xavier and Katinsky, 2012; Holston, 1989).  In contemporary São 
Paulo and Brazil, socio-spatial segregation continues to be a problem and the creation of similar 
residential buildings rarely occurs.  Ironically in Brasilia’s case, this failure also resulted in the 
growth of satellite cities around the new capital, making Brasilia take the spatial form of other 
Brazilian cities, with upper classes living in the central parts, surrounded by a large, poor 
periphery (Xavier and Katinsky, 2012).   
It was at this time that urban planning in Brazil became fully institutionalized with the 
creation of the Sistema Financeiro Habitacional (SFH-Housing Finance System) in 1964.  The 
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federal government created this program under the assumption that planning and managing the 
growth of cities could be achieved through “the construction of public housing units and 
financing the purchase of the personal home, especially by the lower classes” (Cuse Nobre, no 
date).  This was aided by the creation of the Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH- National 
Housing Bank)—which provided low income housing financing—and Serviço Federal de 
Habitação e Urbanismo (SERFHAU- Federal Housing and Urbanism Service)—which provided 
technical assistance to municipalities for creating urban and housing plans.  These institutions all 
provided for early forms of contracts and concessions for public housing and infrastructure 
development, as well as increased roles for private developers in those projects.  Nonetheless, 
they were limited in scale and scope when compared to the Nova Luz project. 
In practice, however, these programs primarily assisted the wealthier classes to purchase 
homes and actually deepened inequalities because of their use of social security-style 
contributions for financing.  Maricato (1982) has suggested that general trends in urbanization 
and inequality during the 60s and 70s were products of the transfer of the economic base from 
rural to urban.  Nonetheless, the urban was still conceptualized “rurally,” without proper land use 
controls, the monetization of land and land markets, and self-built housing and expansion in 
urban peripheries (favelas) (Maricato, 1982).  This also coincided with the emergence of real 
estate capital itself, which was (and is) highly instable and favors specific groups (Ribeiro, 
1993).   
Additionally, during this period, the federal government had institutionalized the 
governance of metropolitan regions (Souza, 2005).  However, following the military 
dictatorship’s collapse, those institutions became associated with authoritarianism and 
centralization, “leaving metropolitan governance in a political, institutional, financial and 
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administrative vacuum” (Souza, C., 2005, 341).  The decentralization process that occurred in 
the 1980s coincided with economic structural adjustment and the rebirth of civilian government.  
What emerged, however, was not new forms of governance but rather a crisis of urban 
governance through the fragmentation of interests following changes in forms of state 
intervention (Melo, 1995).  This was due to the demise of the federal housing bank (BNH) and 
an absence of federal policies.  The lack of federal policies, in turn, occurred because of the 
political bargaining between varied preferences of presidents, legislators and subnational 
politicians, where centralized political parties influence a national government’s ability to control 
resources and allocations (Willis et al, 1999).   
  
Urban Reform and the Entrenchment of Spatial Segregation 
After that initial instability, the “urban reform agenda” (found in the Estatuto da Cidade, 
City Statute passed in 2001) slowly restructured urban policy and governance.   Along with the 
end of the military dictatorship, Pereira (2008) notes that the Urban Reform Agenda’s calls for 
the “social function of land” have articulated the demise of highly technocratic forms of urban 
planning in Brazil.  Yet, even today, this claim varies greatly from project to project and city to 
city as technocratic planning remains the norm.  During that period, a number of city 
governments attempted to redevelop their urban cores or downtowns, including Rio de Janeiro, 
Salvador and São Paulo through international funding for historic preservation.  This rebuilding 
of old buildings under the sign of cultural heritage and creation of museums relied on the idea of 
“culture-led redevelopment” to reimagine historic centers (see, for example:  Dundar, 2010; 
Degen, 2003; Knox, 2009; Rodriguez and Martinez, 2003).  These efforts varied in success: 
those that seemed to be most successful had significant amounts of community cooperation and 
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were able to overcome characteristic partisan issues and the politics of changes in ruling party 
(Vargas and de Castilho, 2009).  Yet, these projects illustrate a major problem in Brazilian urban 
planning:  while the initial phase may have been successful, they often resulted in nothing more 
than a pilot project without the completion of later stages.  Often this occurs because of 
administrative changes whereby a newly elected mayor starts urban agendas anew and without 
the continuity of previous projects. 
Despite the reemergence of urban planning and incorporation of new forms of 
participation, this new model has not resulted in a complete shift in urban governance.  State 
powers for development are more restricted due to financial constraints and public participation 
is highly uneven.  Strategic planning and governance models imported from advanced capitalist 
societies and entrepreneurial city modes can disguise transnational interests, real estate power, 
and neoliberalism (Arantes et al, 200).  New approaches have replaced functionalist, modernist 
planning (technocratic, top-down planning whereby the purposes of the city drive planning), but 
have not overcome structures of consolidated leadership in the hands of a few influential 
individuals and widespread real estate speculation.  Nor have they created democratic 
participation beyond issue-based responses (Maricato, 2001).   Sette (2007) has also identified 
how the power of real estate interests and the desire to become a global city influenced new 
urban development forms in São Paulo.  Especially at that time, business groups, promotional 
materials, and conferences—along with high profile visits—promoted São Paulo’s economic and 
cultural significance.  However, he notes, there was a lack of international firms involved in 
construction, development, and the occupation of new buildings—which actually remained 
vacant for some time after completion. 
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Numerous social changes have occurred as a result of corresponding transformations in 
urban form and governance.  Caldeira (2000) observes that the growth of violence and need for 
security are creating new spatial forms of segregation in São Paulo.  Taking the appearance of 
gated communities, securitized private spaces, and a compromised public sphere, new closed off 
developments cause public spaces to be abandoned by those not “forced” to use them.  She also 
notes that this fear of violence and desire for security are the leading articulators of individuals’ 
engagement with their city (Caldeira, 2008).  Yet, at the same time, the reduced role of the state, 
becoming a “mediator of change rather than promoter” and “managing private interests instead 
of intervening directly” has enlarged the role for civil society (Caldeira, 2008, 52).  Likewise, 
corporations and real estate interests have been able to engage with this new urban governance 
and weaken the potential for urban improvement (Caldeira and Holston, 2008).  It is this 
juxtaposition of civil society (potential) power and strong role of private interests that occurred 
in Nova Luz, as a result of different urban planning instruments coming together and a retreating 
state planning apparatus.  
Additionally, longstanding structural issues of social class dating back to colonialism and 
continuing even to re-democratization in the 1980s have limited citizenship and land rights—
which have been connected during many historical periods (Holston, 2008).  Today, this gives 
rise to “a culture of fear and suspicion that produces abandonment, lawlessness, enclosure, 
fortification and privatization” along with the “delegitimization of the rule of law, institutions 
and practices of law and justice” (Caldeira and Holston, 1999, 693-695).  Yet, some traditionally 
excluded groups, like the urban poor, which have relied on self-built housing have been able to 
overcome this and find their own forms of citizenship by achieving land rights in informal 
settlements through protest and political empowerment (Holston, 2008).   Nonetheless, Marques 
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(2012) detects that social networks can mediate segregation, but they still influence one’s ability 
to escape social precariousness and obtain employment and do not overcome all of the 
continuing problems in Brazil’s cities.   
 
Beyond the Urban Reform Agenda 
Despite increased recognition of the right to ownership for informal urban squatters and 
direct participation of citizens in urban policy decision processes—the “Urban Reform Agenda” 
has become complicated by longstanding systems of political brokerage, where “clientelism and 
corporatism, and an elitist technocracy and ambiguity which are also present and vigorous” 
(Rolnik, 2011, 252).  Brazil may be at end of the “Urban Reform” cycle, with violence and 
inequality still major issues requiring attention (Maricato, 2011).  Although changes in national 
policy to focus on redistribution of income have created creating new possibilities, they do not 
address calls for the right to the city and democratiziation found in under this paradigm.  A 
continuation of exclusionary land regulations and costs and the neoliberal agenda exacerbate 
these problems (Maricato, 2011).  The new federal housing program, “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” 
(my house, my life) for lower socio-economic status families also faces issues of favoring real 
estate development interests and overlooking spatial considerations of equality (Sette, 2012).  In 
reality, houses are often constructed on the urban fringe and are still financially out of reach from 
many low-income families.   
  
Urban Planning in São Paulo 
 Many Brazilian cities had early sectorial plans for specific parts of urban development in 
the early 20th century, like São Paulo’s Plano de Avenidas de Prestes Maia (Avenues Plan).   
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At the municipal level, the creation of Planos Diretores de Desenvolvimento Integrado (PDDI-
Integrated Development Master Plans) and Leis de Uso e Ocupação do Solo (Use and 
Occupation of Land Laws, or zoning) only began to occur in the 1960s, however.  In São Paulo, 
zoning was first created in 1972 with the creation of the PDDI and Plano Urbanistico Basico 
(PUB-Basic Urban Plan).  These plans provided very basic controls for land uses and building 
heights.  In the 1980s, however, the implementation limitations of these plans became apparent, 
exacerbated by the national economic crisis (Cusce Nobre, no date).  Table 4 provides a 
summary of the Mayors of São Paulo since 1983. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Recent Mayors of São Paulo (design by Joshua Shake) 
Mayor Term Party 
Mário Covas May 11, 1983 Dec 31, 1985 
Partido do Movimento Democratico 
Brasileiro (PMDB) 
Jânio Quadros Jan 1, 1986 Dec 31, 1988 Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 
Luiza Erundina Jan 1, 1989 Dec 31, 1992 Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
Paulo Maluf Jan 1, 1993 Dec 31, 1996 Partido Democratico Social (PDS) 
Celso Pitta 
(briefly removed 
from office in 
2000) Jan 1, 1997 Dec 31, 2000 Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB) 
Marta Suplicy Jan 1, 2001 Dec 31, 2004 Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
José Serra Jan 1, 2005 Mar 31, 2006 
Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira 
(PSDB) 
Gilberto Kassab 
(succeeded Serra 
following 
resignation in 
2006; re-elected 
in 2008) Mar 31, 2006 Dec 31, 2012 
Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL); 
Democratas (DEM); Partido Social 
Democratico (PSD) 
Fernando Haddad Jan 1, 2013 present Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
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 As a result, the new Master Plan, drafted during the Mario Covas administration (1983-
1985) proposed the first use of public-private partnerships with the intent of minimizing public 
expenditures (Cusce Nobre, no date).  They took the form of a new planning instrument, the 
Operação Urbana (Urban Operation) which sought to stimulate the production of public housing, 
infrastructure, and public facilities in a number of central (Campo de Marte, Centro, Santo 
Amaro, Pinheiros, and Barra Funda) and periphery (São Miguel, São Matheus, Vila Matilde, 
Vila Maria, Vila Nova Cachoerinha, Paraisópolis and Campo Limpo) neighborhoods (Cuse 
Nobre, no date).   The next mayor, Janio Quadros (1986-1988) abandoned those plans, and 
shifted emphasis to a new instrument—the Operação Interligada (Interconnected Operation).  
These allowed the private sector to donate a certain number of public housing units to the city in 
exchange for increases in the permitted land use and building size.  Both of these instruments 
were included in the Master Plan created in 1988.  From 1988 to 1996, the Operações 
Interligadas resulted in 115 proposals, US$ 58,282,450 in exchanges, and 466,000 square meters 
in additional construction, with most of the proposals occurring in higher income areas 
(Wilderode, 1997).  In 1988, this mechanism was suspended and later declared unconstitutional 
for being in violation of the zoning law.   
 The following administration, Luiza Erundina (1989-1992), reversed the stance on 
Operações Urbanas, creating the Operação Urbana Vale do Anhagabaú (Anhagabau Valley 
Urban Operation) for part of the old downtown region in 1991.  Along with this, the city 
government explored the use of otogora onerosa do direito de construir (a fee paid in exchange 
for building above the maximum floor-to-area ratio for a specific lot).  The law provided for up 
to 150,000 square meters of additional construction through otogora onerosa, however after three 
years only seven proposals (using 13% of the potential) reached the city government (Cusce 
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Nobre, no date).  The Erundina administration introduced other new instruments in its Master 
Plan:  it set the maximum floor-to-area ratio for the entire city at one, with areas for densification 
and areas for non-densification.  In the densification areas, real estate developers could use the 
outorga onerosa to build above the floor-to-area ratio of one.  The funds received from this 
would be applied to a Fundo de Urbanização (Urbanization Fund) for the creation and 
rehabilitation of public housing in the newly-created Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social (ZEIS-
Social Interest Special Zoning). 
 Continuing the trend of reversing the previous administrations plans, the Paulo Maluf 
(1993-1996) administration shelved that of Eurndina.  This administration and the one to follow 
(Celso Pitta, 1997-2000) emphasized the Operação Urbana Faria Lima (Faria Lima Urban 
Operation), created in 1995.  This project, in a wealthier region of the city, focused on the 
construction of a number of highway and road construction projects in the area (Cusce Nobre, no 
date).  Instead of using one of the other development instruments, this administration created the 
Certificados de Potencial Adicional Construitivo (CEPACs-Potential Additional Construction 
Certificates).  The private sector did take great interest in this project, however through 2000 the 
city government had received R$116,000,000 in profits, compared to R$150,000,000 in project 
expenditures (Cusce Nobre, no date).  Cusce Nobre further notes that the city government did not 
consider the social impacts of this instrument like the displacement of existing residents and did 
not invest sufficiently in the creation of public housing in the area.  Operações Urbanas tend to 
be more successful in areas with a greater real estate market interest; the Operação Urbana 
Centro has resulted in very few proposals while the Faria Lima resulted in 102 in just the first 
five years (Cusce Nobre, no date). 
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 In 2001, the Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute) was passed, creating a unified set of federal 
urban planning enabling legislation.  Many of the above-mentioned urban planning instruments 
became incorporated and legitimized by it (Cusce Nobre, no date).  The Master Plan developed 
in 2002, under the administration of Marta Suplicy (2001-2004) incorporated the Urban 
Operations and ZEIS management councils, along with minimum, basic, and maximum floor-to-
area ratios, and definitions of outorga onerosa calculations.  Additionally, this plan stipulates that 
the municipal government should use its powers of land parceling, compulsory construction, 
time progressive taxes for non-use of buildings or property, and eminent domain to ensure the 
social function of property (Cusce Nobre, no date).  Finally, this plan introduces the Concessão 
Urbanistica (Urban Concession) which would be utilized in the following administration.   
 
Collapse of Dictatorship and Rise of Democratic Governance 
 The present phase of Brazilian social movements finds its roots even in the most 
oppressive days of the military dictatorship in the early 1970s.  During that time, workers and 
residents and their civil society groups were regrouping for the next phase of opening up new 
spaces, “rejecting traditional practices of clientlism and submission to the state” (Kowarick and 
Bonduki, 1994, 140).  During the years of resistance, in the period up to 1979, both the state and 
factory leaders prevented any activities within the factories and effectively paralyzed the unions.  
It was under this repression that the periphery “as the principle location of workers’ dwellings” 
became the locus for social action (Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994, 141).  Movements began to 
form in demand for better living conditions amidst the lack of basic services.  However, that 
political groups, parties, and social scientists often undervalued such movements, in that they 
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were only accessories to the workplace movements and “acquired their existence only insofar as 
they served to stimulate the workers’ movement” (Kowarick, 1994, 33).   
Rather, these movements had very specific demands for water and sewerage, public 
transportation, and public daycares, along with more general grievances with the economic 
inequalities and perceived absence of their needs in state policy (Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994).  
This process, and both the large and small mobilizations around São Paulo, also brought these 
movements into the political opposition against the military regime.  In doing so, these 
movements created new forms of participation based in “collective action and participation, 
grass-roots democracy, and autonomy,” along with laying the groundwork for the 1980s 
movements (Telles, 1994, 177; Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994; Holston, 2008). 
In 1980s, a number of external factors helped to strengthen the role of social movements 
in constructing the new democracy.  The military government was slowly starting the process of 
abertura (opening), which restored civil rights, lifted censorship, allowed for the regrouping of 
political parties, as well as provide for amnesty for political prisoners, exiles, and banned 
politicians and free elections for state governors (Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994).  Social 
movements changed their mode of operation after successfully obtaining their early demands in 
the 1970s and 1980s and external pressure on the state was the main mechanism for producing 
policy, whereby “politics produce policy” (Marques, 2003, 121) Within the groups, mediation 
processes transformed individual problems into collective needs. These processes were placed 
into the wider context of political change of the period, whereby the movements did not just 
cause change in the actions of the state, but also in the political arena (Marques, 2003, 121).  In 
this model he suggests, “politics produce policy, but influence the creation of a new politics.” 
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In São Paulo, this culminated in the Erundina administration from 1989-1992: “during no 
other moment of the city’s history were social movements so able to suggest and implement 
policy.  Despite deep conflicts between social movements and the decision-making apparatus of 
municipal administration, there seemed to be an unprecedented attempt to recognize the 
differences of dealing with the everyday problems of city life (Kowarick and Bonduki, 1994, 
146). 
 Nationally, the expansion of participatory processes was cemented with the 
institutionalization of mechanisms and instruments of democratic governance and the public 
policy councils of the 1988 constitution.  Social movements were instrumental in shaping these 
bodies and policies.  For cities, the Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute) passed in 2001 regulated 
new forms of public participation across a number of specific bodies.  One of the most 
significant is with the Plano Diretor (Master Plan).  Attempting to separate it from the political 
cycles discussed in the previous section, following the City Statute, this document must include 
public and community association participation in the formulation, execution, and 
accompaniment of plans, programs, and urban development projects (Caldeira and Holston, 
2014).  The Master Plans must also provide specific mechanisms for public participation in the 
employment of the various urban development instruments.  In São Paulo, the Master Plan of 
2002 made obligatory public audiences for public or private developments and projects being 
implemented that may cause negative environmental, neighbor, or other impacts.  These 
documents also promote and make mandatory the use of other participatory bodies.  However, 
Avritzer (2009) noted that despite the introduction of participatory institutions in the vein of the 
City Statute during the Suplicy administration, these were limited by well-organized 
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conservative and centrist opposition groups in São Paulo, which often nullified proposals or 
forced negotiations in certain sectors (Arvitzer, 2009, 78, 150).  
 On the other hand, Telles (1994) points out that, despite early optimism, the processes 
which began in the 1970s also resulted in the “fossilization” of certain characteristics in recent 
movements, whereby certain elements have become “empty rhetoric and a ritualized set of 
procedures that have little to do with meaningful political action” (Telles, 1994, 174-177).  
However, issues of “narrow horizons of practices that consisted of routine pressure on 
government to meet specific demands, fragmentation of interests and the prevalence of a 
corporatist idea of rights, isolation inside a type of communitarianism which provides no 
immunity to the populist manipulations of the state and clientlism, and affirmation of the 
importance of grass-roots control to the exclusion of all forms of political representation and any 
instrumental approach to institutions” (Telles, 174-175).  Nonetheless, if this is indeed true, there 
is also a need to move away from the isolated, frozen understandings of periods of the 
movements and instead understand them as historical processes.  Marques (2003) further notes 
that, despite the increasing complexity of understanding the relationships between social 
movements and the state, politics and the state remain overlooked.  Politics should be 
“understood as a field where real struggles, strategies and conflicts unfold” and the state “treated 
in its complexity of heterogeneous sets of institutions embedded in histories, structures, 
identities, and self-interests” (Marques, 2003, 122).  Therefore, he suggests that there is a “need 
to integrate, in analytically coherent ways, the structure with the action, based on the features 
that constitute the State and Brazilian society” and that this is best understood at the urban level 
(Marques, 2003, 122).   
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Neoliberalism takes Hold:  Economic and State Restructuring 
During the waning years of the dictatorship in the 1980s, Brazil faced severe economic 
problems.  The decade was thus termed the “lost decade” with three unsuccessful attempts at 
combating inflation: The Plano Cruzado in 1986, the Plano Bresser in 1987, and the Plano Collor 
in 1990.  Following the dictatorship, Brazil also confronted severe economic problems.  An 
economic and state restructuring marked the decade of the 1990s in Brazil.  Amann and Baer 
(2002) note that this increasingly conformed to the Washington Consensus.  When President 
Fernando Collor de Mello took power, he rapidly reduced import tariffs by approximately 50% 
between 1990 and 1994 (ibid).  In his first year in power alone, most non-tariff barriers were 
abolished, subjecting firms to competition and increasing the import of goods to GDP ratio from 
4.4% to 8.9% by 1999 (ibid).  It was during his administration that the process of privatization 
began.  The Brazilian Privatization Program (PND) was introduced in Law No. 8.031 in 1990.  
This began with the privatization through sale of all productive state companies in the strategic 
sectors of steel, fertilizers, and petrochemicals (BNDES, no date).  Between 1990 and 1994, the 
government privatized 33 companies, of which 18 were state-controlled and in 15 the state was 
the minority shareholder (ibid).  The government obtained US$8.6 billion through these sales 
and transferred another US$3.3 billion in debt to the private sector.  
 Upon taking office in 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso expanded the 
privatization programs to public services, like utilities and finances.  His administration also 
engaged in concessions in transportation, highway, sanitation, ports and telecommunications 
infrastructures, with the secondary goal of “improving the quality of the services offered to the 
Brazilian society, through investments to be made by the new controllers of the privatized 
companies” (BNDES, no date).  With these restructurings, the state no longer was the direct 
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provider of services but took on new roles in coordinating and regulating the sectors at the 
federal level.  Additionally, this process resulted in the progressive decentralization of 
infrastructure and service provision from the federal level to states and municipalities.    
 One of the most important programs introduced by Cardoso was the Plano Real (Real 
Plan) in 1994.  This currency restructuring involved tight money policy and temporary exchange 
rate pegging but was able to control the extremely high inflation that had plagued the country (in 
1994 it was 2,406%, but has not exceeded single digits since 1997).  In the process, the fiscal 
deficit and long-term price stability became problems and were addressed through cutting 
government expenditures, tax restructuring, and reworking the social security system (Amann 
and Baer, 2002).   Other internal restructurings (rationalization and outsourcing) sought to 
redirect the public administration’s attention to areas in which it had clear competencies and 
further reduce public expenditures. 
Also under Cardoso, investment liberalization programs also continued: a constitutional 
amendment removed all legal distinctions between domestic and foreign firms and foreign 
capital was permitted to enter previously excluded sectors, such as oil exploration and public 
utilities. Amann and Baer (2002) note a number of economic results of this process.  The budget 
reached a surplus in 1999 and the economy became more internationally integrated; however, 
these outcomes came at the expense of substantial dismissals of workers during the privatization 
process and investments in technology as economic sectors faced new international competition.   
Additionally, during this period a number of governance and state reforms occurred.  For 
Bresser Pereira (1997), the Minister of the Ministerio da Administração Federal e Reforma do 
Estado (MARE-Federal Administration and State Reform Ministry) during Cardoso’s first 
administration, these processes of state reform had four outcomes:  reducing the size of the state, 
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deregulation and increased use of market control functions, increased government capacity to 
implement decisions, and increased power of political institutions (Bresser Pereira, 1997). 
 At the same time that decentralization and economic restructuring programs were 
occurring at the national level, a number of policies were passed that impacted municipalities, as 
well.  With the new Constitution of 1988 and the passing of the Law of Fiscal Responsibility in 
2000, public service administrative responsibility became decentralized to the local level.  The 
Ministerio das Cidades (Cities Ministry) notes that “especially within the field of urban policies, 
the involvement of towns, particularly large cities, increased both in relation to the financial 
aspects and the management of these [decentralization] policies. However, the real situation of 
Brazilian towns shows that most of them... do not have the necessary resources and management 
capability to address these issues” (Ministerio das Cidades, 2004, 58-59).  Carolini (2008) notes 
that in this new structuring, neither state nor federal investments significantly reach the city of 
São Paulo because poverty-reducing programs prioritize small municipalities and those with 
lower HDIs (from Fix et al, 2003).  Additionally, the city’s struggle to identify as an engine of 
growth on a global scale often translates into the prioritization of creating a positive image of the 
city’s fiscal health in order to service elite and private sector demands to attract foreign direct 
investment (Schiffer, 2002).  Between the years 1999 and 2002, São Paulo’s municipal spending 
on housing and urbanism projects fell by almost 20%, while spending on improving the city’s 
fiscal health by paying down public debt saw an increase of almost 120% (Pochmann, 2005).   
 These effects occurred as a result of the 1999 Brazilian currency crisis and resultant 
Fiscal Stabilization Program, combined with the introduction of the Law of Fiscal Responsibility 
(Carolini, 2013).  In 1999, Brazil experienced a currency devaluation and renegotiated debts with 
the IMF.  In doing so, the Federal government legally instituted a consolidated primary budget 
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surplus target which was first set to 3.1% of GDP (Carolini 2008).  A second part of these 
policies was the Fiscal Stabilization Program which was directed at subnational governments.  
This program restructured state and municipal debt at fixed interest rates so that the federal 
government could exchange that debt and issue its own market rates, subsidizing local 
governments (ibid).   This resulted in a complete restructuring of municipal spending and 
shifting away from large-scale capital projects to an increased reliance on private sector 
cooperation to complete development programs.  Local and state governments which decided to 
participate in the program were then required to offer their own revenue and rights to 
intergovernmental transfers as debt guarantees, signing agreements with the federal government 
forbidding any new indebtedness until their current debts were paid off, providing for the 
mandatory annual reduction of extant debt until the end of 2016 (Carolini, 2008; Afonso 2004; 
Afonso and Arauju 2004; de Mello 2005). 
 As a result, in 2000, the federal government drafted the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, 
Complementary Law No. 101.  This law created a hybrid set of fiscal reforms, “including 
procedural rules which are typical in high income countries and emphasize accountability, and 
stringent numerical rules which are spending related targets more common in lower and middle 
income countries” (Carolini, 2013, 356-357; Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007).  Additionally, the 
law established a strict framework for transparency and accountability in the planning, execution, 
and reporting of government budgets.2   
                                                            
2 Specifically, for municipalities this law requires:   
First, the law sets a debt ceiling for governments – for municipalities in particular at 120 percent of their net current 
revenue. Secondly, personnel spending - including pension payments and sub-contracts - cannot exceed 60% of 
municipal net current revenue. Another measure requires that any spending mandate have a correspondence in 
permanent revenues, so as to avoid the rolling over of expenditures to future administrations. The LFR also bans 
new spending commitments that cannot be executed before the incumbent administration's term ends and mandates 
the recording of any unspent commitments in the two quarters before an administration's term is ended - unless 
sufficient cash balances are available to cover the commitments at the end of the fiscal year (Lei Complementar n. 
101 2000). The law further requires that government attain a consolidated primary budget surplus, which is 
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In São Paulo, the law restructured the city’s subnational debt, restricted debt financing to 
noncapital projects, and created a debt ceiling of 120% of net current revenue (Carolini, 2013).   
However, the impact of these programs was exacerbated by a number of financial scandals 
involving São Paulo’s mayors during the 1990s.  Under Mayors Maluf and Pitta, the city debt 
ballooned to over R$ 7 billion, or US $4 billion, with about R$ in debt at the beginning of Mayor 
Supicy’s term.  This sum equaled about two times the municipal budget, and about half of the 
debt came from bonds needed to service debts resulting from lawsuits.  Both mayors were 
indicted on charges resulting from an illegal bond issues scheme, on charges of providing false 
documentation and the misuse of funds.  Only a fraction of the money went to the stated 
purposes, while the rest (mostly in 1994 and 1995) went to public works projects during the 
Maluf administration and were said to fund the major highway and tunnel expansion projects.  
The city government was able to renegotiate some of the debts under the above programs, but 
resulted in the highly restricted system of today.  During the following (Suplicy) administration 
from 2001-2004, Carolini (2013) noted that São Paulo’s housing and urban development 
spending remained somewhat stable, but was shifting away from municipal-agency-led capital 
investments during the time of increased public participation at the local level and decentralized 
responsibility and transparency from the federal level.  In Figure 6, a timeline is presented, 
summarizing the principal events at the national, state, and local levels, as well as the precedent 
redevelopment projects discussed in the next section. 
                                                            
determined each year and has recently centered more or less around 4.25% of GDP. Finally, in its effort to 
institutionalize transparency in government, the LFR calls for the preparation of the following interlinked budget 
framework documents at every level of government: a) Piano Pluri-Anual (PPA)/Multi-year Plan: a four-year budget 
plan to allocate projected budgetary resources over the following years for different programs and activities. b) Lei 
de Diretrizes Orcamentarias (LDO)/Annual Budget Guidelines Law: a three-year budget guideline law that sets 
targets for the main budget aggregates (e.g., expenditure, revenue) listed in a Fiscal Targets Annex; c) Lei 
Orcamentaria Anual (LOA)/Annual Budget Law: an annual budget law that allocates budget resources to the 
programs and activities outlined in the PPA and consistent with the fiscal targets set by the LDO.  (Carolini, 2008, 
99-100) 
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Figure 6:  Timeline of Selected Events in São Paulo and Brazil (design by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
62 
Precedent Redevelopment Projects 
 Leite (2009) notes that São Paulo until recently ignored large-scale redevelopment 
projects in its downtown areas, unlike other cities around the world.  He argues that in doing so, 
“urban improvements can now address contemporary reality more coherently and avoid the 
errors of earlier efforts elsewhere,” along with the growing realization that “the impossibility of 
completing a comprehensive urban redesign in a metropolis of such a scale as São Paulo now 
seems clear: its territory is immeasurable” (Leite, 2009, 248-249).  Now, the greatest opportunity 
is “to use urban design to stitch together new territorial logics and to link disconnected public 
spaces and facilities…making urban connections possible and linking fragmented metropolitan 
territories by redeveloping empty spaces that articulate the territory and by carrying out urban 
restoration” (Leite, 2009, 248-249).  This method, of using urban design and connecting existing 
urban features, was the dominant mode of urban redevelopment in downtown until the Nova Luz 
project proposal.  And although it did result in punctual improvements, the desired connections 
between the disparate elements has not occurred. 
 Between 1975 and 1979 municipal plans for the old downtown emphasized historic 
preservation and the circulation of vehicles, but did result in the government purchase of the first 
skyscraper in Latin America—Edificio Martinelli—which would become the home of many 
municipal secretariats in the following decades.  Also during this time, the city created a system 
of sidewalks through the conversion of 11 kilometers of streets to pedestrian-only or limited 
access walkways, summing about one third of the street system in the region.  During the 1970s, 
there were a number of projects proposed for the central region, in attempts at reversing the 
urban expansion that was exploding during the decade; however, only two major projects were 
implemented (Cusce Nobre, 2009).  Along with the rehabilitation of the Municipal Theatre, 
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numerous architecture and urban design competitions were held and one was actually completed.  
The Vale do Anhangabau project built a pedestrian space/park cap over the Avenida Prestes 
Maia (the principal north-south artery in downtown).  This project won awards in 1981 and 1988 
and attempted to unite the two parts of downtown through the 15-acre space dedicated to 
pedestrian uses, public events, and leisure; however, the project was criticized for not 
incorporating historic and geographic dimensions of the space (Leite, 2009).  Following this, 
there were a few other punctual projects, like the Projeto Corredor Sé—Arouche, which 
attempted to connect cultural facilities, activities, and references in parts of the center.  In the 
1990s, the state government also engaged in a few punctual projects along the lines of cultural 
facility creation, including the Sala São Paulo (the home of the orchestra) in the old Estação Julio 
Prestes; remodeling of the Pinacoteca do Estado (state art museum); and the creation of the 
Museu da Lingua Portuguesa (Portuguese Language Museum) in an unused portion of the Luz 
train station, all of these failed attempts at using cultural anchors to incentivize private sector 
investment and development through the culture-led model.  
 
Neoliberal Redevelopment:  Operação Urbana Centro and Procentro 
 During the Erundina administration (1989-1992), the Vale do Anhangabau project was 
completed.  Additionally, it was her administration that first used an Operação Urbana in the 
downtown region.  This instrument had been created in the 1988 Master Plan, but never put into 
practice in the city.  The Operação Urbana Anhangabau attempted to improve the urban and 
environmental landscapes in the downtown area through better use of underutilized and empty 
buildings and incentives for preserving historical and residential buildings in the area.   
Operações Urbanas provide exemptions to zoning and building restrictions through the payment 
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of fees (outorga onerosa), along with promoting the preservation of historic buildings through the 
transfer of development rights and other provisions for public space provision.  In this project 
area, 150,000 square meters of potential construction were available through the outorga onerosa 
program, but when the project expired in 1994, only seven proposals were presented, accounting 
for just 13% of that potential (Cusce Nobre, 2009).  These incentives were not enough to 
stimulate the desired private sector interest in redeveloping the area.   
 In the early 1990s, the Associação Viva o Centro (Center Lives Association) was formed 
with the support of BankBoston and other financial sector businesses headquartered in the 
downtown region (although BankBoston later moved to the Berrini region discussed in other 
places of this dissertation).  This group held workshops, events, and contracted studies and 
projects with Regina Meyer to generate debate about redeveloping the region.  They decided to 
emphasize local actions, punctual projects focused on the specific features and dynamics of each 
part of the center.  In this sense, the emergence of the real estate and business elite group calling 
for redevelopment efforts mimics similar “neoliberal” or “entrepreneurial” efforts pursued by the 
same “growth machine” interests in North America during the 1990s (Hackworth, 2008; Harvey, 
1989). 
 During the Maluf (1993-1996) and Pitta (1997-2000) administrations, the urban 
development attentions shifted from the central region.  They emphasized development through 
the Operação Urbana Faria Lima in the southwest region of the city.  Along with this, road 
improvement and construction projects and the removal of favelas contributed to the valorization 
of developments and continued interest of the private sector in the region.  The efforts of 
Associação Viva o Centro did lead to two government actions in the 1990s for the downtown, 
however.  The Programa de Requalificação Urbana e Funcional da Area Central (PROCENTRO-
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Urban and Functional Requalification Program for the Central Region) was created in 1993 and 
in some ways unified the six urban plans that had been proposed for the region over a 30-year 
period.  This program was justified through its identification of: functional, environmental and 
landscape deterioration; difficulty of access, circulation, and parking; obsolescence and 
insufficiencies of the building stock; and public and personal safety deficiencies in the center.  
To combat this, it proposed (1) the recuperation of public spaces in the central area, with the 
recuperation of street and plaza pavements, increases in the tree coverage, street furniture, 
illumination, and visual communication, along with trash collection and street cleaning. (2) 
Improvements to vehicular, pedestrian, cargo, and public transportation accessibility in the 
central region through the flexibility of pedestrian-only streets, improvements to bus terminals, 
and the creation of underground parking structures. (3) Incentivizing the installation of 
residential cultural, recreational, and tourist activities in the region, the recuperation of the 
physical environment through the recuperation of façades and transferring development rights 
from historic buildings.  The decree that created the Comissão Procentro (Procentro 
Commission) for the implementation of the program, defined its membership.  However, the 
only civil society members were the Associação Viva o Centro business leaders. 
 The main outcome from this program’s activities came in 1997 with the creation of the 
Operação Urbana Centro and the Lei das Fachadas (Façades Law).  Among other fiscal 
incentives and flexible zoning, the Operação Urbana changed the Coeficiente de Aproveitamento 
(building floor-to-area ratio) from a maximum of 4.0 in the rest of the city to 6.0 for residential, 
hotel, mixed, and garage uses and 12.0 for greater mixed-use developments.  The Lei das 
Fachadas provided 10-year exemptions in municipal property taxes (IPTU) for historic 
preservation buildings that repaired their façades.   
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 Despite these incentives, the new legislation programs were not enough to attract new 
private sector development interest and revitalize the area.  According to planning documents, 
during seven years of the Operação Urbana (1992 to 2003) only 101 proposals were received.  
Of these, 34 were for bringing buildings into zoning compliance, 34 for transferring development 
rights/potential, and 33 for purchasing additional development rights.  Yet, only 18 of these latter 
requests were approved (see also Cusce Nobre, 2009).  There were 56 proposals received under 
the Lei das Fachadas, but only nine of these were approved (ibid).  In comparison, between 1995 
and 2000, Operação Urbana Faria Lima received 140 proposals with 85 approved, resulting in 
R$ 170 million in revenues for the city (ibid).   
 Finally, according to interviews with city and community group leaders, it was not until 
2000 that an alternative civil society movement for conceptualizing the downtown region was 
formed.3  At the Movimentos Populares e Universidade (Popular Movements and the University) 
event at the University of São Paulo (USP) students, the Central dos Movimentos Populares 
(CMP-Popular Movements Central), and the União dos Movimentos de Moradia (UMM) formed 
the Forum Centro Vivo (Center Lives Forum).  This group attempted to provide an alternative to 
the business-led Associação Viva o Centro, fighting for urban reforms and the social function of 
property, along with questioning the state of abandonment in the downtown and the legitimacy 
of the public sector’s actions.  Until this point, the redevelopment planning of the region lacked 
widespread public participation and was dominated by real estate and cooperate interests.4  
Figure 7 shows the Nova Luz region and some of the features employed by previous 
redevelopment attempts, including Parque da Luz and Estação da Luz. 
 
                                                            
3 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
4 Interview with Luiz Kohara (11/2013) Director, Centro Gaspar Garcia de Direitos Humanos 
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Figure 7:  View of Estação da Luz and Parque da Luz Region (image by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Re-emergence of Culture-led Redevelopment:  Monumenta and Ação Centro 
 During the following administration (Suplicy, 2001-2004) the center received renewed 
attention through new policy approaches and a wider and more diverse vison of the region.  In 
2001 the city government, along with the Procentro movement and the Administração Regional 
da Sé (Se Regional Administration released a new plan: Plano Reconstruir o Centro (Rebuild the 
Center Plan) that proposed revitalizing more districts that made up the center (including Bela 
Vista, Bom Retiro, Bras, Cambuci, Consolação, Liberdade, Pari, Republica, Santa Cecilia, and 
Sé).  This plan emphasized the central region’s accessibility, abandonment, and underutilization, 
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along with functional and social diversity through activities including housing, employment, 
culture, recreation, education, and representation according to planning documents and 
interviews with project consultants.5  It proposed eight basic programs:  walk in the center; live 
in the center; work in the center; discover the center; preserve the center; invest in the center; 
protect the center; and govern the center.  These programs emphasized using urban design to 
reorganize public spaces while restoring the architectural heritage (Leite, 2009).  In the same 
year, Decreto (Decree) 40.753 expanded Procentro’s representation to include representatives 
from 12 municipal secretariats; four state companies; four legal, architect, and engineer 
associations; for representatives from business, real estate and commercial interests; four 
representatives from socially excluded groups like tenement residents and the homeless; the 
Associação Viva o Centro; Conselho de Defesa do Patrimonio Historico, Arqueologico, Artistico 
e Turistico (Historic and Cultural Preservation Board-Condephaat); and the Caixa Economica 
Federal (housing finance bank).  This new structure also became headquartered in a special 
department in the Secretaria de Habitação (Housing Secretariat). 
  
Monumenta Program 
In 2002, the city of São Paulo was finally able to enter into the Monumenta program, a 
redevelopment partnership between local and federal governments seeking to follow a culture-
led redevelopment model (see, for example:  Dundar, 2010; Degen, 2003; Knox, 2009; 
Rodriguez and Martinez, 2003).  Since 1996 it had been trying to do so, but struggled coming to 
agreement about the amount of the local government’s financial participation.  This program was 
managed by the Ministry of Culture with financial support from the Inter-American 
                                                            
5 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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Development Bank (IDB) and technical assistance from UNESCO.  The first national program of 
its kind, it sought to rehabilitate historic areas in Brazilian cities (over 26 cities participated) 
(Leite, 2009).  In São Paulo, this program (along with the Plano Reconstruir o Centro) 
emphasized the region around the Luz train station, attempting to restore buildings, improve 
pedestrian infrastructure, and reduce visual pollution with a loan of US$150 million.  To 
incentivize private sector participation in the restoration of buildings, the project proposed 
project financing for restoring artistic, historic, and scenic buildings, along with façade reforms 
with interest-free loans and other programs through the Lei de Incentivos Seletivos (Selective 
Incentives Law).   
 Yet, program coordinators quickly realized that the projects proposed surpassed the 
amount of funding available and other administrative difficulties, and bureaucratic issues, 
reduced the project’s potential, according to planning documents and interviews6 (see also Leite, 
2009; Kara Jose, 2007).  Kara Jose (2007) observed that the program did not have the 
instruments necessary for completing an urban plan of its scale and was thus limited to punctual 
interventions on historic buildings along with the sidewalks, illumination, and signage adjacent 
to them.  Additionally, there were many inter-sectorial coordination difficulties, since the 
projects involved multiple municipal secretariats and other government bodies; however, some 
collaboration with the state government was achieved since it is a large property holder in the 
region (Kara Jose, 2007; Leite, 2009).  After four years, only one project had been completed 
(the Chaminé); only R$30,000 of the R$19.5 million of the total project budget had been spent 
by 2004.  By 2005, only one property owner had sought the zero interest loan program for self-
improvement of properties (Kara Jose, 2007).   
                                                            
6 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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 Kara Jose (2007) also observed that the program did not have a clear public participation 
program, despite calling for increasing the public’s recognition of historic heritage; there were no 
major benefits to the local population or public accountability.  Additionally, the public 
programs, like promotion of economic activities, educational programs, and training of local tour 
guides, were not realized.  Only two participatory workshops were held, and only a few civil 
society representatives attended (Kara Jose, 2007). 
 
Ação Centro 
 In 2003, the city government activities in the downtown region shifted to the jurisdiction 
of the Empresa Municipal de Urbanização (EMURB-Municipal Urbanization Company, city 
company responsible for large city projects).7  Now extinct, this company launched the 
PROCENTRO-Ação Centro (Center Action) Program, which originated with the old 
PROCENTRO programs but was substantially changed in order to receive the IDB funding.  
This project sought to reverse the real estate devaluing and recuperate housing functions; 
transform social and economic profiles; recuperate the urban environment; improve 
transportation and circulation; and, strengthen the municipal institutions.  To accomplish these 
goals, the Operação Urbana Centro was reworked and a ZEIS 3 (public housing zoning) was 
implanted in the region through the 2002 Master Plan.  Additionally, the Programa Morar no 
Centro (Live in the Center Program) attempted to incentivize social housing in the area.   The 
new Master Plan also considered buildings at least 80% unoccupied for at least five years 
available for interventions.   
                                                            
7 This company was created in 1971, during the height of state power, as a municipal public company, which 
planned and constructed redevelopment efforts in the city.  In 2009, it ceased to exist and its functions were spread 
throughout other city departments. 
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 To accomplish the other goals, the program also attempted business development 
programs, registering informal commercial activities, and social outreach programs.  In 
improving transportation, the program proposed restructuring the pedestrian-only sidewalks, 
removing bus terminals from the center, construction of underground parking, and a citywide 
system of bus lanes.  It was also this program that resulted in the creation of the subprefecture 
system in the city and the re-ordering of municipal secretariats which would majority-housed in 
the downtown region. 
 The first project completed under this program was the Corredor Cultural in 2004 (began 
in 2002 as part of the Plano Reconstruir o Centro) according to city planners.8  It focused on the 
reform of and areas around Praça da Patriarca and Dom Jose Gaspar and illumination in Praça da 
Sé.  It also organized the restoration of the Biblioteca Municipal, Teatro Municipal, Praça da 
Patriarca, MASP-Centro, Centro Cultural Banco do Brasil, Shopping Light, along with 
attempting to better connect them through the improvements in plazas and pedestrian only 
streets.  Funding for this project came from public advertising in plazas and clocks and resources 
obtained through the Operação Urbana Centro (Pinto and Galvanese, 2009).   Other projects 
completed during that phase include: reforms of the Mercado Municipal and Galeria Olindo; two 
housing projects (Baronesa de Porto Carrero and Riskalah Jorge) and the relocation of a favela 
(Favela do Gato) to another; Projeto Oficina Boracelia for waste pickers; prohibition of the sale 
of illegal products on the streets; street improvements in the 25 de Março commercial area; and 
the removal of the Praça do Patriarca bus terminal and Avenida Nove de Julho and Consolação 
bus lanes (Cusce Nobre, 2009). 
                                                            
8 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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 The Lei de Incentivos Seletivos of 2004, which sought to attract new businesses to the 
old downtown through additional financial incentives also provided for the transference of a 
large private university to the old BankBoston headquarters according to interviews with city 
planners.9  With the transference of many municipal secretariats to the downtown, 8,500 new 
individuals now worked there; including the transfer of state departments, this total reached 
11,500 (Cusce Nobre, 2009).  Finally, these actions also created a new civil society participatory 
forum:  the Forum de Desenvolvimento Social e Economico do Centro (Social and Economic 
Development Forum of the Center) and the Agencia de Desenvolivemento do Centro (Center 
Development Agency).  Through them, civil society was to serve a greater role in the programs; 
the first was a decisive body and the second an executive body, both with diverse representation 
from active groups in the center.   
 Cusce Nobre (2009) noted, however, that this program received criticisms in that some of 
its proposals were not congruent with others, and that many could result in valorization and 
gentrification.  Additionally, the removal of the bus terminals was considered by some as an 
“elite-izing” action (ibid).  Similarly, Pinto and Galvanse (2009) observed that not all parts of the 
proposals were completed and in some cases not to the original plans; this project did create 
some articulations between the disparate previous ones, but this problem was still one to be 
overcome.  For reference, the perimeters of Nova Luz and other redevelopment project attempts 
in the region are shown in Figure 8.   
  
                                                            
9 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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Figure 8:  Site Map of Selected Redevelopment Project Areas in Centro Region (depiction 
by Joshua Shake) 
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The Failures of Culture-led Redevelopment:  Luz Cultural 
 While the above actions were occurring under the purview of the municipal government, 
the state government attempted a number of activities for the area near the Luz train station.  In 
1983, the State Culture Secretariat developed a project for the Luz station region that was 
released in 1984.  Luz Cultural attempted, through promotion of the cultural facilities in the 
neighborhood, increase tourism and thus initiate revitalization efforts in the neighborhood.  
Following the ideas of culture-led development, the Secretary argued that this method would be 
more successful than infrastructure projects, generating a natural process of redevelopment (Kara 
Jose, 2007).  This effort concentrated on public relations and advertising campaigns, the creation 
of tourist routes connecting all of the cultural attractions in the neighborhood, the organization of 
zoning in collaboration with the city government, and a few revitalization projects for historic 
buildings.  There were no major projects planned; rather, the innovative feature of this project 
was its inductive nature and not financial nature, according to the Secretary (Kara Jose, 2007).  It 
was at this time that the Liceu de Artes e Oficio was converted to the Pinacoteca do Estado (state 
art museum) and the Museu de Arte Sacra (Sacred Art Museum) was reformed.  Additionally, in 
1986 a guide was released highlighting 63 points of interest in the neighborhood, including all of 
the places to visit and architecturally significant buildings, with the intention of “promoting the 
rediscovery of the neighborhood” (Kara Jose, 2007).  However, these efforts did not result in 
increased real estate activity in the neighborhood nor the gentrification pioneers (see Zukin, 
1989); and the attempts at agreements with private interests to revitalize properties failed (Kara 
Jose, 2007).   
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Interviews with city planners revealed in the mid-1990s, the state government once again 
attempted to revitalize the area, this time through the creation of a cultural cluster.10  Instead of 
small projects, this attempt emphasized the creation of larger projects and cultural facilities as 
poof of the government’s capacity to invest and thus attract private sector interest.  Nonetheless, 
the starting anchor for this project was like other projects in the city—transportation—and would 
only later shift to a culture-led redevelopment model (see, for example:  Dundar, 2010; Degen, 
2003; Knox, 2009; Rodriguez and Martinez, 2003).  In 1995, the Secretaria dos Transportes 
Metropolitanos (Metropolitan Transportation Secretariat) implemented the Projeto Integração 
Centro (Center Integration Project), connecting metropolitan region trains (CPTM) to Braz, 
Barra Funda, and Luz stations and starting construction on a new metro line (Kara Jose, 2007).   
The Luz station played a critical role in this effort—as a transportation hub—and as a potential 
cultural pole and attraction in the neighborhood.  The incorporation of cultural components was 
influenced by Associação Viva o Centro and its consultant, Regina Meyer, who coordinated the 
Luz Cultural project as well.  That association also helped in spreading the concept of 
revitalization through culture, promoted the creation of a more comprehensive plan for the 
neighborhood, and provided conceptual definitions and ideas for projects (Kara Jose, 2007).  
Interviews with city planners and documents revealed this project was not fully completed, 
however.11  Aside from the award-winning conversion of the Estação Julio Prestes and adjacent 
plaza into Sala São Paulo for the orchestra (see Figure 9), the Pinacoteca, Parque da Luz, and 
Luz Station were renovated and the Museu da Lingua Portuguesa was installed in part of the Luz 
Station.  Yet, a larger redevelopment plan was not completed as originally proposed for the 
                                                            
10 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
11 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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surrounding area and the culture-led redevelopment attempts once again failed to initiate the 
desired private sector interest in the region.12 
  
 
 
 
      
Figure 9:  Sala São Paulo and Estação Julio Prestes (images by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the previous 30 years, a series of successive redevelopment attempts focused on the 
Luz and surrounding regions of downtown São Paulo.  Their progression reads like a genealogy 
of popular redevelopment governance and structuring mechanisms of the period.  What started 
with growth-machine like, boosterist-led attempts employing neoliberal urbanism techniques and 
no public participation evolved into many attempts at using cultural anchors and the hopes of a 
“Bilbao effect” in São Paulo.  These later efforts incorporated some public participation and also 
saw the use of public-private partnerships for punctual building renovations, but both were 
highly uneven in their use and the culture-led redevelopment efforts did not result in a 
neighborhood-wide transformation as city leaders had hoped.   
                                                            
12 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Regina Meyer (08/2012) Project 
Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects 
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 Nationally, and emerging from the same historical moment, privatization and 
participatory planning became cemented in various laws and regulations and began to frame the 
governance structure that would be used to shape cities and urban policy.  The repeated failures 
of culture-led efforts in the Luz region steered city leaders to seek new redevelopment 
mechanisms to address that area in the Nova Luz project that would follow.  This project also 
would directly bring together those two governance forms whose roots emerged in the same 
historical context but took divergent paths:  privatized urban planning and participatory planning.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A New Redevelopment Tool through Privatized Urban Planning 
 
 
 
 Following numerous attempts over numerous municipal administrations at redevelopment 
in the Nova Luz region of São Paulo, city leaders continued to be interested in reimagining that 
neighborhood.  Early attempts provided a few significant, albeit incremental changes, mostly in 
terms of cultural facilities.  Yet, the desired outcomes of overall neighborhood revitalization 
from “culture-led” redevelopment and market-led “neoliberal” approaches to urbanism did not 
manifest.  This led city leaders to pursue the Nova Luz Project, which followed directly from 
those culture-led previous projects in São Paulo.  However, it was a complete departure from 
redevelopment logics previously pursued. 
 Instead, the São Paulo municipal government decided upon a new redevelopment form, 
untested and unprecedented in Brazil.  This new policy instrument in practice brought back 
together two forms of urban governance which had emerged in the same period of economic, 
political, and social restructuring following the end of military rule in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
That is, the return to and evolution of democratic governance, along with new innovative 
participatory institutions went hand in hand with the rise of entrepreneurial urbanism in São 
Paulo.  In Nova Luz, these two rationalities—collective, public decision making and private 
market efficiencies—to best determine outcomes in urban space were the two dominating and 
competing modes of governance for the creation and completion of the project.  Despite 
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emerging in the same contextual milieu, these policy frameworks took divergent paths until 
brought directly together in the Nova Luz project.  Yet, it was the ways in which the public and 
private forms were structured together that made the project problematic, as they played out 
through points of both consensus and cooperation and others of contention and conflict. 
 
 
Figure 10:  Nova Luz Project Area Map (depiction by Joshua Shake) 
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The Birth of the Nova Luz Project:  Incentives Attempt 
On September 5, 2005, the then vice-mayor of São Paulo (Gilberto Kassab) announced a 
new revitalization program, called Nova Luz, which would be based on building upon the 
existing electronics commercial activities in the area and the creation of a technology cluster.  
They justified a new program focused on the Luz region to end the spreading thin of financial 
resources across a large area of downtown (Cusce Nobre, 2009).  The PROCENTRO and 
Monumenta Projects provided the funding for Phase I of the project planning under the Urban 
Concessions model later employed.  However, the funding for these programs ended in the late 
2000s according to planning documents.  Early eminent domain proceedings occurred under the 
direction of the Operação Urbana Centro (Centro Urban Operation).  Finally, the project area 
itself emerged from early discussions among São Paulo city planners in reusing the underused 
railroad infrastructure in the downtown region that had provided for much of its early centrality 
role:13   
 
“The idea for the Nova Luz Project actually emerged some time ago.  Many years ago 
some internal discussions between planners here began to look at what to do with all of 
the old warehouses and spaces from the railroad infrastructure that cut through the central 
region of the city.” (Anna Barros, Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; translation by 
Joshua Shake) 
 
                                                            
13 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz 
Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat  
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The idea was to provide fiscal incentives for private investment in the region and was aided 
initially by a declaração de utilidade publica (public utility decree).  This act, Decreto Municipal 
No. 46.291, 2005, provided for the eminent domain (desapropriação) of private properties within 
a perimeter of 105 thousand square meters in the Santa Ifigenia neighborhood. 
In October, the city government created an online portal (for 30 days) through which 
businesses interested in investing in the neighborhood could register.  The minimum investment 
was set at R$50 thousand, and the specific types of incentives were originally to be defined 
based on the investment value, construction or reform of buildings, type of business, and other 
factors.  To reach the minimum investment value, valid expenses included project creation (up to 
5% of the total investment value), land acquisition, project completion, service instillation, and 
improvements to structures.  According to interviews with city planners, twenty-three (23) 
businesses expressed interest.14  They included 11 information systems businesses:  Audatex 
Brasil Serviços Ltda.; Bravo Telecomunicações Ltda.; BRQ Soluções em Informática S/A; 
Digisign Ltda.; E-Safetransfers S/A; IBM Brasil Ind. Máquinas e Serviços Ltda.; Magna 
Sistemas Consultoria S/A; Magna Web; Meta Serviços em Informática Ltda; Microsoft 
Informática Ltda.; and Pyxsinfo Tecnologia Ltda.  Three call centers: Atento Brasil S/A; TMS 
Call Center S/A; and TNL Contax.  One publicity firm:  Fess Kobbi Ass. de Marketing e 
Comunicação Ltda.  One printing firm: Klar Indústria e Comércio de Eletro-eletrônico Ltda.  
One cultural institution: Instituto Moreira Salles.  One shopping center: Mercado Eletrônico S/A. 
And five real estate investment firms: BR Properties S/A; Bracor Empreendimentos Imobiliários 
Ltda.; DMF Construtora Incorporadora Ltda.; Klar Imobiliários Ltda.; and Partifib Projetos 
                                                            
14 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz 
Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat 
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Imobiliários.  With this project conceptualization it was clear that this was different from 
previous projects for the Santa Ifigenia/Luz region: 
 
“There was a clear departure from the previous projects for the Centro region.  Nova Luz 
was very different from the other projects that tried to use museums and culture to 
revitalize the area.  It is a very different mode of redevelopment.”  (Regina Meyer Regina 
Meyer, Project Consultant, author of previous redevelopment projects; translation by 
Joshua Shake) 
  
Later, in December 2005, the then mayor José Serra passed Lei Municipal No. 14.096/05 
which, along with Decree 46.996/06, defined the structure of incentives and set the program 
length for ten years.  Two types of incentives were included:  discounts of up to 50% on property 
taxes (IPTU) and discounts of up to 80% on service taxes (ISS).  These were later changed to a 
50% reduction in IPTU, a reduction of up to 60% in ISS, reduction of up to 50% of ITBI 
(Imposto de Transmissão Inter Vivos-another tax on the property); and a reduction of up to 60% 
in ISS for building construction or reform.  Following completion of the investment, the business 
would also receive a Certificado de Incentivo ao Desenvolvimento (CID-Development Incentive 
Certificate) in the value of 50% of the construction, restauration, and residential preservation 
investments along with 80% of the investments in service provision.  These certificates were to 
be valid for five years, distributed in 20% annually adjusted installments and could be used for 
later ISS or IPTU payments, or even the purchase of transit passes (bilhete unico) for 
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employees.15  In total, the proposed projects sought to construct or reform some 154,911 square 
meters with an investment value of R$ 752,718,380 and the creation of 25,926 jobs.  None of 
these investments, however, would be realized as confirmed by city planners.16 
 In March of 2006, the then mayor José Serra stepped down in order to run for São Paulo 
state governor.  In his place Gilberto Kassab (then DEM) became mayor.  He announced early on 
that he would continue the Nova Luz project with the demolition of 270,000 square meters.  A 
year later, in May of 2007, the city government opened the bidding process for streetscape and 
infrastructure improvements in the neighborhood, including new street lighting, sidewalks and 
fiber optic cables along 16 streets.  Because of delays, this project was reopened in June 2008 
and contracts were not signed, however, until December 2008/January 2009 at a cost of R$ 13.7 
million and a 15-month completion period.  Also in May of 2007, the Kassab administration 
announced the enlargement of the Nova Luz project area by 269,000 square meters in Decreto 
Municipal 48.349/07.  At the time, however, the government did not make the lists of specific 
blocks, lots, and buildings that would be subject to eminent domain publicly available.  It was 
also at this time, in 2007, that the complications of this redevelopment attempt began to mount, 
according to city planners:17   
 
“The Santa Ifigenia region is highly fragmented across countless property owners, 
abandoned buildings, and historic preservation designations.   And it turns out that the 
                                                            
15 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz 
Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat 
16 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz 
Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat 
17 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat  
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financial incentives were poorly designed and unclear.  There wasn’t much specificity 
with them.” (Anna Barros, Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; translation by Joshua 
Shake) 
 
Legal issues had delayed the eminent domain proceedings already in progress, and few had yet to 
be resolved, making it clear that the private sector was also losing interest in the project.  Kassab 
had also promised that those nearly 270,000 square meters would be ready for development by 
the end of his term in 2008, but the first 50 eminent domain proceedings took over two years to 
be resolved amidst deep disagreements over reimbursement values.  Planning documents show 
only in October of 2007 did the first demolitions occur; totaling 57 about a year later of the 58 
buildings obtained through eminent domain. 
 The internal issues were slowly causing the failure of this attempt using incentives, 
exacerbated by the poor design of the rebate programs and internal administrative issues.  The 
city government still believed that the 23 businesses would be relocated to the area, but no 
contracts were ever reached and most never left the early negotiations phases.  New project 
initiatives began to seem necessary, as a Nova Luz coordinator expressed when discussing the 
new project in relation to the incentives attempt: 
 
“The idea is to create a 24-hour neighborhood.  You can’t expect [businesses] to relocate 
here when the area changes so much at 6pm.  Here there isn’t anything open.” (Clara 
Marques, Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; translation by Joshua Shake) 
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Despite these mounting failures, the city was also attempting to show its investment interest in 
the region.  Six public facilities were being planned, with a total investment of R$ 97.66 million.  
Only two were actually completed, however: a new headquarters for the Guarda Municipal 
(Municipal Guard) and a new branch of the Escola Technica Estadual (State Technical School).   
Externally, the private sector’s lack of certainty in the proposed redevelopment 
mechanisms’ efficacy, and lack of confidence in the financial and administrative capacities of the 
city government became apparent, as well.  The large construction company Odebrecht produced 
plans under the direction of the architect Márcio Lupion, which would have created mixed-use 
buildings with ground floor retail and apartments between 65 and 120 square meters.  Another 
plan received more public attention.  A group of businesses under the leadership of the Sindicato 
das Empresas de Imoveis de São Paulo (SECOVI-São Paulo Union of Real Estate Companies) 
contracted famed architect and former mayor of Curitiba Jaime Lerner to develop a parallel 
redevelopment plan for the neighborhood.18  This project did not make much headway, however.  
The proposal centered on a 200-meter 80-story tower as its focal point, completely out of scale 
with the rest of the neighborhood.  The project also suggested the removal of the Zona Especial 
de Interese Social (ZEIS-Special Social Interest Zoning) public housing zoning in the area, 
which would have been politically difficult considering the mobilizing civil society groups in the 
neighborhood.19 
 
 
                                                            
18 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project 
19 Interviews with Anna Barros (02/2014) Nova Luz Lead Planner, SP Urbanism; Clara Marques (03/2013) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) Communications Director, Nova Luz 
Project 
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The Creation of a New Redevelopment Instrument:  Urban Concessions 
During the administration of Mayor Marta Suplicy (2001-2004, PT-Workers Party) the 
São Paulo completed the first Plano Diretor (Master Plan) in over 40 years.  According to the 
Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute), this federal legislation requires its completion in cities over 
20,000 habitants, cities in designated metropolitan regions, cities in tourist areas, and cities in 
environmentally sensitive areas.  Paulo José Villela Lomar, legal chief in the Secretaria 
Municipal de Planejamento Urbano (SEMPLA-Municipal Urban Planning Secretariat), 
incorporated among the 42 urban planning instruments the Concessão Urbanistica (Urban 
Concession) which had emerged from his master’s thesis (Francisco da Souza, 2011).    Upon 
passage in the Camara Municipal (City Council), the urban concession became officially 
incorporated into the Master Plan and city law (Article 239, Law No. 13.430, 2002).  This 
redevelopment tool was a new instrument developed in São Paulo that would later be 
incorporated into other Brazilian cities’ municipal codes and plans.  Nonetheless, it was very 
vague and did not specify how it would function nor in which parts of the city it would be used.  
It merely granted the mayor power to open a public bid for delegation of a consortium for project 
completion, stated that the consortium would be remunerated through land and building 
exploration in the project area, that they would be responsible for takings (eminent domain) 
payments, and responsible for plan creation for the project.  It is important to note the historical 
significance of this model of urban development. While historically large scale developers, 
concessions, and contracts all factored significantly in the development of public housing and 
other infrastructure projects in Brazil, the form in which concessions and contracts with the 
private sector is much different in the Luz case in scope, size, scale and powers granted to the 
private sector actors. 
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Kassab was reelected mayor in October 2008 (beating Marta Suplicy in the runoff 
election) and announced a month later that the urban concession could provide for the 
completion of the Nova Luz project.  The city government suggested that this could overcome 
the difficulties of eminent domain and believed the private sector would have more facility in 
negotiating with property owners and speed up the process.  It was also noted at the time that this 
planning instrument had never been used in Brazil and would require City Council approval 
before entering into use, along with the private sector’s renewed hope that the revitalization 
could continue with this new mechanism.   
. On February 26, 2009 the Mayor’s office forwarded the bill creating the urban 
concession provisions to the City Council.  Nearly two months later, on April 22, 2009, the City 
Council approved the Lei da Concessão Urbanistica (Urban Concessions Law, No. 14.917) on a 
42 to 10 vote (See Appendix A for the full text of this law).  This law officially created the 
ability for the public sector to transfer, to the private sector through bidding, the ability to 
redevelop legally defined regions of the city.  In doing so, they must follow all relevant laws and 
directives, as well as provide the necessary services and public facilities in exchange for the 
ability to explore the real estate benefits through the sale and rental of properties.  The law also 
specified the ability of the private sector consortium to initiate eminent domain proceedings 
following the same provisions granted to the public sector, namely, the declaration of public 
utility and just compensation.  The final version of the law, however, did not specify the pre-
determined timelines for project completion or fiscal accountability.  
At the same time, on April 22, 2009, the City Council also approved the first urban 
concession in the city for the Nova Luz perimeter (Law No. 14.918) on a 41 to 10 vote (See 
Appendix B for the full text).  Both of the laws were forwarded to the mayor on the following 
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day and signed into law on May 7, 2009.  Four revisions were proposed, to the Urban 
Concessions Law, all by Councilmember Mara Gabrilli.  The first, and only to be incorporated, 
sought to guarantee architectural accessibility and urban mobility, promoting citizenship, safety, 
and autonomy for persons with deficiencies and limited mobility in the revitalized areas (Art. 3).  
The second revision would have established guaranteed specific timelines for project completion 
in each law creating a specific urban concession project, such that the thousands of people 
directly impacted by the project would be able to know exactly how long they would be 
impacted (Art. 5).  The third would have specified that the bid process recognize the objective 
and efficient allocation of risks from the concession, following the United Kingdom example 
where 60% of the savings in public-private partnerships comes from efficient risk allocation in 
contracts (Art. 15).  The fourth would have required the concessionary group to provide 
semiannual status reports to the city government and civil society (Art. 26). 
In São Paulo, the Mayor’s office was able to build upon a previously named but not 
defined urban policy instrument found in the Master Plan.  Through two successive pieces of 
legislation, not only was this new redevelopment form created, but prescribed for the Nova Luz 
region.  In this sense, the tool was specifically formulated for use there and in response to yet 
another failure at redevelopment.  The incentives attempt at promoting public-private 
partnerships with companies was poorly created, lacked legal specificity, and did not result in 
any real action.  In creating the Urban Concessions law and policy tool, São Paulo city builders 
consolidated their desire to use public-private partnerships to redevelop Nova Luz.  But unlike 
the incentives program—which would have resulted in building by building public-private 
partnerships, the new instrument provided for one firm or one consortium of firms to compete 
plans for the entire 45 block region through a public bid process.  This is a distinctive difference 
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in the emergence of privatized urban planning.  The city government cedes redevelopment 
powers for plan and project completion to private firms for an entire neighborhood.  Whereas in 
Shatkin’s (2008) case of privatized urban planning, private development firms approached local 
governments with plans in hand for projects, the São Paulo government was the leader in the 
privatizing process. 
 
Developing the Nova Luz Plans 
The Nova Luz project is directly subject to Laws No. 14.917 and 14.918, along with the 
São Paulo Master Plan.  However, one set of federal legislation is also relevant here.  According 
to Brazilian Federal Law, there are two types of Public Private Partnerships:  Administrative 
Concessions and Sponsored Concessions (Law 11.079/2004). In both cases, the investor 
implements and operates the projects, which are remunerated by the government (Federal, State, 
Municipal) for a minimum period of five years and a maximum of 35 years.  In Administrative 
Concessions, the government allows the private initiative to develop and provide a service from 
which the State is a direct or indirect user.  The payment to the private sector comes exclusively 
from the State as there is no collection of tariffs or fees from end users.  Sponsored Concessions 
are characterized by a concession agreement for services or public works where there is the 
collection of tariffs or fees from end users and also the payment by the state.  Brazilian law (Law 
8987/1995) distinguishes these types of concessionary Public-Private Partnerships from a 
traditional concession in that the cost of using the service provided by the private party is borne 
exclusively by the users of the service and not by the state in traditional concessions.  The 
specific steps to creating a Public-Private Partnership in Brazil, based in Federal Law 
11.079/2004, are:  1. Submission of preliminary proposals; 2. Approval of proposals; 3. Study of 
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proposal; 4. Modeling of projects; 5.  Public consultation; 6.  Invitation to tender; 7.  Contract; 8. 
Implementation. 
On May 1st, 2010, the São Paulo city government announced the results of the public bid 
process for the development of the Nova Luz Project, originally capped at R$11.8 million (later 
growing to R$12.5 million).  Five groups submitted proposals.  The consortium made up of 
Concremat Engenharia, Companhia City, AECOM Technology Corporation and Fundação 
Getúlio Vargas received 81.3 points surpassing the 75 points gained by the consortium Logos 
Engenharia, RTKL Associates, Piratininga Arquitetos Associados and Arcadis Tetraplan.   
 Based in the relevant federal and local legislation, the city government developed a 
timeline, with the estimated completion date set for just ten months for the entire process.  In 
Steps One and Two, preliminary studies and urban design and redevelopment projects were to be 
created.  Only in Step Three did preliminary public presentations and meetings occur.  The 
timeline provided five weeks to complete this step, which included conducting sectorial 
consultations with representatives of economic sectors whose activities exist in the area or are 
foreseen in the preliminary redevelopment program; representatives from housing movements 
that operate in the intervention area; representatives of trade associations whose activities relate 
to the project area, in particular those representing sectors of construction and real estate, along 
with the creation of a summary report of the meetings.  Steps Four and Five involved revisions of 
the plan and its various components; Step Six involved licensing and public hearings and Step 
Seven the final revisions and changes to the plan. 
Public participation, and specifically participatory planning bodies, were therefore 
incorporated in the project in a relatively small capacity.  According to relevant federal and local 
laws, meetings only need to occur once draft plans are completed, undermining the participatory 
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process and the value given to a truly participatory planning exercise.  Similarly, the timeline 
only provided five weeks to compete specific meetings, a very short time for a project of such a 
large scale.  Project-wide participatory planning municipal councils were never to be formed, 
and the municipal council focused on public housing faced many challenges, which are discussed 
in the next chapter.  Although the minimum requirements for public participation were at least 
met in the project timeline and overall structuring, this format did not promote a full integration 
and full realization of participatory planning.  The incorporation of participatory planning at key 
points, instead of throughout the entire process favored the market based rationality for shaping 
urban space, instead of promoting an even emphasis of that form with participatory democracy 
rationality. 
Along with the Housing Secretariat’s role in public housing programs (discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4), two other secretariats were to be involved following Law No. 14.917 (See 
Appendix A):  The Municipal Urban Development Secretariat (Secretaria Municipal de 
Desenvolvimento Urbano-SMDU) was tasked with coordinating the activities of the urban 
concession, drafting the relevant background documents, and handing coordination with other 
city agencies.  The Municipal Urban Construction and Infrastructure Secretariat (Secretaria 
Municipal de Infraestrutura Urbana e Obras-SIURB) was responsible for granting the urban 
concession, as well as managing the bidding contracting, and monitoring processes.  Likewise, 
Law 14.918 provided for the specific function of the plan, stating: “§ 3 It is entirely up to the 
specific urban project to define, among buildings located within the perimeter of the concession, 
those which will be subject to expropriation, demolition, renovation or construction.”  Table 5 
presents basic information about the Nova Luz Project scope and costs. 
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Table 5:  Nova Luz Project Basic Information (data from Prefeitura de São Paulo; design 
by Joshua Shake) 
Project Area: 50 hectacres (45 blocks) 
Current Inhabitants:  12,000 Proposed Inhabitants: 12,000 
Current Jobs: 24,000 Proposed Jobs: 19,400 
Total New Housing Units: 4986 New Public Housing Units: 2193 
      
Costs 
Design Phase:  R$ 13.7 million 
Preliminary Infrastructure and Streetscape 
Improvements (completed): R$ 12.5 million 
Implementation Phase (5 stages, 15 years): R$ 1.1 billion 
Implementation Cost to Municipality: R$ 370 - R$ 621 million 
 
 
 
Following the neoliberal turn in Brazilian governance, which resulted in departmental 
restructuring and fiscal restrictions, municipalities in general and São Paulo specifically faced a 
lack of financial and management capacities to carry out large-scale urban projects.  Yet, the 
scope and scale of Nova Luz is much larger than anything else attempted in recent history in 
Brazil and significantly greater in scope than the previous attempts in that region of São Paulo.  
With only three municipal secretariats involved—one for contract compliance, one for project 
management, and one overseeing the public housing portions, the demands on municipal 
capacities could be kept to a minimum.  Although the project touched on areas under the purview 
of numerous municipal secretariats—from parks, to schools, to social services, to just name a 
few, many of these secretariats had no previous plans in the works for the region.  In a sense, 
they were receiving a completed plan with minimal staff and financial expenditures.  Thus, I 
argue, a motivating factor in the turn to entrepreneurial urbanism in this case was not just fiscal 
considerations detailed in the literature, but also the capacities (or lack thereof) of local 
governments to carry out large scale projects under neoliberalism.   
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Figure 11:  Site Map of Lots to be Renovated and Demolished in Nova Luz Project (map 
from Prefeitura de São Paulo, used with permission) 
 
 
 
 
Just six months after the contract with the consortium was signed, the São Paulo 
government presented on Nov 17, 2010 the first urban design schematics for the Nova Luz 
Project (See Appendix C for a list of project guidelines).  Figure 11 shows which buildings and 
blocks were to be kept, renovated, and rebuilt.  Articles and releases at the time emphasized the 
fact that streets and plazas have been inspired by places like La Rambla (Barcelona), Campo 
Santa Margherita (Veneza) and Bryant Park (Nova York).  Project leaders even expressed 
inspiration in some of Jane Jacobs ideas for urban spaces (Shake, 2015): 
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“In relation to Jane Jacobs, we have the issue of mixed use involving housing in part of 
the project area.  A premise was to increase the residential areas, especially in ZEIS 
[special public housing zoning], bringing populations to use the region in periods beyond 
commercial hours.  The importance of existing specialized commerce was understood, 
maintained, and valued, which would be complemented with the harmonic coexistence 
with residential uses…enabling residents in ZEIS areas, that already live in the region 
and would live in new housing units to work in this commercial hub.  Maintain and keep 
this population in the region was a goal of the project, resulting through the offer of 
housing units proposed in ZEIS and through the rehabilitation of buildings for HIS 
[public housing].”  (Luis Ramos, Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development 
Secretariat; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
While this point marked the beginning of the complicated interactions with the civil society 
organizations and public at large (discussed in detail in Chapter 4), the planning processes within 
the local government and primarily within the consortium were able to operate very quickly and 
within the prescribed timeline during the early stages.20  Later court stays delayed this process 
(again, discussed in detail in Chapter 4), but attention herein will be given to those internal 
processes. 
Because of the defined roles of specific municipal secretariats and the consortium, project 
development was allowed to and essentially obligated to operate in isolation within the 
consortium.  Periodic meetings were held between consortium planners and municipal project 
coordinators, along with the provision of data and other requested documents, according to city 
                                                            
20 Interviews with Clara Marques (07/2012) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Joyce Reis (09/2013) 
SMDU Employee; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat  
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and consortium planners.21  Additionally, because of that structure, the consortium only dealt 
directly with the Urban Development Secretariat and through it with other relevant city 
departments, undoubtedly streamlining the process. 22  When asked about this structure and the 
cooperation between city departments, the Urban Development Secretariat’s project coordinator 
suggested that there were no issues of territoriality or reluctance to cooperate; rather, because of 
the lack of internal capacities and ability to draft plans for such a large and complex city, some 
departments viewed the Nova Luz project as a gift:  
 
“It was a ready-made plan for a relatively large area of the city in need of public sector 
attention—attention that they were unable to provide because of limited resources.  They 
can only create plans for so many areas of such a large city.”  (Luis Ramos, Nova Luz 
Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
Finally, at the same time that the consortium was drafting Nova Luz project plans, the 
São Paulo State Government, under the direction of its Culture Secretariat, was beginning the 
planning stages of Complexo Cultural da Luz (Luz Cultural Complex.)  This project also sought 
to build upon the more than twenty years of public investments in museums and culture facilities 
in attempting a culture-led redevelopment of the area (like the Sala São Paulo-São Paulo 
Symphony Hall, Estação Julio Prestes-Julio Prestes Station, Parque da Luz-Luz Park, Museu da 
Lingua Portuguesa-Portuguese Language Museum, Museu de Arte Sacra-Sacred Art Museum, 
                                                            
21 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project;; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat 
22 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project;; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat 
 
 
96 
and Pinacoteca-São Paulo State Art Museum).  The completion of the complex would create the 
largest cultural complex in Latin America after the public-private partnership with a Swiss firm 
for a dance hall is completed.  This firm received R$43 million from the state in order to 
complete a 1750 seat theatre for dance and opera presentations, the headquarters for the Tom 
Joabim Escola de Musica do Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo State Music School) with activities 
for 2000 students, a 500 seat recital hall, the headquarters for the São Paulo Companhia de 
Dança (São Paulo Dance Company), another 400 seat experimental theatre, and an arts library.  
Despite the location of this project—adjacent to the Nova Luz project area—and the obvious 
interests in the success of both projects on both the part of the State and Municipal governments, 
city and consortium planners there were no interactions between the two during the planning 
stages of either project.23  This also in spite of the former mayor’s (Serra) role as state governor 
and influential city councilmember Andrea Matarazzo’s roles as Subprefeito of the Sé district 
from 2005 to 2009 and then as State Culture Secretariat from 2009 to 2012.  Since that time, the 
State government has demolished the old bus terminal turned shopping mall for completing the 
project, but no other actions have been taken.  Even with the municipal government changes, city 
officials have stated that still no communication has taken place and no status updates have 
reached them.  As of the end of 2012, the project was to be completed in 2016, but this seems 
highly unlikely given the current state of stagnation.  Court actions in late 2016 suggest that the 
project will not be completed.  Indeed, the lack of cooperation and the operation of the two 
simultaneous projects in isolation does represent a break from the direct interest in the power of 
cultural institutions to revitalize the neighborhood. 
                                                            
23 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project;; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat 
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Beyond Nova Luz 
After about two years of planning, court delays, and interactions with civil society (See 
Chapter 4), the Nova Luz project completed the necessary approval processes in October 2012.  
Figures 12 and 13 show the final proposed ground floor and upper floor uses, respectively.  This, 
however proved to be too late for the Kassab administration to bid the project implementation 
phase; the requests for proposals to start the bid process had not reached formal draft form and 
still had to be open for a determined amount of time—meaning that contracts could not be signed 
by the end of the elected term in December 2012. 
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Figure 12:  Site Map of Proposed Ground Floor Uses in Nova Luz Project (map from 
Prefeitura de São Paulo, used with permission) 
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Figure 13:  Site Map of Proposed Upper Floor Uses in Nova Luz Project (map from 
Prefeitura de São Paulo, used with permission) 
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The municipal government’s turn to entrepreneurial urbanism through the creation of a 
new privatized urban development tool highlights their desire to rely on the greater capacities of 
the private sector to complete a project of such scope and scale.  Beyond this, however, their race 
to complete the project completion bidding process before elections also highlights their desire to 
insulate the project from the electoral politics of Brazil.  Although common in many places, in 
Brazil it is so common for a new mayoral administration to throw away plans and even projects 
in progress from the previous administration that an expression has developed: “engavetar o 
projeto” or to put the project in the desk drawer.  Every four or eight years, (depending on 
incumbency) countless municipal projects are halted across Brazil.  This cycling effectively 
gives mayoral administrations four to eight years to complete projects.  In Nova Luz, however, 
city leaders felt that if the project was contracted before the end of the mayoral term, it would 
stand a greater chance at completion, especially since it optimistically foresaw a 15-year timeline 
for completion. 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Public Housing Proposed in Nova Luz Project (data from Prefeitura de São 
Paulo; design by Joshua Shake) 
Income Bracket Unit Size Percentage of Units Total Units 
Families with income from 0-6 
minimum wages 
37m2 18.8% 412 units 
42m2 50% 1099 units 
1820 units 50m2 14% 309 units 
      
Families with income from 6-16 
minimum wages 
42m2 4.2% 92 units 
50m2 8.7% 191 units 
373 units 65m2 4.1% 90 units 
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As proposed, the 45 block project would have increased the area population by 12,000 
and employment by 19,400 jobs.  4,986 new residential units were to be constructed, of which 
2,193 would have been public housing.  Of which, 1820 units were to be destined for families 
from 0-6 minimum wages and 373 units for families from 6-16 minimum wages.  This 
information is summarized in Table 6.  To do so, all historic preservation designated buildings 
would be restored, along with significant new construction.  The project also sought to double 
the neighborhood shade through the planting of 1342 trees and the creation of two new plazas.  
Other streetscape improvements, like bike lanes and universal accessibility were also proposed.  
In completing the project (in exchange for the ability to profit from the project, similar to 
community benefits), the winning consortium would have also have constructed three new 
nurseries, two schools, one public health clinic, one elderly social service center, and one general 
social service center with a library and workforce training.  This information is summarized in 
Table 7. 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Nova Luz Project Proposed Design Features and Public Facilities (data from 
Prefeitura de São Paulo; design by Joshua Shake) 
77% of current buildings maintained  3 new public nurseries 
100% of historic designated buildings 
restored 2 new public schools 
1342 trees, doubling existing shade 
coverage  1 new public health clinic 
12km of bike lanes  
1 new elderly social work 
facility 
universal accessibility  
1 new general social work 
facility 
2 new plazas   1 new library 
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Should it have continued, the project would then have gone to public bid for its 
completion.  The idea was to once again contract with a single company or consortium of 
companies to realize the entire project, given the intricacy of profit making portions and profit 
losing portions, coordination of a number of simultaneous activities, and overall complexity of 
the project.24  The plan also proposed a 15-year completion timeline, divided into five of 
implementation (See Figures 14, 15, and 16 for the Implementation Plan, Phasing Details, and 
Phasing Plan, respectively).  One of the changes that emerged through the planning process was 
to the form of project participation of the existing property owners.25  The final proposal did end 
up allowing for their participation, under three structures.  They could complete the plan 
designs/guidelines for their property (following the approved project) at 100% cost in voluntary 
implementation.  In shared implementation, they could split the costs (and lose some rights) at 
70% property owner 30% consortium.  Exclusive implementation would have been the third 
option, with 100% of costs borne by the concessionary group and eminent domain. 
                                                            
24 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project;; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat 
25 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project;; Luis Ramos (08/2012) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat 
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Figure 14:  Detailed Implementation Plan for Nova Luz Project (diagram from Prefeitura 
de São Paulo, used with permission) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Full Implementation Plan for Nova Luz Project (diagram from Prefeitura de 
São Paulo, used with permission) 
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Figure 16:  Site Map of Implementation Phasing for Nova Luz Project (map from 
Prefeitura de São Paulo, used with permission) 
 
 
 
 
Here we see the second component of this new privatized urban planning form.  Not only 
did the public sector bid the plan creation portion of the Nova Luz project, but it also sought to 
bid to one firm or one consortium of firms for project completion of the entire 45 block area.   
Once again, the competing logics of private market and public participation come to a head.  In 
the project completion phase, current landowners could ostensibly participate in the revitalization 
of the neighborhood, but only if they followed the tightly prescribed plans for their specific 
property or lot.  Otherwise, the private sector firms would obtain control through one of several 
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mechanisms.  Entrepreneurial urbanism outweighed public participation even in the project 
completion format.   
 None of this would be realized, however.  In Brazil, elections are held in October and 
Kassab was not able to run for reelection.  Seeing an opportunity, community groups actors, 
drafted an agreement regarding the mayoral candidates’ stances on the Nova Luz project.26  
Three of the four frontrunners and all but one of the other candidates signed the agreement, 
which stated that the candidate, if elected, would “suspend and revise the Nova Luz project, 
along with alter it in consideration of the needs of the population that lives and works in the 
region.”  The only major candidate to not sign was Jose Serra (PSDB), who had given birth to 
the Nova Luz project during his uncompleted term as mayor in 2005-2006.  Since no candidate 
received a minimum of 50% of all votes in the first round elections, Serra and Fernando Haddad 
(PT) completed a second round runoff.  Haddad was elected with 55.57% of votes (3,387,720) to 
Serra’s 44.43% (2,708,768).  At the district level, Haddad won in Santa Ifigenia, with 50.98% 
(27,809) to Serra’s 49.02% (27,809), reversing the result of the first round (27.13% Haddad to 
36.09% for Serra).  This also meant that the Santa Ifigenia district was the only one in the central 
region in which Haddad won—a result the community groups attribute to their mobilizations in 
his support leading up to the final election. 
 Even before taking office, Haddad expressed concerns and that he did not want to 
continue the project as it was conceived, but rather still take advantage of some of its physical 
components.  Members of his incoming administration, including the Urban Development 
Secretary, met with civil society actors involved with the ZEIS council still in December.27  
                                                            
26 Interview with Paulo Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President 
27 Interviews with Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa 
Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, 
Urban Development Secretariat 
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Then, shortly after taking office in January, the Haddad administration announced that the 
project was “technically unviable” due to the costs involved.  City planners expressed interest in 
pursuing other types of public-private partnerships to revitalize the area.28  At it, it was 
confirmed that the Nova Luz project was canceled and that government actions in the region 
would be through the ZEIS, in that it already had an active management council with proposals.  
City officials stressed that instead of focusing just on housing, these approaches would be more 
comprehensive and address historic preservation, mobility, and public health and safety; the 
Urban Development Secretariat would also assume administrative responsibilities for this ZEIS, 
along with the Housing Secretariat. 
One of the most promising opportunities for revitalizing the Nova Luz project area, along 
with other central regions of the city, was the Casa Paulista program.  In early 2013, the new São 
Paulo city administration signed cooperation agreements to participate with the São Paulo State 
government’s implementation of the Casa Paulista program within the city.  The city would 
assist in the provision of lots and buildings, many in ZEIS areas, while the state government 
would provide the funding and structuring of the public-private partnerships to complete the new 
housing units.  City planners confirmed that the two government bodies did plan a series of pilot 
projects, but none included any areas within the Nova Luz project perimeter.29  Casa Paulista 
also faced a number of court stays for a lack of participation in the planning processes; the same 
problem that marred the Nova Luz process.  In fact, the state government had not considered at 
all the existence of management councils and not coordinated with the city on structuring them—
                                                            
28 Interviews with Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa 
Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, 
Urban Development Secretariat 
29 Interviews with Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa 
Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, 
Urban Development Secretariat 
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which would have been necessary since São Paulo requires management councils in ZEIS areas 
(See Chapter 4).  As a result, the partnership between the city and state was suspended in late 
2013.  At the same time and despite the public discussion of new projects, city planners 
confirmed that had been no meetings between the Housing Secretariat and the Urban 
Development Secretariat to deliberate new possibilities for the Nova Luz and Santa Ifigenia 
area.30  
The one action taken in the region by the Haddad Administration that has been 
implemented is the Braços Abertos program.  This program seeks to depart from previous 
policies addressing the area’s crack-addicted population.  Instead of a confrontational approach, 
this new approach attempts to provide supportive housing, job opportunities, counseling, 
medical, and rehabilitation services and has been recognized internationally for its innovative 
approach.  
While the above-mentioned projects represent the continuity of urban planning actions in 
the Luz region of the city, they nonetheless were of a much smaller scale and scope than Projeto 
Nova Luz and most have not progressed significantly beyond planning stages.  In this sense, the 
urban megaproject attempts for the region have at least temporarily ended.  Early in Haddad’s 
administration megaproject attention shifted to the Arco do Tiete development project.  This 
sought to redevelop a large area of the city along both banks of the Tiete River, which bisects the 
municipality near the Luz region but not including it.  An open competition for design 
conceptualizations was held in 2013, with a number of proposals publicly presented.  Since then, 
                                                            
30 Interviews with Luis Ramos (11/2013) Nova Luz Project Coordinator, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa 
Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, 
Urban Development Secretariat 
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however, the current political and economic crisis has deepened in Brazil and halted any further 
progress on this project. 
These new ideas for redeveloping the region mark a departure, at least on paper, from the 
previous mode of redevelopment.  In that previous mode, both entrepreneurial urbanism market 
based rationalities and public participation were present and founded in the legislative guidelines 
and regulations, which structured the project.  However, in practice, the public-private 
partnership entrepreneurial urbanism dominated the participatory processes.  The new ideas 
reverse this, privileging participation over public-private partnerships and building on the efforts 
already completed in the neighborhood.  Yet, the lack of project development in these two 
programs shows that the elusive balance between public-private partnerships and participatory 
democracy institutions still has not been found.  
Following the project’s demise, a city council member, Nabil Bonduki (PT), attempted to 
revoke Law No. 14.918/2009 that authorized the urban concession in Nova Luz.  In April 2013 
he introduced Projeto de Lei 282/2013 which would: revoke the Law No 14.918 from May 7, 
2009, that authorizes the Executive to apply the urban concession in the areas of the Nova Luz 
project, and gives other arrangements.  In his justification, he suggested that the local business 
owners and residents could be victims of real estate speculation in the area resulting from the 
project structuring.  Additionally, he expressed concerns that the project had not been drafted 
with sufficient public participation and cited the numerous court decisions that found this as 
well.  Instead, the project should be used as a departure point to debate, with the public, 
possibilities for the region.31  This law was not passed, however.  Moreover, in 2014 the São 
                                                            
31 Interview with Nabil Bonduki (08/2012) City Councilmember, author of bill to end Nova Luz and Urban 
Concessions 
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Paulo government completed the 10-year revisions of its Master Plan.  In it, the Urban 
Concession provision remained as a possible urban redevelopment instrument. 
 
Conclusions 
 The Nova Luz project represents a continuity of earlier projects in the old downtown 
region of the city, which are discussed in Chapter 2.  This continuity is explicit in the use of 
funding from them for the planning stages of Nova Luz and preliminary eminent domain 
activities; it is also implicit in the ongoing interest in redeveloping portions of the old downtown 
region.  However, new redevelopment mechanisms were necessary for new types of projects.  
The previous projects’ funding expired in the 2000s and those projects were more punctual in 
nature.  They emphasized historic preservation, urban design and streetscape improvements, and 
cultural facilities; they were not comprehensive, neighborhood-wide redevelopment actions, 
however.  The comprehensive redevelopment of what was to grow to be a 45-block area in a 
central, downtown region of a Brazilian city was not only unprecedented in São Paulo but in all 
of Brazil.   
Another factor became very apparent in the incentives-based redevelopment attempt and 
refers to the public sector’s capacity to carry out a project of such scale.  In Chapter 2, I 
presented the decentralization and economic restructuring that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s 
following redemocratization; these two dynamics indeed influenced the city government’s 
capabilities in the Nova Luz attempts.  The private sector grew impatient and began to lose 
confidence in the public sector’s capacities to complete the necessary steps.  The eminent 
domain proceedings were very delayed, as well.  As they were seeking new mechanisms, city 
officials acknowledged that the private sector may be more financially and logistically capable of 
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completing the project.  City officials also recognized that many departments and secretariats had 
no ongoing plans for the Santa Ifigenia/Nova Luz region, as they could not comprehensively 
plan for all parts of such a large city. 
Additionally, the Nova Luz project had an optimistic 15-year completion schedule, but 
the administrative change was a decisive factor in its lack of continuity.  In this case, and in 
countless cases across Brazil, administrative changes in the political party in power result in the 
cancelation of numerous projects and contracts.  São Paulo city officials were still trying to 
contract the project completion phase even in the final days of their administration.  Thus, their 
actions show they were seeking to insulate the Nova Luz project from the four or eight year 
cycles of electoral politics to ensure its completion by the private sector, which is not barred by 
such cycles.  This would also allow the private sector to proceed at a quicker pace, without the 
bureaucratic encumberments of the public sector.  I conclude that—along with financial 
considerations—cities may turn to privatized urban planning because of a lack of internal 
capacity to complete a development project. 
Finally, the project, in its current form, failed for two reasons.  The new administration 
officially acknowledged the problems with the participatory process, which I discuss in detail in 
Chapter 4.  However, deeply tied to this factor is that of electoral politics.  As mentioned above, 
political power shifts can deeply influence urban planning in São Paulo and Brazil.  Cognizant of 
this, the civil society groups took advantage of the elections and attempted to ensure the Nova 
Luz project would not be completed in its proposed form.  The Nova Luz project itself became a 
political instrument, representative of the previous administration; the new mayor (Haddad) 
quickly spoke out and ended it shortly after taking office.  In its place, he suggested projects 
would be developed with ample participation, highlighting this as a departure from the previous 
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administration’s approaches.  In this sense, the uneven application of the two governance forms 
(which will be explored more in the next chapter) became apparent.  Although participatory 
democracy institutions and the public-private partnership were occurring concurrently for the 
same urban space and project, they were uneven in nature, marked by both periods of consensus 
and cooperation and others of contention and conflict. 
The second factor that brought about the demise of the Nova Luz project is what I shall 
call “intramunicipal competition.”  I will briefly introduce this concept here but will explore it in 
more detail in Chapter 5.  Interurban competition is a well-known occurrence in economic 
development in which neighboring municipalities compete with one another through different 
packages of development opportunities, tax breaks, land provisions, and other incentives.  
intramunicipal competition I argue is a similar phenomenon that can only be recently observed in 
geographically large cities that have undergone neighborhood specific processes of growth and 
decline.  In it, a city tries to develop or redevelop multiple areas simultaneously using a different 
package of incentives for each.  This splits private sector interests between them as they seek the 
best combination of low development costs and high profit possibilities.  The Nova Luz project 
was being planned at the same time the Faria Lima/Berrini region was being consolidated as a 
completed centrality and business district.  The comparatively high outlays of redeveloping Nova 
Luz—including those identified by the city government in ending the project, irregular land 
parcels, high number of property owners, and even time in confronting a very mobilized civil 
society—proved to be too costly for the project to continue.  Developer and private sector 
attention was (and still is) very interested in the Faria Lima/Berrini region and was not 
completely sold on the prospect of the Nova Luz project.  Municipal action and real estate 
developer interest had significant momentum in that other region, where significant investments 
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and construction had been occurring for a number of years.  A certainty of returns there, instead 
of the relative unknown and complications of a highly mobilized and politically connected public 
in Nova Luz dissuaded interest as had occurred with so many other redevelopment attempts in 
the region. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Winning the Battle, but Losing the War:  Participation in the Nova Luz Project 
  
 
 
In the overall Nova Luz project format, the entrepreneurial urbanism through public-
private partnerships and participatory planning rationales for shaping urban space were unevenly 
implemented, despite both originating in the same historical and social context and both being 
regulated by federal and local legislation.  While their coexistane in this project (and as two 
widely popular contemporary forms of urban governance) is historically specific, their 
functionality was marked by periods of cooperation and consensus and others of contestation and 
conflict. Just as the ways in which these two governance strategies were brought together proved 
to be problematic for the planning, so too did the specific types of participatory planning and 
public forums held in the project.  Interviews and meeting minutes show that the specific timing 
and structure of participatory planning bodies in the Nova Luz project excluded some very 
relevant community actors from the process.  In doing so, they sought other settings to express 
their views, which I call “extra-formal” participation—outside of the structured and official 
participatory planning municipal councils.  Through these actions, they were able to not merely 
impact specific components of the plan, but prevent the entire project from moving forward. 
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Emergence of Municipal Councils in Brazil 
 One of the most widespread and under researched participatory planning forms in Brazil 
is the municipal management council (Houtzager et al, 2004).  These councils are a federal and 
municipal legal requirement for a number of areas at the citywide level—like housing, food 
systems, and health (Vera et al, 2012), and in certain types of specific projects—like public 
housing in the redevelopment projects that are the subject of this research.   
 Municipal councils are one of the principal institutional innovations of the 
redemocratization process in Brazil (Tatagiba, 2004).  They originated in the 1970s and 1980s 
reform movements during the waning years of the military dictatorship and their emergence can 
be divided in three distinct phases.  Still during the dictatorship, early municipal councils had no 
power, given the certainties of centralized powers at the time.  During the period of “political 
opening,” which was marked by widespread societal pressure for democratization, new political 
actors and modes of interaction with the state began to emerge (Tatagiba, 2004).     
The end of the military dictatorship marks the third phase of the instutionalization of 
municipal councils.  They slowly became legitimized through new constitutional principles, the 
restructuring of policies, and political-administrative decentralization (ibid).  With the new 
constitution of 1988, policy councils in all three levels of government (federal, state, and 
municipal) became formalized channels of “autonomous decision” with representation of both 
the state and civil society and a part of the state administrative structure (Tatagiba, 2004, 360).  
During the 1990s, their formal codification provided for a widespread expansion and 
diversification of their implementation and areas of actuation.  In São Paulo, this expansion 
occurred through the creation of the Lei Organica Municipal de São Paulo (São Paulo Organic 
Law, the set of statutes that govern the city). 
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Municipal Council Dynamics 
Nonetheless, there is a contradiction between the theoretical literature—like that 
introduced in Chapter 1—and the realities of transition, democratic reform, and urban 
inequalities in the Brazilian context (Pupo and Bueno, 2012).   These institutions represent the 
possibility of the institutionalization of participation and the ability to intervene in public 
administration through collaboration with the state in that municipal councils are spaces of 
decision, as defined by law (Gohn, 2002).  In practice, they are only virtual spaces that lack 
decision-making powers.   Concurrent policy elaboration processes, outside of those occurring 
within the municipal councils, can undermine the actual influence of the participatory processes 
(Pupo and Bueno, 2012).  Similarly, these structures have limited the ability to keep mayoral 
power in check in formulating urban policy agendas and have been unable to modify the 
practices and agendas of city councils, as they have subsequently increased their own clientist 
(exchanging favors), old-style politics (Wampler, 2004; Tonella, 2013). 
Internally, the poor are most often not self-representing, but are represented by civil 
society actors that are politically connected to elected officials and governmental departments 
(Hernandez-Medina, 2010; Lavalle et al, 2005; Coelho, 2006).  This makes municipal councils a 
policy issue approach more than representative approach of governance (Lavalle et al, 2005).  
Similarly, prescriptive conceptualizations of an idealized form of democratic participation—
implicit in many critiques—overlook the fact that they emphasize different moments in the 
policymaking process:  formulation, implementation, or monitoring (Silver et al, 2010, 453). 
  The membership formation of the councils can also pose problems.  The inclusion of civil 
society actors, rather than the extent of their participation, serves as the legitimizer of the 
process; consequently, the inclusion of real estate interests and those connected to the political 
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party in power undermine the municipal councils (Pupo and Bueno, 2012).  This, because 
specific regulations provide for the same number of participants from government bodies as civil 
society groups.  In addition, with each successive political administration change, the 
composition of municipal councils changes (Tatagiba, 2011).   In this regard, the state has 
developed its own controls to regulate and influence the composition of municipal councils and 
other democratic participation bodies that can result in the favoring of certain alliances and 
regimes (Vera et al, 2012). 
   Additionally, the political orientation of the party in power at the municipal level changes 
the ways in which civil society actors interact with the state.  In leftist government power, they 
tend to be less conflictive and use protests less, while taking advantage of the greater ability to 
participate directly. Yet, this often increases internal fragmentation between the various interest 
groups.  Similarly, public policies that incorporate participation tend to push groups to negotiate 
with the government, while less permeable policies often result in more direct actions, like 
demonstrations (Tatagiba, 2011). 
 In São Paulo, this form of participation distinguishes itself through the direct 
participation of common citizens and civil organizations.  They have found that politically 
embedded actors, along with those politically connected (especially with the Workers Party, PT), 
and those included by the government for service provision have higher propensities to 
participate (Houtzager et al, 2004).  Nonetheless, they have observed that there is a tri-part model 
between different forms of participation, incorporation or interpretation of benefits, and 
articulation of involvement within the civil society groups.  They note that this multitude of 
structural combinations, including:  functions of different actors; interconnections between those 
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who participate; and roles political parties and the state, mark the emergence of a new form of 
mass politics in São Paulo (Houtzager et al, 2004).   
In 2004, there were 19 municipal councils active in the city of São Paulo, but there was a 
large variation in their meeting frequency (Tatagiba, 2004).  Tatagiba (2004) observed that of 
these, half directly elect their president, while the remainder appoint one from the relevant city 
secretariat.  Additionally, the seats were distributed with a slight favoring of civil society groups: 
53.8% civil society and 37.3% city or other government representatives (Tatagiba, 2004, 342-
346).   Despite the municipal council federal enabling legislation calling for equal representation 
between civil society and government, 11 councils had more civil society representatives, four 
more government representatives, and only two an even distribution between the two (Tatagiba, 
2004, 350-352).  Civil society representatives included civil associations, residents, unions and 
professional associations, and even businesses and business leadership organizations (Tatagiba, 
2004, 353-355).  There was also no consistency in member selection, with some councils using 
elections, regional elections, sectorial elections, and even appointments (ibid).   Finally, the 
organizations also did not have uniform capacities, while seven were deliberative and two had 
oversight powers, the majority (nine) were merely bodies used for consultation (Tatagiba, 360).  
Part of this variance is attributed to whether their creation was originally from federal legislation 
or from municipal legislation.  Nonetheless, these numbers oversimplify the actual capacities of 
the councils:  those with low deliberative capacities can be strong in budgetary control or in the 
execution of programs and projects (Tatagiba, 2004). 
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From Municipal Councils to Project-specific Municipal Management Councils 
In addition to the sectoral-based municipal management councils, São Paulo is also home 
to project-specific councils where public housing projects are to be completed in special zones.  
While São Paulo was not the first city to create these zones, it is the only major city to require 
participatory councils for them and the case described herein is the first time in Brazilian history 
where a management council was formed for a ZEIS 3.  This configuration is also different in 
that the ZEIS and management council are inside of the larger Nova Luz project perimeter and 
were therefore created following that project’s plan and not the typical—and legally mandated—
process discussed below.   
There are four different types of these zones, termed ZEIS (Zonas Especiais de Interesse 
Social, Special Interest Housing Zones), in São Paulo.  Within the 45 block perimeter of Nova 
Luz, 11 blocks were demarcated as ZEIS 3 in the 2002 Plano Diretor (Master Plan). The Plan 
designates ZEIS 3 as areas destined for public interest housing, with predominately-underutilized 
lots and buildings, situated in areas with preexisting infrastructure, urban services, and 
employment opportunities. 
Two mayoral decrees in 2004 outline the planning process and requirements in all ZEIS 
areas, including the role of the management council.  Decree 44 44.667 passed on 26 April 26, 
2004 regulates the provisions of Law No. 13.430, the São Paulo Master Plan, of September 13, 
2002. It establishes the Strategic Master Plan requirements for ZEIS areas, Urbanization Plans, 
and provides for specific standards for the production Public and Low Income Housing.  In its 
outlined sequence of events, the creation of the Management Council is the first item and is 
tasked with approving urban, social, infrastructure and housing plans for the specific project 
area. 
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The second decree, 45.127 passed on August 13, 2004, amends provisions of the original 
decree along with regulating Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 13.657, of October 2003, granting 
exemption from building rates; providing exemption from payment of public fees in the cases 
specified therein; and establishing standards of competence.  It also specifies the structure and 
details more of the activities of the management council.  Specifically, Article 22 states that the 
Council is coordinated by SEHAB, composed of representatives of the Government, including 
public utilities; and civil society, including residents, their associations and homeowners located 
in ZEIS, with parity between the number of representatives of the Government and civil society, 
each serving two year terms with the possibility for one reelection.  That article also states that 
the Management Council develops and approves its own bylaws and coordinates participation of 
the population and NGOs in the project area. 
 
Forms of Participation in the Nova Luz Project 
 In addition to the contractual obligations requiring the creation of various studies and 
plans, the consortium was also required to create and manage a communication plan for public 
interactions.  This plan outlined three different channels of interaction, two of which are legal 
obligations based in the Master Plan:  the creation of a Management Council to accompany and 
approve the ZEIS urbanization plan and Public Hearings.  The third was left to the consortium’s 
discretion to design and consisted of the creation of written and visual materials, a project 
website, and an information center in the project area.   
The specific laws which created the urban concessions redevelopment instrument and 
provided for its use in Nova Luz (Law No. 14.917, May 7, 2009 “Urban Concessions Law” and 
Law No. 14.918, May 7, 2009 “Authorizing the executive to apply the urban concession in Nova 
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Luz,” respectively; included as Appendices I and II) provide for a management council, as well.  
In Article 4, the mayor was required to establish the Nova Luz Management Council, composed 
of equal representatives of civil society and the city government.  It also gave the mayor the 
power to appoint the Chair of the Management Council. 
This process, however was not completed since it only provides for the creation of a 
council following the completion of the project plan and once the implementation phase is 
contracted.  Additionally, it would have only had verification and monitoring compliance 
capacities during project implementation.  Therefore, in the subsections that follow I present the 
details, processes, and outcomes of each of the three channels that were actually completed. 
 
Participatory Planning through the Management Council 
The presence of a ZEIS 3 within the larger Nova Luz project perimeter makes mandatory 
a management council, as outlined in the two decrees above.  This body, however, was not 
created until April 2011, just three months before the original project plan delivery date.  
AMOALUZ (Associação de Moradores e Amigos da Santa Ifigenia e da Luz), the most active 
and organized of the social movements in the area, along with other housing movements 
pressured the city government and project coordinators to initiate the process of community 
meetings and formal elections under the Housing Secretariat’s direction.  According to 
interviews with movement leaders, AMOALUZ was formed in 2009, with the goal of 
articulating residents’ concerns with the Nova Luz project.32  Following meetings with project 
coordinators, where the association’s leaders were urged to formalize a group, AMOALUZ 
                                                            
32 Interviews with Clara Marques (03/2013) Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Clara Marques (07/2012) 
Communications Director, Nova Luz Project; Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone 
Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
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attempted to confront the high levels of indifference and low levels of knowledge amongst 
residents towards the project.33  Renters, which make up 49.5% of the neighborhood residents, 
were especially inactive in the council, due to their perceived lack of power in relation to the 
state and social vulnerability (Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2011).   
 Under the early leadership of the Centro Gaspar Garcia, ten meetings were held, 
including representation from the already articulated commercial association (Associação dos 
Commerciantes de Santa Ifigenia) (see below).34  However, according to interviews with 
movement leaders, this group was reluctant to participate in the process.35  They perceived 
AMOALUZ’s actions in attempting to articulate changes in the project through the formal—
internal to the public sector—bodies as a form of cooptation and legitimization of the Nova Luz 
project.   
 
“They thought that by negotiating with the city about the project we were supporting it or 
working with the city.  In reality, we realized that it would be good if it were ended, but 
we have to try to improve it [through the Municipal Management Council] in case the 
court cases don’t go through so we aren’t stuck with something really bad.”  (Simone 
Gatti, ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
Additionally, because the management council’s oversight was just directly the public housing 
portion of the larger Nova Luz project, they were excluded from participation in that body. 
                                                            
33 Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
34 Interview with Luiz Kohara (11/2013) Director, Centro Gaspar Garcia de Direitos Humanos 
35 Interviews with Antonio Santana (07/2013) President, AMSI; Antonio Santana (10/2012) President, AMSI; Paulo 
Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President; Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
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Nonetheless, they did attempt to form their own housing group (AMSI-Associação de Moradores 
de Santa Ifigenia) with separate but highly connected leadership.  This group’s activities and 
positions were similar to those of the commercial association, including many of the project 
demands and stance towards AMOALUZ.  This undoubtedly limited their engagement with the 
municipal council and other civil society groups, and they were not granted a seat on the council. 
 Following those ten meetings, the associations (AMOALUZ; Associação Comunitária de 
Moradores na luta por Justiça, Ocupação Mauá; UMM-União dos Movimentos de Moradia-; 
Movimento Estadual da População de Rua-MEPP; GARMIC-Grupo de Articulação para a 
Conquista da Moradia do Idoso da Capital; FLM-Frente de Luta da Moradia; Centro Gaspar 
Garcia de Direitos Humanos; MSTC-Movimento dos Sem Teto do Centro; ASTC-Associação 
dos Sem Teto do Centro; MMRC-Movimento de Moradia da Região Centro; and ULC-
Unificação da Luta de Cortiços), under AMOALUZ’s leadership, forwarded the only proposal to 
the city government in June 2011.  After much debate, this proposal allowed for the formation of 
a council with split membership:  six seats to be granted to civil society and six to the public 
sector.  Of this, the civil society seats were further divided:  four seats were to be granted to 
active civil society groups in the region (which would in turn represent the others without seats) 
and appointed by the groups themselves, without vote.  One of the remaining two was destined 
for an area resident representing property owners and the other an area resident representing 
renters.  According to meeting minutes and interviews with city and movement leaders, 
following further pressure from commercial interests, two seats were later added with the idea 
that commercial interests could be represented.36  The final distribution included representatives, 
                                                            
36 Interviews with Alonzo Lopez (08/2012) Nova Luz Public Housing Project Manager, Housing Secretariat; 
Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni (08/2012) ZEIS 
Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat 
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among the public sector chairs from:  two from the Secretaria Municipal de Habitação-
Superintendência de Habitação Popular (Public Housing Department, Municipal Housing 
Secretariat); Secretaria Municipal de Infraestrutura Urbana (Municipal Urban Infrastructure 
Secretariat); Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Urbano (Urban Development Municipal 
Secretariat); São Paulo Urbanismo (São Paulo Urbanism); São Paulo Obras (São Paulo Public 
Works); Companhia Metropolitana de Habitação de São Paulo (São Paulo Metropolitan Housing 
Company); and the Subprefeitura da Sé (Se Subprefecture).  From civil society, representatives 
included:  AMOALUZ; Associação Comunitária de Moradores na Luta por Justiça; União dos 
Movimentos de Moradia; Movimento Nacional da População de Rua-MNPR; and four elected 
representatives, all property owners and most representing local comercial interests, because of 
the lack of interest among renters. 
 Although the management council was successfully formed (depicted in a typical 
meeting in Figure 17), a number of irregularities occurred during this process.  The Housing 
Secretariat did not create the management council at the legislatively prescribed time.  
Additionally, since the ZEIS and management council are within the larger Nova Luz project 
perimeter, they were created following that project’s directives and developed by the city 
government and project consortium—not by the management council as provided for by the 
decrees outlined above.  At the onset, this left the council with the power to revise and not 
develop the urbanization plan for the area.  Property owners are also guaranteed involvement in 
this process, but were nonetheless not included in the initial formation of the management 
council.  Conversely, guarantees to include the population in greatest need of public housing in 
the area—renters—were not proposed.  According to surveys conducted during project creation, 
within the Nova Luz project perimeter this population represents 49.5% of the residents, of 
 
 
124 
which 44.39% have incomes below three minimum wages.  Within the ZEIS perimeter, these 
numbers swell to 72.09% and 82.07%, respectively (Prefeitura de São Paulo, 2011).  However, it 
was difficult to involve this population: 
 
“They [renters] make up a large portion of the residents here, but we can’t get them to 
participate. They don’t have seats on the council and it was difficult to get them to come 
out to meetings and events.  They feel they don’t have much power or influence.”  
(Simone Gatti, ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  Municipal Management Council Meeting (image by Joshua Shake) 
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Following the council formation, tensions continued between the civil society 
representatives and those representing the city.  According to interviews with movement leaders, 
many of these centered on the extent to which the council could make changes to the Nova Luz 
project outside of the ZEIS perimeter and make changes to the draft project already completed.37  
Contradicting the Master Plan and Nova Luz project directives, the draft plan was presented to 
the council the same time the licensing began—although the urbanization plan had not yet been 
approved by the council.  Up to that point, the council had only approved the ZEIS 3 project 
directives and not debated the preliminary urbanization plan.  Within the civil society groups, 
however, collaborative activities emerged.  They held meetings before the official council 
meetings and collectively drafted documents, in order to be a unified front in negotiating their 
desired changes to the project and its plans, according to movement leaders.38 
 The civil society members then notified the Defensoria Publica (attorney general), which 
attempted a Termo de Ajuste de Conduta (TAC-Conduct adjustment terms) with the Urban 
Development Secretary such that the council would be able to analyze and approve the ZEIS 
urbanization plan before licensing began.  The Secretariat, however, did not agree to the terms 
under the justification that the council could continue evaluating the document during the 
licensing period and that the council had already completed its main task in drafting the 
urbanization plan directives. 
Despite being beset by problems from the onset, the council was successful in changing 
the original 11 directives (as proposed by the public sector) into 37 (See Appendix D).  Among 
them, the following are most notable:  the need to create a registry of residents and businesses as 
                                                            
37 Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
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a guarantee of attending and understanding of the actual project demands; the creation of 
instruments that guarantee the permanence of the present population and local commercial 
activities; the revision of intervention criteria that ignored productive activities and cultural 
heritage in the region; the creation of housing policies beyond home ownership for residents 
between 0 and 3 minimum wages that do not qualify for financing; and, mechanisms that restrict 
the resale of public housing, such that the subsidy destined to low income housing not be 
destined to middle classes during short- or medium-term valorization of the area. 
 Because of the problems in the timeline and the public sector’s continuance of the 
licensing process, none of these suggestions materialized in preliminary plans.  Consequently, 
the rest of the council’s meetings focused on debates and discussions of how to include them.  
Nonetheless, this process highlighted some of the policy problems of the larger Urban 
Concessions format, like the lack of definition of mechanisms to guarantee the permanence of 
existing residents and commercial activities.    
The council was able to finally vote on the ZEIS urbanization plan on April 4, 2012, but 
under pressure to complete this phase of the planning process.  The plan was approved, but 
without the participation of the civil society actors.  They refused to vote because of a number of 
unanswered concerns including the inclusion of revisions and the lack of specific policies for the 
inclusion of current residents in the plan.39  Although they did not vote, there was still an official 
quorum since enough representatives from the public sector bodies were present to allow for a 
vote.  The Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo Attorney General) once again 
intervened with na Ação Civil Pública (Civil Public Action).  This attempted to reject the vote 
and re-empower the participatory process.  Following a city government appeal, the Tribunal de 
                                                            
39 Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
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Justiça de São Paulo (São Paulo Court) upheld the action and stayed the Nova Luz administrative 
process.   
In the waning months of the project (in 2012), after the process was reinstated and as the 
public sector was attempting to complete the bid process, the civil society actors pushed for the 
inclusion of the above directives in the relevant bid documents.  Just as the public sector viewed 
this as a way to ensure continuation of the Nova Luz project, civil society saw this as the only 
way to guarantee that all of the decisions between them and the public sector would be realized; 
or, at least create an institutional, political, and legal antecedent for future actions.40  In the final 
plan, many of the civil society concerns were incorporated, but not in their entirety (See 
Appendix E).  Nonetheless, the earlier court stay did allow for the reworking of the cadastro 
(registry) of residents.  This instrument was not originally a part of the planning process, but 
provided for a guarantee of the permanence of the present residents.  A critical component, the 
Instrução Normativa do Cadastro (Normative Registry Instructions) was not included, however.  
This would have strengthened the above guarantees, but did not have adequate public sector 
support.  It would have created a Cartão de Atendimento (Service Card) to be given to each 
family, which would have functioned as a guarantee of an actual housing unit in the new ZEIS 
project, along with providing directives for attending the necessities of immigrant families—a 
significant population of the area.  Public sector representatives argued that the specific details of 
the housing provision process would be elaborated in future planning steps, like the creation of 
the Plano de Relocação (Relocation Plan).41  Civil society actors, however, alleged that this was 
                                                            
40 Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; 
Jacqulene Mazoni (08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat 
41 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Alonzo Lopez (08/2012) Nova Luz Public Housing 
Project Manager, Housing Secretariat 
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just another attempt at speeding up the bid process.42  Structurally, however, it is worth noting 
that according to the legally defined planning process, the Relocation Plan is an integral part of 
the Urbanization Plan and has direct impacts on the concessions and public benefits to be defined 
in the bid documents.  
 Another major victory was with the number of public housing units to be produced within 
the ZEIS perimeter.  The minimum percentage required by law is 50%, but this was increased to 
80%, leaving 20% for market-rate housing.  Based on preliminary demand studies, this 
percentage was also directed for families whose income is less than six minimum wages.  This is 
also noteworthy in that it increased the amount of low income housing to be available in the 
central region of the city, as this region contains the highest housing deficit in the entire city, 
thus attempting to provide housing for both the relocation of current residents and the provision 
of units for others.  Additionally, the council was able to preserve the Bar Leo, an identified 
cultural heritage site within the perimeter that was originally destined for demolition.43  Attempts 
at similar actions for other structures outside of the ZEIS perimeter were merely considered as 
suggestions, since they were outside of the prescribed purview of the council. 
 On the surface, much of this participatory process could be seen as just appeasing the 
minimum legal requirements for participatory planning (through the municipal management 
council ).  Indeed, especially at the early stages, meetings seemed to be more informative than 
decision making.  This, and the issues of when meetings were held during the planning 
process—after some preliminary plans were already developed—and the exclusion of relevant 
actors privileged technocratic rationality over collective rationality (Forester, 1989; 1993; 
                                                            
42 42 Interviews with Simone Gatti (07/2013) ZEIS Councilmember, AMOALUZ; Simone Gatti (10/2012) ZEIS 
Councilmember, AMOALUZ 
43 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat 
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Flyvbjerg, 1998; Dryzek, 1990).  In doing so, they privileged the market rationalities embedded 
within this mode of entrepreneurial urbanism.  The prescribed process, with set goals and 
actions, along with minimal opportunities for the participatory planning process’ municipal 
management council to make real changes to the plan raises questions regarding the 
“participatory nature” of the council; participatory planning bodies’ activities should unfold as 
the process progresses, rather than have predetermined outcomes (Healey, 1993).  Management 
council members from the community were able to affect real change, however, through their 
perseverance and persistence for a more democratic process, despite glaring undemocratic issues 
like the vote on the ZEIS urbanization plan. 
 
Communication Strategies and Public Hearings 
According to the contractual agreements, the consortium team was responsible for 
administering the two other public information channels for the overall Nova Luz project.  
Specifically, they were tasked with “divulging the proposal to the various interested societal 
sectors, in a clear and objective format, since this is an official channel of information to 
guarantee the population’s accompaniment of the process and participation in the creation of the 
plan” (Termos de Referencia).  This took the form of various printed materials, a website, and an 
information center in the area.   
In practice, this resulted in the disclosure of previously drafted preliminary plan 
documents, both on the website and at the information center, more than the management of a 
participatory process involving the community at large.  The information center actually opened 
some time after the preliminary plans were created.  It served as a display for architectural 
renderings and models, rather than a formal space for receiving project feedback from the 
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community.  Of the nearly 5000 visitors, about 2316 visited the space for cultural activities.  The 
website also only provided meeting minutes after significant community pressure, and received 
723 messages throughout the project planning phases, but about 30% of those messages were 
from university students and researchers inquiring about various project aspects (Subproduto 
7.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18:  Nova Luz Project Public Hearing (image by Prefeitura de São Paulo, used with 
permission) 
 
 
 
 The third and final form of public interaction was a series of public hearings (depicted in 
Figure 18) and meetings.  The urban concession Terms of Reference (included as Appendix C) 
defines the roles of both the consortium and the city in these types of meetings.   The city 
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government was responsible for sending official invitations and establishment of a venue for the 
meetings.  Whereas the consortium was responsible for all in-meeting management including 
completion and dissemination of meeting minutes.  
Throughout the public hearing and wider public participation process, the private sector 
actors (consortium) and not the city are responsible for taking the lead.  Also, recall from 
Chapter 3 that according to the national public-private partnership law, public hearings only need 
to be held after a preliminary plan has been completed.  These two legal structures raise 
important questions about the legitimacy of the wider public participation process.  The first 
public hearing was held on January 14, 2011, but was suspended by the city government before 
completed because of security concerns.  The presentation of preliminary project plans began, 
but because of community frustrations and protest, it was impossible for the presentation to 
continue.  Nonetheless, consortium documents suggest that this was a legitimate public hearing 
and counted towards the minimum number of hearings required, despite many legal arguments to 
the contrary.  In total, five hearings were held during the entire duration of the planning process, 
split between open hearings and required public hearings in front of specific city boards in the 
approval process. 
There were also 30 sectorial meetings held with various groups.  Of these, eight were city 
departments or boards, seven with civil society groups indirectly connected to the region, and 
nine with commercial interests in the neighborhood.  While some of these meetings were 
initiated by the consortium, many of them were held following specific groups initiative.  Instead 
of forming a methodological participatory process of community interaction, these meetings 
were part of a disjointed and closed door process.  For its part, the consortium concluded that 
“There was significant participation from diverse actors in the preparation of the Nova Luz 
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project” (Subproduto 7.2).  In the consortium’s summary documents, most of the highlighted 
outcomes from all of the participatory processes are those that emerged from the ZEIS 
management council.  Others include the creation of social facilities, including those directed at 
educational, health, social care, elderly, and leisure services.  Finally, and most notable, were 
changes to the possible means of project completion participation by current property owners 
during the implementation phases.  The format still restricts their participation to following the 
plan’s guidelines for their property; that the specifics of this format emerged from discussions 
and were not part of the original structure further underscores the extent to which Nova Luz is an 
example of privatized urban planning. 
 
Extra-formal Participation and the End of the Project 
At the same time that the above activities were occurring in the formal participation 
frameworks—the ZEIS management council and public hearings and meetings—another form of 
participation, that I call extra-formal participation, was occurring primarily under the direction of 
the Associação dos Comerciantes de Santa Ifigenia (ACSI-Santa Ifigenia Commercial 
Association).  This group formed in 2005 in direct opposition to the Nova Luz project.  They 
viewed AMOALUZs actions as a de facto acceptance of the project and took the position that the 
project should be ended.44  That is, rather than negotiate possible improvements in the project 
should it go forward, it should be declared unconstitutional through court actions.  They argued 
that the provisions of the urban concessions law, allowing for the private sector completion of 
the project, were an illegal taking of private property for another private use.45  They also 
                                                            
44 Interviews with Antonio Santana (07/2013) President, AMSI; Antonio Santana (10/2012) President, AMSI; Paulo 
Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President 
45 Interviews with Antonio Santana (07/2013) President, AMSI; Antonio Santana (10/2012) President, AMSI; Paulo 
Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President 
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stressed the lack of guarantees for maintaining current businesses in the redevelopment project.  
Additionally, many of their arguments centered on the perceived dubious nature from which the 
project emerged, citing that: the law was originally drafted by SECOVI (the real estate 
development association); the councilmembers, including the law’s sponsor, all received money 
from real estate interests; most of those councilmembers and the mayor were being investigated 
for impropriety; the law passed the legality and constitutionality commission of the city council 
by a 5-4 vote, and all those that voted in favor received campaign money from real estate 
interests; and the emergence of the term “crackolandia” as propaganda to garner support for the 
redevelopment project:46 
 
“They created this term—crackolandia—to stigmatize this area.  You never heard it 
before, and now it is all over the media…And what they’re doing is unconstitutional.  We 
can’t negotiate with it, it isn’t right.  We have to stop it.”  (Paulo Garcia, ACSI President; 
translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
In April of 2011, they were successful in suspending the project through an “ação direta 
de inconstitutionalidade (ADIN-direct unconstitutionality action).  Other commercial 
associations, including the Sindicato do Comércio Varejista de Material Elétrico e Aparelhos 
Eletrodomésticos no Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo State Electric and Electrodomestic 
Appliances Commercial Association) supported this action.  They argued that the Nova Luz 
project would also result in widespread layoffs due to the removal of the neighborhood’s 
                                                            
46 Interviews with Antonio Santana (07/2013) President, AMSI; Antonio Santana (10/2012) President, AMSI; Paulo 
Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President 
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commercial activities.47  Days after, however, the suspension itself was stayed, starting a legal 
back-and-forth of appeals that would continue through late 2012.  The suspension was 
reactivated and then stayed once again by the Tribunal de Justiça (courts) in February/March 
2012, as the project leaders were awaiting the approval of the impact study—the last step before 
bidding the project completion phase.  This decision also was said to prevent any further 
suspensions until those up to this point reached final resolution.  However, in June, the third 
suspension was granted, this time in the 6a Vara da Fazenda Publica de São Paulo (6tth Branch of 
the São Paulo Internal Revenue Service) through an ação civil publica (civil public action) 
started in May 2012 by the Defensoria Publica (attorney general).  Despite the previous decision 
barring future suspensions, the city government still had to appeal this final suspension proving 
that the previous decision had occurred. 
 After successfully registering that appeal, the city government was able to continue the 
process of internal approvals, completing it in October of 2012.  This, however proved to be too 
late for the Kassab administration to bid the project implementation phase; the requests for 
proposals had not reached formal draft form and still had to be open for a determined amount of 
time—meaning that contracts could not be signed by the end of the elected term in December 
2012.  In Brazil, elections are also held in October and Kassab was not able to run for reelection.  
Seeing an opportunity, ACSI, with support from other civil society actors, drafted an agreement 
regarding the mayoral candidates’ stances on the Nova Luz project.48  Three of the four 
frontrunners and all but one of the other candidates signed the agreement, which stated that the 
candidate, if elected, would “suspend and revise the Nova Luz project, along with alter it in 
                                                            
47 Interviews with Antonio Santana (07/2013) President, AMSI; Antonio Santana (10/2012) President, AMSI; Paulo 
Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President 
48 Interviews with Paulo Garcia (09/2013) ACSI President; Paulo Garcia (08/2012) ACSI President 
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consideration of the needs of the population that lives and works in the region.”  The only major 
candidate to not sign was Jose Serra (PSDB), who had given birth to the Nova Luz project during 
his uncompleted term as mayor in 2005-2006.  Since no candidate received a minimum of 50% 
of all votes in the first round elections, Serra and Fernando Haddad (PT) completed a second 
round runoff.  Haddad was elected with 55.57% of votes (3,387,720) to Serra’s 44.43% 
(2,708,768).  At the district level, Haddad won in Santa Ifigenia, with 50.98% (27,809) to Serra’s 
49.02% (27,809), reversing the result of the first round (27.13% Haddad to 36.09% for Serra).  
This also meant that the Santa Ifigenia district was the only one in the central region in which 
Haddad won—a result the community groups attribute to their mobilizations in his support 
leading up to the final election. 
Another court suspension in January 2013 (in the 6a Vara da Fazenda Publica) 
determined that the city government make alterations to the project, and consider the project’s 
congruence with the Master Plan and other relevant city regulations.  The attorney general, 
which had drafted the action that resulted in the decision, further elaborated that the city 
government should have completed the registry of residents and that the ZEIS management 
council did not follow all of the legal requirements dealing with its operations.  The judge who 
handed down the decision stated: “the present situation is one of constant disrespect on the part 
of the city government for the constitutional and legal necessities of public participation” (G1 
São Paulo). 
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Figure 19:  Meeting Between Community and City Groups (image by Camila de Oliveira, 
used with permission) 
 
 
 
Even before taking office, Haddad expressed concerns and that he did not want to 
continue the project as it was conceived, but rather still take advantage of some of its physical 
components.  Members of his incoming administration, including the Urban Development 
Secretary, met with civil society actors involved with the ZEIS council still in December.  Then, 
shortly after taking office in January, the Haddad administration announced that the project was 
“technically unviable” due to the costs involved.  It expressed interest in pursuing other types of 
public-private partnerships to revitalize the area.  In February, a second meeting was held 
between AMOALUZ, FLM, MSTC, and representatives from the Urban Development 
Secretariat (shown in Figure 19).  At it, it was confirmed that the Nova Luz project was canceled 
and that government actions in the region would be through the ZEIS, in that it already had an 
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active management council with proposals.49  City officials stressed that instead of focusing just 
on housing, these approaches would be more comprehensive and address historic preservation, 
mobility, and public health and safety; the Urban Development Secretariat would also assume 
administrative responsibilities for this ZEIS, along with the Housing Secretariat.  The 
coordination for the public participation department also stressed that the activities of the ZEIS 
management council resume.  Over a year later, however, this has not occurred.50  And 
community leaders began to realize that the Santa Ifigenia/Luz area may not be a priority: 
 
“It worked out for us.  They did make some improvements.  The streets are a little better 
and they upgraded all of the fiber optic cables in the neighborhood, so the internet is a lot 
faster.  But, now there is not project for here.  The city isn’t doing anything here but there 
are still a lot of problems to be fixed.  Perhaps bad attention is better than no attention…”   
(Paulo Garcia, ACSI President; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
Maua Occupation 
Another, smaller scale, form of extra-formal participation occurred in the Nova Luz 
process.  Within the project perimeter, Ocupação Maua (Maua Occupation) has received 
significant local and international attention for its internal community-based regulations system 
and maintenance and cleaning collaborative efforts (see Figure 20).  In 2003, the first occupation 
of the old and abandoned Hotel Santos Dumont occurred, under the leadership of the MSTC.  
                                                            
49 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Teresa Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat 
50 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Teresa Herling (04/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban 
Development Secretariat; Teresa Herling (09/2013) Adjunct Secretary, Urban Development Secretariat 
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Just 35 days later, the first police-led removal occurred.  Four years later, in 2007, the second 
occupation occurred.  At this point, the building had been abandoned for twenty years.  This 
second occupation was led by the MSTC and two other organizations:  Movimento de Moradia 
da Região Centro (MMRC) and the Associação Sem-Teto da Cidade de São Paulo (ASTCSP).  A 
few hours following this second occupation, a police report was filed but no other actions 
occurred. At the time, the six story building was home to 237 families and represented on the 
ZEIS management council.   
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 20:  Before and After Photos of Resident Improvements at Maua Occupation (image 
by Projeto Maua 340, used with permission) 
 
 
 
 
 
According to planning documents, the Nova Luz project defined the site of the Maua 
Occupation as an area destined for entertainment uses, meaning the building was to be 
 
 
139 
demolished.  Through actions in the ZEIS council in 2011, the members were able to explicitly 
remove the building from the Nova Luz project—the only building to not be considered by the 
plans.51  Instead of being included in the project plans, project leaders decided that the residents 
could remain and the building remodeled and designated as public housing.  The Housing 
Secretariat also expressed interest in providing support for the necessary building reforms. 
Shortly thereafter, the absent property owner entered with another de-occupation order, 
despite owing the city R$2.65 million in back taxes.  Occupation leaders assumed this sudden 
interest resulted from the fact that the building would no longer be demolished in the Nova Luz 
plans and he served to profit—despite the back taxes—should the area be redeveloped.52  This 
action was taken to court just one week before the occupation would have completed five years, 
a period in which the constitutional mechanism of “usucapião” (automatic control after 
occupation) could take place and increase the chances of the residents obtaining the rights to the 
building.  Their intention was to demolish the building and transform the site into a 160 unit 
mixed use complex, with ground floor commercial activities for “sem-teto” residents and had 
even raised funds for a feasibility study.   
Following the effective end of the Nova Luz project, Housing Secretariat officials 
expressed concern about the future of the project.53  Although the residents were able to delay 
the de-occupation orders until 2012 and again through 2013, officials stressed that they were 
without a project in city processing:   
                                                            
51 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Nelson Souza (03/2014) Community Leader, ZEIS 
Councilmember, MSTC (Maua Occupation); Roberto Mallo (03/2014) Community Leader, MSTC (Maua 
Occupation) 
52 Interviews with Nelson Souza (03/2014) Community Leader, ZEIS Councilmember, MSTC (Maua Occupation); 
Roberto Mallo (03/2014) Community Leader, MSTC (Maua Occupation) 
53 Interviews with Jacqulene Mazoni (09/2013) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; Jacqulene Mazoni 
(08/2012) ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat 
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“They see it as a victory but I don’t know…before they had a project and were included 
in a plan; now they don’t have anything and have to restart at the beginning.”  (Jacqulene 
Mazoni, ZEIS Council Coordinator, Housing Secretariat; translation by Joshua Shake) 
 
This is highlighted by the fact that despite receiving some recognition from the Housing 
Department, in the Brazilian legal system this was not enough to prevent the filing of the de-
occupation orders at the onset, but did nonetheless aid in the granting of the delays. 
One of the early actions of the new mayoral administration (PT, discussed in detail in the 
next section and in Chapter 1) was a series of meetings with “sem-teto” housing movements just 
seven days into the term in 2013.  In July of that same year, the new mayor Haddad published a 
decree declaring the Occupation site as a social interest area—the first step in the series of 
actions necessary to transform the site into public housing according to interviews with housing 
movement leaders.54  Yet, in November, another court decision occurred reversing the previous 
delays—this against the wishes of some government agencies (Se Subprefecture, attorney 
general, and the Conselho Tutelar-child protective services) and without notifying the 
residents—and setting the date for April 2014.  Fortunately, just a few weeks before, in March, 
the city government formalized the purchase plans for the site delaying the process once more.  
Later, at the end of April, the city government made the initial deposit for taking possession of 
the building, seemingly ending the uncertainties.  Nonetheless, the property owner can still 
appeal this action.55 
 
                                                            
54 Interviews with Nelson Souza (03/2014) Community Leader, ZEIS Councilmember, MSTC (Maua Occupation); 
Roberto Mallo (03/2014) Community Leader, MSTC (Maua Occupation) 
55 Interviews with Nelson Souza (03/2014) Community Leader, ZEIS Councilmember, MSTC (Maua Occupation); 
Roberto Mallo (03/2014) Community Leader, MSTC (Maua Occupation) 
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Conclusions 
 Democratic forms of governance emerged at about the same historical moment as 
entrepreneurial forms of governance in Brazil.  That is, in the 1980s and 1990s as Brazil was in 
the process of redemocratization.  We saw the entrepreneurial shift occurred due to 
hyperinflation, other economic issues, and the desire to decentralize the central military 
government’s rule.  On the other hand, the various forms of participatory governance emerged 
from the growth of social movements calling for direct elections and the end of the dictatorship.  
With the passage of the new constitution and subsequent laws and regulations, these institutions 
became structural components within the new democracy.  Yet, these two governance 
strategies—although both present—evolved on different paths and only recently were brought 
back together.  This, however, occurred almost by happenstance, due to the overlapping 
regulatory frameworks for Nova Luz.  Recall that the redevelopment mechanisms were 
developed specifically for this project, and should the project area not have had public housing 
zoning (ZEIS), this entire story could have been very different.  It was the existence of this 
zoning that required the management council.  
In this case, participatory governance and the institutions and actors that make it up are 
still immature.  This example in São Paulo was the first time a project specific municipal council 
was used in all of Brazil, and the most active civil society groups actually just formed in 
opposition to the project—rather than being longstanding community based associations as seen 
in other arenas.  Contrary to other research, the civil society actors that were most active were 
not explicitly those that were most politically connected but rather those that were most visible.  
Yet, an aversion to this possibility was indeed present in the dynamics between AMOALUZ and 
ACSI.  ACSI perceived that AMOALUZ’s engagement with the municipal council was 
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legitimizing the project.  Rather, it was the only possible way to minimize the possible impacts 
of the project and effectively renegotiate some of its components.  As Pupo and Bueno (2012) 
point out, policy processes outside of the participatory council can have significant impacts on 
those within it, even undermining them in some cases. 
Additionally, the specific types of participation engagement in this example differ from 
those observed in other contexts.  Tatagiba (2011) noted that in other participatory bodies, the 
political orientation of the party in power dictates the type of participation that occurs: in left 
leaning governments, civil society actors tend to participate directly while in right leaning 
governments they tend to be more confrontational.  In this case, the dynamics between ACSI and 
AMOALUZ provide a different conclusion.  The two groups were able to work able to cooperate 
to some extent following the initial disagreements, but both took different approaches throughout 
the process.  AMOALUZ and other civil society groups saw their best means of engagement as 
through the ZEIS council while ACSI’s interactions with the state were less direct.  In this sense, 
these groups simultaneously participated both collaboratively—through the project council—and 
combatively—through court actions barring the project and the accord signed by the mayoral 
candidates. 
This dynamic also occurred in part due to the structure of the ZEIS council, which only 
dealt with housing issues and those issues within the 11 blocks under this designation.  Although 
they were able to provide some feedback to the wider Nova Luz project area, most remained as 
suggestions rather than changes in policy.  Other interested and active parties—like ACSI—were 
effectively excluded from the only formalized participatory body.  The project wide municipal 
council was not formed since legislatively that was only required to occur once the project was in 
the implementation phase.  This complicates the intent of the council(s) and is confounded by 
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often strained relations between the city government and civil society actors in the ZEIS council; 
others have noted that the inclusion of civil society actors—rather than the extent of their 
participation—serves as the legitimizer of the process (Pupo and Bueno, 2012).  At least in the 
eyes of some public sector and consortium employees, this may be true in this case as well.    
Likewise, the private sector consortium organized and directed many of the public meetings, 
further delegitimizing the process.  Similarly, many of the sectorial meetings occurred not by 
their initiative, but through that of the civil society actors themselves.  A public participation 
process directed by private sector planners raises many issues regarding the larger trend of 
privatizing urban planning and indeed undermines the legitimacy of the process.  Public 
processes should be led by the public sector, which serves as a neutral body between private 
actors and the public at large.  However, by ceding the meeting management power to the private 
sector, the public sector was effectively privileging the entrepreneurial urbanism private market 
based rationality over the collective, public, and participatory rationality for shaping urban space.  
This also created a situation of uneven power, with more given to the private sector development 
consortium, at least in the view of the community.  
Returning to the collaborative and combative forms of civil society engagement, it was 
indeed the combination of both activities that ensured the project in its prescribed form did not 
continue.  All of the groups initially viewed this as a victory, as well.  However, to date no 
concrete activities or plans have taken place in the neighborhood.  And, the civil society and 
council momenta that were championed have all but disappeared.  The council has been 
disbanded, there are no interactions between or within the various civil society groups, and many 
of their websites have either expired or not been updated since the end of the project.  In follow-
up interviews, both city officials and civil society leaders expressed concern that this was 
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happening.  Civil society leaders were beginning to retrospectively observe that some attention is 
better than no attention.  That is, despite the problems with Nova Luz, the Santa Ifigenia region 
was at least the subject of debate and planning processes—which have all but disappeared today.  
Consequently, the community groups won the battle against Nova Luz, but in doing and without 
realizing at the time, also lost the war for public action and necessary improvements to their 
neighborhood in the near future. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Intramunicipal Competition:  Real Estate Interest and Public Participation across 
Coexisting Redevelopment Projects 
 
 
 
Cities are assemblages, comprised of various policies, projects, and plans which together 
form the coherent body of the metropolis (McCann and Ward, 2011).  However, in many urban 
contexts, projects and plans are completed in various parts of the city, without due consideration 
to how they fit together in urban space, contribute to each other’s’ development, or may help or 
hinder the full completion of each specific project.  In São Paulo, different redevelopment project 
attempts have been taking place in different parts of the city at the same time, but with very 
different sets of policy instruments to influence their completion.  While the Nova Luz project 
plans were being developed, two other redevelopment projects, in adjacent districts of the city 
some 12 kilometers from the old center and Nova Luz, were nearing completion (see Figure 21).  
The Faria Lima and Agua Espraiada Urban Operations employed very different redevelopment 
tools and differed starkly in their levels of public participation from Nova Luz.  These 
differences, however, provided for their greater successful completion while at the same time 
competing for real estate development attention with Nova Luz.  I refer to this phenomenon as 
“intramunicipal competition” and argue that the varying ways in which public and private 
interests came together across the different projects was an influential factor in Nova Luz’s 
demise.   
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Figure 21:  Locations of Luz, Faria Lima, and Agua Espraiada Redevelopment Areas in 
São Paulo (depiction by Joshua Shake) 
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Interurban Competition, Intraurban Competition and Intramunicpal Competition 
 The issue of interurban competition between cities or regions in economic development is 
well known (McCann, 2004; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Gordon, 1999). Interurban 
competition occurs as cities and regions use varying policies, promotions, incentives and other 
features to attract development.  Different cities offer different packages, and thus competition 
occurs between them as they seek growth.  Macro level economic change, like the end of the 
cold war, can force cities to compete with each other for development (Korcelli-Olejniczak, 
2007).  More commonly, interurban competition occurs at a local level between neighboring 
municipalities.  Community redevelopment agencies often compete over sales-tax generating big 
box retailers and car dealerships through grants, tax rebates, and land discounts (Kirkpatrick and 
Smith, 2011).  Beyond attraction strategies, private sector actors can also force cities to compete, 
as in the case of airline manipulation for airport development (Nunn et al, 1996).  Likewise, local 
growth coalitions can play a significant role in competing for downtown redevelopment projects 
(Leibovitz and Salmon, 1999).  Intersections between infrastructure policies and economic 
development create the interjurisdictional environment for cooperation and competition in 
seeking development (Nunn, 1995).  For Ward (2003), however, “nation states have codified the 
inter-urban competition endemic in contemporary capitalism, building upon and reinforcing, 
rather than ameliorating, uneven economic development. Cities have thus been placed squarely 
in the front line of delivering national competitiveness” (Ward, 2003, 199). 
Different development trends also create different means of competition.  discusses the 
role of cities focusing on arts consumption in employing culture-led redevelopment strategies has 
been a central means of competition in recent years (Mathews, 2014).  McCann (2004) argues 
Billings of cities as best places has created a new promotional form of competition for attracting 
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firms and workers at a global scale (McCann, 2004).  Similarly, fairs and exhibitions also play 
significant roles in city promotion and the forms of competition cities engage in to attract those 
events (Rubalcaba-Bermejo and Cuadrado-Roura, 1995).   
Globalization has also affected the ways in which cities compete for development.  The 
growth of multinationals, rapid information exchange, and the liberalization of trade and capital 
flows have increased the fields in which cities compete and the likelihood that they compete 
across international borders (Gordon, 1999).  For financial centers, competition is played out 
through the geographical dynamics of financial production and transactions (Lee and Schmidt-
Marwede, 1993).  Alternatively, Swyngedouw and Baeten (2001) argue that in the increased 
interurban competition from globalization, local factors and local embeddedness, like growth 
coalitions, play a more important role in achieving and preserving a city’s status.  Additionally, 
the restructuring of Europe and the emergence of a European system of cities also serve as 
examples of new regionalisms under which competition for multinational firms occur (Rozenblat 
and Pumain, 1993). 
Similarly, intraurban competition has received attention in the literature.  Most often, it 
refers to dynamics within an urban region, but the use of this term has not been restricted to such 
cases.  Like some of the above authors, Boudreau et al (2006) observed that in regional 
governance, the new rules of globalization and neoliberal governance have changed the framing 
of local urban struggles.  Guarneros-Meza (2008) have noted the rise of intraurban competition 
to attract new industrial sectors and expand service sector in Mexico since the 1980s.  
Megaprojects are also an important feature of intraurban competition.  However, biased 
discourses can naturalize the process of competition and legitimize relaxation of planning 
process for megaprojects (Farhat, 2014; Fainstein, 2008).  Like megaprojects, postindustrial 
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cities and city regions are also competing for mega events in the hopes that they, along with 
cultural clustering, can aid in the redevelopment of large spaces of land (Gospodini, 2006).  Once 
a city-region attains a mega event, there can also be significant concerns about competition 
between the event subsites, as Davidson and McNeill (2012) observed in the case of the Sydney 
Olympic games. 
Different city and region-level groups can also promote intraurban competition.  For 
example, business organizations often push for a favorable business climate, port improvements 
capital works projects in the context of competition (Marquis, 2009).  Likewise, intersections of 
intra and interurban competition and BID delivery strategies where inter and intraurban 
competition, along with state restructuring and lose governance, have been thought to produce 
challenges to accountability, sustainability, and equality (Lewis, 2010).  In Shanghai, district 
level urban plans used to promote grand vision of government and encourage investment (Wu, 
2000). 
 Other features and dynamics have also been observed in attempting to find an advantage 
in intraurban competition.  For example, urban design in the Seoul metro region has been used as 
a distinctive feature (Kriznik, 2013).  Similarly, Pløger (1995) has proposed that the aestheticized 
urban landscape is a key factor both national and international competition.  However, when 
intraurban competition occurs at a neighborhood level, the scarcity of funds and uneven levels of 
organization and political influence mean some neighborhoods win while others lose (Stegman, 
1979).  In these instances, intra-urban and intra-municipal race, class, socioeconomic conflicts 
have increased through government connected place-based elites in a metro region (Vojnovic, 
2003).  
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On the other hand, both of the above forms of economic development competition often 
overlook dynamics that may happen within a specific city.  Additionally, their use has been too 
interchangeable and imprecise to account for the specific peculiarities that can happen within one 
local governmental jurisdiction.  By this, I refer to intramunicipal competition.  A related 
concept, intracity competition, has been noted for some economic sectors within a city—most 
notably newspapers and media (for example: Daniel, 2011; Kiernan and Levy, 1999; Lacy, 1987; 
Lacy et al, 2001; Stephen and Hugh, 2004)—but has not been used in reference to municipal 
government economic development policies.  Recently, the idea of intramunicipal competition 
has been used in discussing school voucher systems within specific school districts (Sandström 
and Bergström, 2005).  It was used in passing, however, over forty years ago in discussing the 
role of local industrial development corporations and the spread effect in regional development 
(Hale, 1967; citing Bridges, 1965a, 1965b).   
 In his comparison of the centralities of São Paulo, Frugoli (2000) did observe that 
competition was another factor at play between them:  new “subcenters maintain certain 
relationships of complementarity with the central core, but more often compete economically 
with the traditional center” (Frugoli, 2000, 26).  Frugoli (2000), however, leaves his discussion 
of economic structures there, turning to a detailed and valuable comparison of the social 
networks at play shaping the old downtown, Avenida Paulista, and Berrini-Faria Lima 
centralities, along with an examination of the resultant socio-spatial outcomes in each.  
Nevertheless, economic competition between the centralities, and more precisely the competition 
of urban economic development (and redevelopment) policies between them is of great interest.  
In the sections that follow, I introduce in greater detail another redevelopment policy mechanism 
in use in São Paulo and discuss two of its most arguably successful outcomes, along with the 
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participatory dynamics in each.  These projects also helped to cement the new centrality in São 
Paulo at the turn of the 21st century along the Berrini-Faria Lima corridor in the southwest region 
of the city. 
 
Urban Operations 
Before the Nova Luz project and its new redevelopment tool of urban concessions, São 
Paulo had already been using other instruments for large redevelopment projects.  In the 1980s, 
the national economic crisis and difficulties in implementing the first urban plans of the 1970s 
forced the public sector to seek out new alternatives.  As a result, the new Master Plan, drafted 
during the Mario Covas administration (1983-1985) proposed the first use of public-private 
partnerships with the intent of minimizing public expenditures (Cusce Nobre, no date).  They 
took the form of a new planning instrument, the Operação Urbana (Urban Operation) which 
sought to stimulate the production of public housing, infrastructure, and public facilities in a 
number of central (Campo de Marte, Centro, Santo Amaro, Pinheiros, and Barra Funda) and 
periphery (São Miguel, São Matheus, Vila Matilde, Vila Maria, Vila Nova Cachoerinha, 
Paraisópolis and Campo Limpo) neighborhoods (Cuse Nobre, no date).   The next mayor, Janio 
Quadros (1986-1988) abandoned those plans, and shifted emphasis to a new instrument—the 
Operação Interligada (Interconnected Operation).  These allowed the private sector to donate a 
certain number of public housing units to the city in exchange for increases in the permitted land 
use and building size.  Both of these instruments were included in the Master Plan created in 
1988.  From 1988 to 1996, the Operações Interligadas resulted in 115 proposals, US$ 58,282,450 
in exchanges, and 466,000 square meters in additional construction, with most of the proposals 
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occurring in higher income areas (Wilderode, 1997).  In 1988, this mechanism was suspended 
and later declared unconstitutional for being in violation of the zoning law.   
 The following administration, Luiza Erundina (1989-1992), reversed the stance on 
Operações Urbanas, creating the Operação Urbana Vale do Anhagabaú (Anhagabau Valley 
Urban Operation) for part of the old downtown region in 1991.  Along with this, the city 
government explored the use of otogora onerosa do direito de construir (a fee paid in exchange 
for building above the maximum floor-to-area ratio for a specific lot).  The law provided for up 
to 150,000 square meters of additional construction through otogora onerosa, however after three 
years only seven proposals (using 13% of the potential) reached the city government (Cusce 
Nobre, no date).  Continuing the trend of reversing previous administrations plans, the Paulo 
Maluf (1993-1996) administration shelved those of Eurndina.  This administration and the one to 
follow (Celso Pitta, 1997-2000) emphasized the Operação Urbana Faria Lima (Faria Lima Urban 
Operation), created in 1995.  In a wealthier region of the city, this project focused on the 
construction of a number of highway and road construction interventions in the area (Cusce 
Nobre, no date).  Instead of using one of the other development instruments, this administration 
created the Certificatos de Potencial Adicional Construitivo (CEPACs-Potential Additional 
Construction Certificates).  The private sector did take great interest in this project, however 
through 2000 the city government had received R$116,000,000 in profits, compared to 
R$150,000,000 in project expenditures (Cusce Nobre, no date).  Cusce Nobre further notes that 
the city government did not consider the social impacts of this instrument and did not invest 
sufficiently in the creation of public housing in the area.  Operações Urbanas tend to be more 
successful in areas with a greater real estate market interest; the Operação Urbana Centro has 
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resulted in very few proposals while the Faria Lima resulted in 102 in just the first five years 
(Cusce Nobre, no date). 
 In 2001, the Estatuto da Cidade Law 10.257/2001 (City Statute) was passed, creating a 
unified set of federal urban planning enabling legislation.  Many of the urban planning 
instruments first employed in São Paulo became incorporated and legitimized by it, including the 
Operação Urbana (Urban Operation) (Cusce Nobre, no date). Urban operations, according to 
their proponents, represent an important advance in Brazilian urban planning:  1) they make 
large urban projects viable despite budgetary restrictions and allow for congruencies between 
densification and infrastructural capacities in defined perimeters; 2) they allow for those 
benefiting from a project to pay its costs, freeing up public funding for other priority projects; 3) 
they make it possible for the public sector to recoup part of the valorization that comes from 
public investments, such that it does not just remain in the hands of real estate interests (Fix, 
2004, 2).   
 The Urban Operations of today have their origins in the Operações Interligadas.  These 
allowed for the purchase of zoning exemptions, such as increasing building heights or densities 
and uses not normally permitted in the zoning through the payment of fees.  The money for these 
fees arguably came from the additional profits obtained from the exemptions.  These negotiations 
occurred for each lot through the submission of requests to the Comissão Normativa de 
Legislação Urbana (Normative Commission of Urban Legislation) which was part of the 
Secretaria Municipal de Planejamento (Municipal Planning Secretariat).  The profits would then 
be applied to the Fundo Municipal de Habitação (Municipal Housing Fund) for the construction 
of public housing units.  Although this instrument was criticized for not adequately accounting 
for infrastructural needs, that interconnection between private development and public housing 
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allowed it to pass (Fix, 2004).  Most of these Operations were in areas, like the southwest, with 
higher real estate market interest; this, however, this increased transportation infrastructure 
demand and shifted larger amounts of spending on costly transportation projects (Fix, 2004).   
Thus, she argues, the instrument indirectly favored spending for real estate and infrastructure 
interests and projects, undermining the social justifications under which it passed (ibid).  This 
mechanism also did not result in widespread redevelopment efforts; rather, since it operated on a 
lot-by-lot basis, it provided for isolated investments and multiple types of exemptions to zoning, 
but increased the number of non-conforming uses and buildings (ibid).  It was these problems 
that eventually led to the unconstitutionality decision that prevented their further use. 
 As an alternative, the Urban Operations provided for the definition of project area 
perimeters where the incentives would be applied uniformly.  Additionally, the profits obtained 
by the public sector in the sale of exemptions would be applied for infrastructure and service 
projects in the region where they were obtained.  Proponents of this method argued that this 
structure would allow the Operations to be self-financed by those who would benefit from them 
(i.e. the middle class) and prioritize certain projects over others (Fix, 2004).  Fix (2004), goes on 
to explain some of the problems with this model, however:  these Operations are reliant on the 
private sector real estate interest to be successful in generating profits for the city and thus must 
be concentrated in already privileged areas of the city.  The city government must also often 
build anchor projects to stimulate private sector interest and show its commitment. Thus, if 
successful, the government shares in the profits emerging from the area’s valorization; but, the 
government loses money on its investment should the ideal valorization not occur (Fix, 2004, 3).  
In this model, even when profits are made, they only are recouped in the medium to long term 
and prioritize spending on non-citywide priority projects (according to Fix (2004), spending on 
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road infrastructure over addressing housing issues).  Upon incorporation in the City Statute, 
Urban Operations must also follow this model whereby funds obtained from the sale of 
exemptions must be applied exclusively to projects in the areas in which they are obtained.  Fix 
(2004) argues that, therefore, this policy instrument is contradictory to the goals of income 
redistribution policies, democratizing the access to land, and favor reinvestment in already 
privileged areas.  Marques (2003) however, found that infrastructure spending in São Paulo 
favored certain regions in the 1990s but was not completely restricted to them as some spending 
did indeed occur in peripheral (and poorer) regions of the city.  
 Urban Operations first appeared in the Covas Master Plan (1983-1984).  This first 
iteration proposed numerous project areas throughout the city “in determined points, with little 
defined shapes” for a series of public-private partnership based interventions (Fix, 2004, 4).  
Even at this time, they were met with criticism, accused of being “utopic, absurd, and statist” in 
that they did not provide for enough private sector participation (ibid).  In 1987, the architect 
Júlio Neves proposed a project for the Avenida Faria Lima region of the city.  His proposal for 
urban renewal involved state takings (eminent domain) of large areas, bulldozing and rebuilding 
entire blocks “in Hausmannian or Avenida Rio Branco (Rio de Janeiro) style;” to accomplish 
this, public-private redevelopment partnerships in the North American or European style were 
proposed (ibid).  This project format was taken up again in the following administration’s Master 
Plan, proposing Urban Operations to “increase the benefits of the Operações Interligadas” 
through the “combined public and private sector action to improve urbanization standards” 
(ibid). 
 The Erundina administration (1989-1992) proposed five Urban Operations, including:  
Anhangabaú, Água Espraiada, Água Branca, Faria Lima-Berrini and Paraisópolis.  Only one, 
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Anhangabaú, was implemented in 1991.  This project was not successful, however, as it did not 
attract sufficient private sector interest.  At the time, the Secretaria Municipal de Planejamento 
Urbano (Sempla-Municipal Urban Planning Secretariat) began to recognize the problems with it 
and started exploring projects in the Água Espraiada and Faria Lima-Berrini areas, seeing them 
as better possibilities since they already were real estate interests in them (Fix, 2004).   The 
following administration, Maluf (1993-1996) passed the Operação Água Espraiada and 
completed construction on the avenue of the same name as the anchor project before the project 
passed (1995-1996).  The Faria Lima project, following some of Neves’ directives, was approved 
in 1995.  Finally, the Anhangabaú project was revisited and its perimeters changed, passing in 
1997 under the new name of Operação Centro.  Two of these projects, Faria Lima and Agua 
Espraiada, will be explored in greater detail below.  Together, they served to cement the 
transition to a new centrality (away from the old downtown and Avenida Paulista) in the city and 
were reaching their full potential just as the Nova Luz project was being attempted (see Figure 
22 for an example of this new area). 
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Figure 22:  New Business Office Tower Complex along Pinheiros River, Constructed 
Through Urban Operations (image by Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons License) 
 
 
 
Faria Lima 
 The extension of this avenue in the southwest was originally proposed by real estate 
interests and became one of the most important municipal projects during the Maluf 
administration.  The Operação Urbana allows property owners to obtain the right to construct up 
to four times the lot area.  Additionally, the city government provided other incentives, 
especially for large developments, including granting of additional development rights on 
reassembled conjoined lots and concessions for land use changes on lots greater than 1000 
square meters (Fix, 2004).  Initially, the area’s middle class residents in the neighborhoods of 
Pinheiros and Vila Olympia mobilized in neighborhood associations to preserve their “quality of 
life.”  This, as the project proposed changing the character of the neighborhoods from small 
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conjoined houses to office towers, hotels, flats, and shopping centers through the use of eminent 
domain.   
 The plan was approved, however, passing unanimously in the city council in 1995 (Fix, 
2004).  The residents were able to reduce the number of takings and restrict the maximum 
building heights in a few parts of the project area (ibid).  Between 1995 and 2000, marked 
changes had already occurred in the neighborhood’s uses and population; the low-density middle 
class neighborhood was being substituted for one comprised of tall office towers (Fix, 2004).  At 
that time, the amount of constructed space of office towers had grown 23.4%, horizontal 
commercial and services 14%, luxury residential towers 12.8%, and semi-luxurious residential 
towers 11.3%; on the other hand, semi-luxurious horizontal residential development decreased 
25.9% of constructed land uses (Fix, 2004).  Fix (2004) also notes that the incentivized lot 
reassembling resulted in the concentration of land uses and ownership.  Together, these 
initiatives allowed the Faria Lima region to surpass Avenida Paulista with the most expensive 
high-end office rents in the city (ibid).   
 Inside the project area, the public sector spent US$150 million (R$476 million in 2004) 
with projects and eminent domain proceedings (Fix, 2004).  The public sector also completed a 
number of projects surrounding it, in order to make it more viable.  These include the Ayrton 
Senna tunnel complex that passes under Avenida Faria Lima, a new tunnel under the Pinheiros 
River, and a new bridge (Eugenio Goldfarb) over it.  Estimates made in 2004 place the value of 
these projects at over R$2 billion (Fix, 2004).  Thus, the total project costs greatly exceed those 
obtained through profits from development right purchases.  Even subsequent mayoral 
administrations (Suplicy, 2001-2004) viewed the project as a success, stressing the money 
entering city coffers but ignoring all of the necessary costs to make this valorization happen (Fix, 
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2004).  Additionally, she points out that the project caused negative impacts for the existing 
population and the approval of similar developments outside of the project area (and thus, 
outside of the area in which funds could be spent) over-expended the infrastructure of the region 
(Fix, 2004).  Further, to alleviate the impacts of these developments, the city government was 
forced to engage in not just road widening, but large-scale efforts including the construction of 
new metro lines and stops and new avenues altogether; this creates what she calls a “vicious 
cycle” of further government spending and public investments in concentrated areas (Fix, 2004).   
 This cycle continued into the next mayoral administration (Suplicy), which in 2001 
started work on a connector avenue between Avenida Faria Lima and Avenida Engenheiro Luis 
Carlos Berrini—another adjacent corridor of recent business tower construction and real estate 
interest.  Fix (2012a) argues that this project is just one more of many that has little importance 
in citywide transportation infrastructure but was very important symbolically for the real estate 
sector as it unified these two fronts of development growth in the same region of São Paulo.  
Along with this project, the city government also implemented the Bulevar JK, raised pedestrian 
walkways, and the remodeling of Largo da Batata (which, in 2014 has still not been fully 
realized).  Together, early estimates for these projects placed their costs at over R$369 million, 
but like so many other projects, have grown significantly since (Fix, 2004).   
 Real estate developers stressed the importance of the new roadway projects in that traffic 
in the region had gotten significantly worse.  This, however at the time when millions of square 
meters of high-end office space sat vacant in the Faria Lima and Berrini regions, reaching 70% 
in the second semester of 2003 (Fix, 2012b).  Fix (2012b) observed a number of factors 
contributing to this real estate crisis:  the accumulation of new buildings in a relatively short 
period of time flooded the market with available space that was all similar, multinational 
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businesses’ demand decreased, pension fund investment volume decreased, and credibility issues 
for a few of the real estate investments funds.   
 Some of these problems point to several of the other important dynamics that helped 
construct this region as a whole (by this, Faria Lima, Berrini, and Agua Espraiada).  In São 
Paulo, like in other large urban cities around the world, new financial capital circuits helped 
further the real estate boom.  A structure that transferred buildings into real estate titles into one 
that acted like other share-like financial systems created a profitable and attractive system for 
investors.  Yet, in São Paulo, the interconnections between the financial sector and real estate 
markets took a different form than those of Europe and the United States (Fix, 2012b).  While 
real estate developers were increasingly internationalizing—through strategic partnerships and 
other arrangements—the capital necessary to construct the new “globalized” São Paulo came 
from Brazilian investors (Fix, 2012b; Sette Whittaker, 2007).  Principally, these financial 
resources came from pension fund investments, and many of those pension funds were connected 
to state companies (Fix, 2012b).  This arrangement can be traced back to the Planning Secretary 
during the Maluf administration, when the Operação was originally conceived.  The large 
amounts of capital they controlled turned them into the principal investors in high end office 
buildings in São Paulo during the 1990s, placing more than 20% of their portfolios in the 
developments (Fix, 2012b; Fix, 2004).  In the early 2000s, however, they reduced their 
participation in the real estate sector; Fix (2004) identifies this as one of the other problems with 
this development model—many who point to the success of the Faria Lima area and suggest its 
repetition overlook the temporary role played by the pension funds in its success.   
 Finally, the Faria Lima Urban Operation was the first to use the Certificado de Potencial 
Adicional de Construção (CEPACs- Potential Additional Construction Certificates).  These are 
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emitted by the São Paulo city government and managed by SP Urbanismo.  They serve as a 
system of real estate certificates or financial titles, used as a form of payment for additional 
construction rights within Urban Operation project areas.  Each CEPAC certificate is equivalent 
to a determined value of square meters for utilization as additional construction or modification 
of uses and parameters on a lot or project.  The first public offer of CEPACs occurs through 
negotiation in the Mercado de Balcão Organizado da BOVESPA (the Brazilian stock exchange, 
headquartered in São Paulo).  Following the initial sale, they can be traded and negotiated freely 
in secondary markets until the point in which they are officially tied to a specific lot within one 
of the Urban Operations.  As with any other financial title, their price changes according to 
market interest.  CEPACs can also be used as payment in the takings of properties for public 
projects.  In these instances, the Índice Edificações em Geral (General Buildings Index), 
published monthly by the Secretaria Municipal de Finanças (Municipal Finances Secretariat) in 
the Diário Oficial da Cidade de São Paulo (Official São Paulo City Journal), and based in the 
price of the most recent auction regularizes the value of the certificate.  The monies received 
from the public distributions of the certificates can only be used in payment of the specific 
interventions approved by the management group of each Urban Operation.  Finally, the Caixa 
Economica Federal (federal housing finance bank) is responsible for auditing the use of 
resources and for tracking the prescribed interventions.   
 Initially, this system was approved in March of 1995 but the initial auction of certificates 
was delayed due to legal questions regarding federal authorization for emitting municipal titles 
(Fix, 2004).  To overcome this, the city government first used a provision allowing for “the 
purchase of development rights in national currency in place of a CEPAC,” thus creating a 
system of “CEPAC equivalents” instead of the actual titles (Fix, 2004).  Those issues were 
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overcome, however, and today they are used in both the Faria Lima Urban Operation and Água 
Espraiada Urban Operation.   
 The system of negotiation and free exchange of the certificates has been controversial 
from the onset, however.  Through this structure, they allow for the disconnection between 
possession of the certificate and possession of the lot.  Anyone could by the development title, 
independent of property ownership in one of the Urban Operations, which could generate a new 
form of “financialized” real estate speculation (Fix, 2004; Fix, 2012b).  
Neoliberal urbanism (Hackworth, 2007) forms of redevelopment took hold in São Paulo 
in the 1990s, following economic and governance restructurings.  For much of this period, there 
was no completion between the rationalities of public participation and markets.  Redevelopment 
efforts in the Faria Lima Urban Operation emphasized transportation infrastructure, along with 
land development.  Only in latter periods did public opposition mobilize and call for changes to 
the project.  Yet, the overemphasis on real estate development and resulted in large amounts of 
vacant newly competed space.  This rapid valorization of real estate in the region resulted in an 
over-accumulation of office space (Weber, 2002).  Thus, instead of just attempting to revitalize 
an area of the city, real estate valorization was indeed an implicit goal of this project. 
 
Agua Espraiada  
 The other project of interest for this comparison is Operação Urbana Agua Espraiada, 
which also had a large avenue project as its anchor.  Even before the Operação was approved, the 
traffic lanes were constructed along a creek that connected the Berrini business district with the 
middle and upper class neighborhood of Brooklyn.  This was possible under an old law that 
provided for roadway improvements (Fix, 2004).  Fix (2004) points out that the rationale for the 
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project was not for traffic circulation, but for the “resolution” of the problem of favelas along the 
creek.  Nonetheless, this action did help increase property values in the area, as more than 50,000 
people were removed.  Most of these people did not have an option other than to relocate to 
newer favelas, growing along the margins of the reservoirs in an environmental protection area at 
the southern end of the city (Fix, 2012a) (See below for more on this process).   
For its part, the city government offered “verba de atendimento” (a payment) in the sum 
of R$1,500—which would not purchase a new home in a favela; transportation back to their 
place of origin—since many were reputedly emigrants from other regions of the country; or, the 
purchase of a public housing unit in the extreme eastern region of the city with monthly 
payments over 25 years—but this alternative was far from employment and existing social 
networks (Fix, 2012a; Fix, 2004).  During the Maluf administration, the Cingapura Project 
attempted to build vertical projects in place of favelas on their current location, without the 
removal of residents to other regions of the city.  Seeing this as an alternative, the residents 
attempted to receive units through this program on the site of their homes.  In the end, only four 
percent of residents received some form of public housing, and all of it outside of the Urban 
Operation project area.   
 The formal approval of the Operação Urbana Agua Espraiada occurred in December 
2001 under the new Suplicy administration.  The new project was essentially the same as that 
drafted under the previous administration, despite the new PT (Workers Party) government and 
recent passage of the City Statute’s reforms (Fix, 2004).  The government and majority of city 
council members rejected alterations that would have created minimum social justice guarantees 
in the project’s implementation and the favela residents were unsuccessful in attempting to have 
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a part of the project area designated as a Zona Especial de Interesse Social (ZEIS-Special Social 
Interest Zoning, for the provision of public housing) (Fix, 2004; Fix, 2012a).   
 
 
 
  
Figure 23:  Journalista Roberto Marinho Bridge over Pinheiros River (image by 
Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons License) 
 
 
 
 
 Fix (2004) also pointed out that, like the Faria Lima project, some parts of this one were 
excluded from official city accounting.  For example, the R$800 million (R$ 1.242 billion in 
2004 reais) spent on the project before the Urban Operation entered into law were excluded from 
possible allowable expenditures for the city-received profits, despite having been the what made 
the project viable in the first place (Fix, 2004).  Instead, the money received would be used to 
construct a new interchange complex and two bridges over the Pinheiros River (which do not 
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even have bus transportation across them) and named after Journalista Roberto Marinho, 
deceased President of the Globo communication and entertainment company (shown in Figure 
23).  The city government also contracted the same company that completed the Avenida Agua 
Espraiada (also renamed in honor of Roberto Marinho) portion of the project; a company that 
was under investigation for overbilling in that project and payment to Mayors Maluf’s and Pitta’s 
accounts in Switzerland (See Chapter 2 for more on their corruption scandals) (Fix, 2004).   
Taken together, the projects proposed as part of the Operation cost approximately 
R$1.125 billion in 2004 reais, including, increased accessibility, pedestrian passageways, avenue 
extensions, and housing (Fix, 2004).  Of this, a maximum of R$350 million would be used for 
projects destined for favela residents, but those removed during the previous administration 
would not be eligible (this, despite the fact that in the original environmental impact report 
passed at that time, they would receive priority once funds began to enter into public sector 
coffers) (ibid).   
Fix (2004) criticizes this series of projects—that transcends multiple municipal 
administrations and multiple parties—in that, despite emerging in a time of fiscal crisis and 
changing the public sector’s role to “promoter, inductor, and regulator,” the projects still only 
come to fruition thanks to significant public sector financial commitments, “concentrating 
resources in one part of the city that is being adapted for the implantation of real estate 
megaprojects, with modernized infrastructure, government takings, and expulsions” (Fix, 2004, 
10).  Additionally, in one concerted set of actions, the “city becomes a growth machine, 
facilitating the growth of financialized real estate, with new office towers for national and 
multinational businesses; high-end apartments for the transnational class; luxury hotels, 
restaurants, clubs, and theatres” (Fix, 2004; Fix, 2012b).  While these new mechanisms are seen 
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as beneficial for increasing the role of the private sector in improving urban space, the perceived 
social impacts are indeed limited:  after ten years of the Operações Interligadas, which were able 
to collect enough funding for 10,000 public housing units, only 4,800 were actually completed 
(Fix, 2004).  In Agua Espraiada alone, 50,000 people were removed from their homes in favelas; 
and in Faria Lima, none of the 10% legally defined minimum of funds to be used for public 
housing had been spent as of 2004 (Fix, 2004).  Finally, even in the regulatory document for 
Urban Operations—the City Statute—there are contradictions, making it at the same time an 
advance to the political left and the political right (Massoneto, 2003) 
Had the area been designated ZEIS as some had called for, the outcomes of this project 
may have been decidedly different.  In Nova Luz, it was the ZEIS zoning designation that legally 
required participatory planning through the municipal management council structure.  
Nonetheless, this project is a clear example of neoliberal urbanism, where the city government 
acts as promoter and regulator, while still offering large outpourings of public funds in support of 
real estate development interests.  And, like in other examples, the touted public benefits 
benefited a relatively small geographic portion of the city, did not entirely result in direct public 
investments within the project area, and largely took the form of highway and road 
infrastructure. 
 
Business and the Favela in Agua Espraiada 
 The first attempt at constructing a new avenue along the Aguas Espraiadas creek corridor 
occurred in 1964, when the Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem (Highway Department) of 
the State of São Paulo engaged in takings in order to construct a large expressway.  This 
department did not complete the project, however, and the cleared areas soon became occupied 
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by favelas, like others throughout the valley.  By 1987, estimates placed 6481 families in favelas 
on private, city, state and federal lands in the area (Frugoli, 2000).  By 1992, the area near the 
creek occupied by favelas had increased to about five percent (ibid).  In early 1994 one of the 
first conflicts between the growing business sector and the favela residents occurred, when favela 
residents blocked some of the lanes of Avenida Berrini for 16 hours in protest over the running 
over of two residents; business leaders at the time suggested that the favela is part of the region’s 
reality, but does not prohibit its development (Frugoli, 2000).   
 Later in September 1994, the highway project received its first step towards completion 
during the Maluf administration:  the state government ceded the lands over to the city 
government for completion of the urbanization and channelization of the area the city 
government adjacent to the creek.  Two months later, business leaders from some 60 companies 
(later growing to about 122) including, Unibanco, the World Trade Center, Hotel Meliá Bratke-
Collet, ASD Empreendimentos, Centro Empresarial Nações Unidas, and Biesp announced the 
formation of a “pool” of businesses in the area.  This pool would finance the construction of 
1000 housing units (estimated at a cost at the time of R$8 million) to facilitate the removal of the 
Jardim Edith favela located between Avenida Berrini and the Marginal Pinheiros (another 
expressway, parallel to the Pinheiros River) (Frugoli, 2000).  The removal of that favela was not 
included in the original city plans.  Frugoli (2000) points out that the formation of the pool of 
businesses eliminated the need for the creation of an Operação Interligada, in that: “they would 
construct the housing units and donate them to the Fundo Municipal de Habitação, at no cost to 
the city government, with no need to obtain city council approval, and through the later 
formation of a non-governmental organization for the administration of the housing units” 
(Frugoli, 2000).  Originally, they considered locations in the extreme east region of the city for 
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the proposed project (Conjuntos Santa Etelvina e Barro Branco), some 40-50 kilometers away 
from the site; however, later the City Housing Secretariat suggested exploring someplace closer 
to the site.  It was at this time that favela community leaders first spoke out against the plans, 
suggesting that the Cingapura project should be used to construct units on the site of the favela, 
since a large portion of the residents worked in the nearby buildings as cleaners/maids or in the 
construction of the new towers (Frugoli, 2000).    
 In early 1995, city leaders and pool members announced that they had reached an 
agreement to purchase 41,000 square meters in Jardim Educandario near the Raposo Tavares 
highway in the west region of the city for R$2 million and the remaining R$6 million would be 
used to construct 950 units on the site (Frugoli, 2000).  To divide the costs, (based on the 
estimated valorization to occur in the area with the removal of the favela) the business pool 
contracted Arthur Andersen for US$100,000 (ibid).  The consulting firm developed a “payment 
handicapping system” under which businesses contributed to the pool based on their relative 
distance from the favela (ibid).   
 At the time (in 1995), the Jardim Edith favela actually had three thousand families, or 
about 12 thousand residents in an area of about 68,000 square meters (Fix, 2012a).  By 
September of 1995, the favela removal process had already begun.  During the registry 
surveys—that were only conducted at this point, the residents were given three options:  
purchase a public housing unit financed and constructed by the city government in the areas in 
the extreme east of the city; receive a one-time payment of R$ 1,500; or, in the case of the 
residents of Jardim Edith, the financed purchase of the units to be constructed by the pool in 
Jardim Educandario (Fix, 2012a).  This final option, the residents argued, was not fully divulged 
by the city government representatives and thus resulted in the low numbers opting for this 
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alternative (ibid).  The few that did, however, faced numerous problems.  While waiting for the 
actual units to be completed, they had to stay in temporary barrack-style structures, surrounded 
by walls, and constructed on the site of the first homes demolished in the favela. Inside, they 
faced deplorable conditions:  multiple families staying in large halls, private security at the door 
limiting their comings and goings, aggressive behavior directed towards them, and high instances 
of crimes (Fix, 2012a).  All of this while beginning to pay the 25 years of installments for the 
yet-to-be completed units (R$57 at the time, with future adjustments) (ibid).   
Despite having specified procedures for payments or the other options, in reality, some 
residents were able to “negotiate” higher payments depending on the amount of resistance they 
gave and there were issues of cooptation of the community leaders that were originally against 
the favela removal (ibid).  The guidelines for the removal process also stipulated that it should be 
immediate and complete, further endangering those that remained in the temporary barracks.  To 
accomplish this, project coordinators used tactics of violence and terror, including threats, 
cutting off water and light service, psychological pressure, bulldozers circling the remaining 
houses “like vultures,” and the eventual departure of the city government from the project, 
leaving the remaining residents to negotiate directly and on a case by case basis with the 
developers (Fix, 2012a; Fix, 2004).   
The avenue was inaugurated in 1997, but in July of the same year, some 30 houses had 
returned to the site of the removed favela (Frugoli, 2000).  Days later, the Associação de 
Promoção Habitacional (Housing Promotion Association, the association formed by the pool of 
businesses) announced that it had completed construction on 200 units in Jardim Educandario 
and about 150 families were already living there, and promised the completion of 340 more 
apartments (ibid).  By December 1997, however, the city government affirmed that there were 
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indeed 150 families living there, in seven buildings in the Cingapura style and they had stayed in 
the temporary housing for one year.  However, only 44 additional families would receive units in 
the two new buildings, bringing the total number of units constructed to 196 and not the 1000 
first promised (Frugoli, 2000). 
In the end, the funds collected by the pool would have only financed the construction of 
units to house approximately 15% of the residents, but only four percent actually went to public 
housing (Fix, 2012a; Fix, 2004).  Fix (2012a) and others discovered that many of the residents 
that received the one-time payment had moved to environmental protection areas along the 
Billings and Guarapiranga reservoirs in the extreme southern region of the city.  This was largely 
due to the small value of the payment and the lack of other options for purchasing or rental of 
other housing in other favelas.  The discovery led the Comissão de Meio Ambiente da Ordem 
dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB-Brazilian Lawyers Order Environmental Commission) and the 
Procuradoria-Geral de Justiça (Attorney General) to investigate the irregular occupations in that 
region.  They found the city government responsible for not conducting the necessary monitoring 
of the residents during their resettling and the state government accountable for not taking 
responsibility when the reservoir occupations occurred (Frugoli, 2000). 
 The poorest residents in a city are often the most vulnerable.  São Paulo city leaders, 
faced with an opportunity for a public-private partnership to rehouse favela residents clearly 
privileged the growth coalition push for a neoliberal urbanism redevelopment scheme.  With the 
issue of the favela taken care of, there was not much community resistance left, since only small 
portions of the remaining area were residential.  The process in which the favela residents were 
removed, however, requires greater attention.  Unlike in the Nova Luz project, this occurred 
directly through the private development sector’s actions, which approached the city government 
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with their idea.  In this sense, this mode mirrors more closely Shatkin’s (2008) conceptualization 
of privatized urban planning, in which the process of large-scale development is instigated by the 
private sector.  However, in Agua Espraiada, this was in collaboration with larger municipal 
government efforts to redevelop the area, and served as an impetus for the project. 
 
Middle Class Resistance in Faria Lima 
 The original portion of the Faria Lima Avenue project started in 1968 and was completed 
in 1970.  An extension of it, however, remained in city plans, possible due to the Lei de 
Melhoramento Viário (Transportation Improvement Law).  In early 1993, this extension was 
taken up by the Maluf administration as its most important project.  When it was first announced, 
the project was ill-defined and did not specify the exact number of takings to occur, placing the 
number between 500 and 2,100 properties (Fix, 2012a).  At the time, two groups of residents 
formed in the middle and upper class neighborhoods to be impacted (Pinheiros, Itaim, Vila Nova 
Funchal and Vila Olímpia) (Fix, 2012a).  One group felt that no amount of opposition could 
prevent the project or agreed with it, and decided to negotiate adequate values for the eminent 
domain takings.  The other wanted to preserve the “quality of life” of their neighborhoods, 
fighting against the project and the resulting transformation to their neighborhoods (Fix, 2012a). 
 Two community organizations were formed, Vila Olímpia Viva (which also included the 
Itaim and Vila Funchal areas) and Pinheiros Vivo, comprised each of lawyers, administrators, 
professors, architects, economists, and homemakers (Fix, 2012a).  In addition, both groups were 
directed by architects:  USP professor Siegbert Zanettini led Vila Olimpia Viva and city 
employee Horacio Galvanezzi led Pinheiros Vivo.  Fix (2012a) observed that the two groups 
worked together tactically, organizing protests and bringing juridical claims against the project.  
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While the city government publically ignored the existence of community groups, the media 
gave their movements significant attention (and much more than was given to the favela 
residents in Agua Espraiada) (ibid).   
 One of the principal issues for the groups was the eminent domain process.  There were 
varying estimates of the number of houses to be removed and whether legal rate (tax declared), 
market rate, or above market rate values would be paid (Fix, 2012a).  This issue was finally 
settled in the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court) in March and set the value at the 
market rate.  Unlike the case of the favela residents, these residents were able to negotiate the 
payment amounts and not met with physical force when they attempted to prevent the demolition 
of buildings (Fix, 2012a).  Despite their protests, the first demolition was able to occur on the 
following day, April 16, even before the Urban Operation was officially approved (ibid).  Fix 
(2012a) also notes that, although the project was for the extension of the avenue, the underlying 
motivation was to create new real estate development along it. 
 After nearly two years of fighting over the project, the residents were unable to prevent 
the construction of the avenue, but the city government was not able to pass the Urban Operation 
(Fix, 2012a).  At this time, the community groups mobilized to formulate an alternative project, 
the Planos Diretores de Bairro (Neighborhood Master Plan) and show that they were not just 
opposed to the project (ibid).  In the plan developed for the Faria Lima area, the residents’ 
associations, under the coordination of the architect Candido Malta, proposed “harmonizing the 
objectives of renovation and modernization of the city with preservation” calling for the 
exclusion of historic vilas and other notable buildings in areas with public transportation 
accessibility, along with the creation of “islands of tranquility” within the neighborhoods (Fix, 
2012a).  The plan also emphasized densification along public transportation axes and the margins 
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of rivers.   In the end, through their efforts the residents were able to reduce the number of 
takings and restrict the maximum building heights in a few parts of the project area (Fix, 2004).  
Additionally, the Urban Operation finally passed in March of 1995, with a unanimous vote in the 
city council. 
 Just as in the case of Nova Luz, a layering of rationalities was apparent here.  
Technocratic planning perspectives, in support of local growth coalitions and a neoliberal 
urbanism drive were privileged over community and public input.  Unlike in the Agua Espraiada 
redevelopment, community members were able to mobilize and make some very small changes 
to the project.  This is undoubtedly due to their economic status—middle class individuals rather 
than favela residents in the other example.  Nonetheless, city leaders were able to move forward 
with the overall development scheme for the area, since there was no legal requirement for 
participatory planning and no requirement for public approvals of plan components.   
 
Conclusions 
Much can be learned from both an internal comparison between the two fronts of 
redevelopment in the Berrini/Faria Lima region in the 1990s-2000s and a wider comparison 
between those and the Nova Luz attempts.  Fix (2004; 2012a; 2012b) has pointed out some of the 
distinctions between the favela removal in Agua Espraiada and the development of Avenida 
Faria Lima to the north.  Both of these projects ostensibly relied on the extension of important 
avenues as initial—and irreversible—project instigators.  That is, the completion or near 
completion of the Faria Lima extension and expansion of Avenida Agua Espraiada (now 
Journalista Roberto Marinho) both occurred before the full approval of the respective Operações 
Urbanas.  Their completions, however, provided for significant neighborhood changes, 
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government takings of land, and project inertia that set the stage for the Operações Urbanas to 
take place.   
One of the most important distinctions between the two projects, however, involves the 
different impacts on the various communities.  The removal of Favela Jardim Edith affected 
scores more individuals than the takings that occurred in the other neighborhoods for Faria Lima.  
However, the former case received scant media attention while the latter received much more.  
This is unfortunately not surprising, considering one was a poor favela community and the other 
middle and upper class.  Nonetheless, it still raises important issues about community 
mobilization, information access, access to resources, and other inequalities.  While the favela 
community did have a formed community association with leadership, there were accounts of 
their cooptation by the private sector “pool” project coordinators.  On the other hand, the 
communities impacted by the Faria Lima project each formed their own association and then 
worked together, providing for geographic specificities but a consorted effort in attempting to 
express their issues with the project.  This also allowed for at least the appearance of a larger 
effort.  These groups also were able to rely on the support of internal resources—like lawyers, 
planners, and architects—that could help further their demands.   
Another factor worth examining is the role of the private sector and the larger 
redevelopment of the two areas also played varying roles.  In both areas, the private sector real 
estate interests sought to benefit from the early activities surrounding the opening of the avenues 
and the later incentives provided under the Operações Urbanas.  Both areas were already 
receiving development pressure from real estate interests, as well.  However, the private sector 
pool took the lead in the favela removal efforts with the explicit goal of land (and investment) 
valorization in the area surrounding that site.  The formation of the pool of investors to finance 
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replacement public housing was unprecedented in Brazil and likely one of just a few similar 
actions in other cities around the world.  In doing so, the interested parties sought to unencumber 
such action from the public sector processes.  Yet, it is also very clear that they only intended to 
do the minimum necessary to appease the eyes of public opinion.  They originally proposed a 
replacement housing site some 50 kilometers from the favela’s location and only 196 housing 
units were completed—far from the 1000 originally promised.  At the same time, for the public 
sector, this provided a project plan and completion strategy “for free.”  To put it a different way, 
the public sector did not have to use internal funds and find a suitable site on its own to deal with 
the “problem” of the favela.  The ambivalence of the municipal government was also made clear 
in their leaving of the community and forcing the residents to negotiate directly and on an 
individual basis with the pool’s representatives, along with the later court decision finding it 
negligent in managing the removal and relocation of the favela residents.  In the end, however, 
neither the favela residents of Jardim Edith nor the middle and upper class residents near the 
Faria Lima project won their battles; both avenue projects were completed and both Operações 
Urbanas were approved.  The impacts on the Jardim Edith residents were much more violent; 
conversely, at least some of the middle and upper class residents’ concerns were met through 
some project modifications. 
 
Multiple Centralities, Multiple Projects 
Turning now to a discussion of the Berrini/Faria Lima projects and the Nova Luz 
attempts, one of the most obvious differences is that of the redevelopment mechanisms 
employed.  In the old downtown, multiple attempts at using Operações Urbanas never served to 
stir the necessary private sector real estate interest to provide for significant redevelopment of the 
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region.  The city and state governments also attempted multiple “culture led” redevelopment 
programs; while they did provide for a rich network of museums and performance spaces, 
nonetheless did not provide a significant development instigator in the region.  On the other 
hand, the Berrini and Faria Lima projects were initiated through major road projects in areas that 
already had some internal inertia of private sector real estate interest.   
Both project areas also differ in their land development mechanisms and resulting 
neighborhood changes.  Public sector eminent domain activities and private sector incentives 
were enough to transform primarily middle and upper class neighborhoods to high end office 
towers, hotels, and shopping centers in the Berrini/Faria Lima region, although the costs incurred 
by the public sector to facilitate such development were not fully recouped through the Operação 
Urbana structure.  Conversely, the Nova Luz attempt using urban concessions was a completely 
different model for development.  It emerged from the growing costs of public sector eminent 
domain proceedings and project delays in the incentives attempt there, but would have—at least 
on paper—preserved all of the neighborhood’s historic features and allowed for some of its 
lower income residents to remain.  In this sense, although neighborhood change would have 
occurred, it likely would not have been to the extent experienced by the other example. 
Another important point of comparison is the role of the private sector in each.  In Agua 
Espraiada, the private sector development interests took the lead and proposed the favela 
relocation project at their cost.  In Nova Luz, the incentives attempt provided a structure under 
which private sector actors would redevelop parts of the neighborhood on a building-by-building 
basis, through the use of tax breaks and other financial incentives.  In the larger redevelopment 
effort, the municipal government sought out the private sector for both developing a complete 
redevelopment plan for the 45-block area as well as the completion of the entire project, both 
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completed or to be completed by a single firm or consortium of firms.  In both cases, however, it 
is clear that the municipal government wanted, needed, or relied on the private sector’s lead for 
completing the favela removal or large redevelopment project.  This points to issues of public 
sector capacity in completing projects of certain scales and larger trends of the privatization of 
urban planning. 
City builders did at least implicitly learn from the mistakes of the participatory processes.  
The institution of ZEIS participatory management councils during the Suplicy administration 
ensured that the egregious example of Jardim Edith did not occur in Nova Luz.  Although it had 
many internal and external issues, this council provided at least one formal forum for civil 
society in Nova Luz.  No such participatory planning body existed in the Jardim Edith example 
nor Faria Lima.  In the latter examples, both communities struggled to receive any attention from 
the public sector and only one was marginally successful in attaining any project changes.  
Participation in Nova Luz did not result in all of civil society’s demands being met, but many of 
their suggestions were incorporated in latter versions of the project plans.  Similarly, the Nova 
Luz project structure—as a comprehensive redevelopment plan—provided for the incorporation 
of many community benefits, like schools, social service facilities, and nurseries.  The Operação 
Urbana format does not provide for such structure, merely allowing for the profits received by 
the public sector to be spent on whatever deemed necessary in the area.  In exchange for the 
development rights in the Nova Luz area, the firms completing the project would have 
mandatorily completed such features.   
On a related note, electoral politics in general indeed play a significant role in many of 
the differences between the two efforts outlined herein.  While a full discussion of this is largely 
outside the scope of this dissertation, I will touch briefly here on it.  Between the municipal 
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administrations in São Paulo which completed or proposed the various projects discussed herein 
exists significant differences in urban project priorities, stances on informal settlements and 
informal settlement upgrading programs, and civil society, just to name a few.  Additionally, 
some of the administrations responsible for the above projects have been marred by international 
corruption scandals that may have directly or indirectly influenced their municipal priorities.   
 
Intramunicipal Competition 
Finally, and most significantly, is the dynamic I refer to as “intramunicipal competition.”  
Interurban competition is a well-known occurrence in economic development in which 
neighboring municipalities compete with one another through different packages of development 
opportunities, tax breaks, land provisions, and other incentives.  intramunicipal competition I 
argue, is a similar phenomenon that can only be recently observed in geographically large cities 
that have undergone neighborhood specific processes of growth and decline.  In it, a city tries to 
develop or redevelop multiple areas simultaneously using a different package of incentives for 
each.  This splits private sector interests between them as they seek the best combination of low 
development costs and high profit possibilities.   
City builders were planning the Nova Luz project at the same time businesses were 
buying office space in the Faria Lima/Berrini region and completing it as a new business district.  
The comparatively high outlays of redeveloping Nova Luz—including those identified by the 
city government in ending the project, irregular land parcels, high number of property owners, 
and even time in confronting a very mobilized civil society—proved to be too costly for the 
project to continue.  Developer and private sector attention was (and still is) very interested in 
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the Faria Lima/Berrini region and was not completely sold on the prospect of the Nova Luz 
project. 
 As Fix (2012b) noted, for some time in the 2000s much of the newly completed office 
space in the Faria Lima/Berrini region sat vacant.  Only some time later did it become rented out.  
This, however, was precisely the same time that the Nova Luz efforts were taking off, first under 
the incentives approach.  For its part, it was poorly defined and slow to progress—which stymied 
any potential development interests.  On a citywide scale, however, real estate markets were still 
“catching up” with the flooded market in the new centrality to the southeast.  Additionally, many 
of the companies that expressed interest in the incentives approach had recently invested in 
office space in the Faria Lima/Berrini region. A region that concentrates many multinational, 
tech sector, and service sector companies. In insisting on redeveloping the Nova Luz region, 
planners and city leaders failed to recognize these dynamics at a citywide scale, however.  The 
development of new centralities in São Paulo has traditionally happened on multiple-decade long 
cycles, not immediately following the consolidation of the previous.  Even if Nova Luz was not 
an attempt at recreating part of the old downtown as an emerging centrality, it still attempted to 
reverse the real estate development inertia that had been in a different region of the city for some 
time.  No amount of incentives was able to reverse this (through the incentives approach or the 
Operação Urbana Centro) and the Concessão Urbana format served to be politically, financially, 
and logistically very costly. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
I ague that in São Paulo, a new, historically specific form of privatized urban planning for 
redevelopment has emerged.  This form combines public-private partnerships and participatory 
planning in the form of municipal management councils.  Despite originating in the same 
historical, political, and economic context, the Nova Luz redevelopment project is the first 
instance of such a juxtaposition of governance structures.   Unlike conventional understandings, 
however, this research shows these two modes are not inherently incompatible, but careful 
attention must occur as they are brought together or “assembled.”  Further, the São Paulo case 
exemplifies a more nuanced understanding of the public and private logics of urban 
development; they are not either/or, oppositional forces but occur concurrently for the same 
urban space and project in varied ways—sometimes in consensus and cooperation and other 
times in contestation and conflict. 
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Figure 24:  Locations of São Paulo Redevelopment Project Areas discussed in Dissertation 
(depiction by Joshua Shake) 
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This research contributes to the emerging perspectives regarding the privatization of 
urban planning.  As Shatkin (2008) points out, this shift increases the “potential for conflict 
between citizens and private developers and equity issues while decreasing popular participation 
opportunities” (399).  While these issues may be present in São Paulo to some extent, the context 
is decidedly different.  In Shatkin’s case, the private sector was the leader in the process, while in 
São Paulo the city government is directing the redevelopment efforts in collaboration with the 
private sector.  The processes are indeed resulting in the privatization of urban planning in São 
Paulo, however they take Shatkin’s example further. The São Paulo case shows that privatizing 
urban planning can take many forms and is uneven in its manifestations.  That is, the 
privatization turn can occur concurrently with the participatory turn and the two are not binary 
governance strategies for shaping urban form.  This case further demonstrates the potentials for 
including participatory processes within public-private partnerships. 
In Brazil, participation through municipal management councils is a legal requirement, 
although in practice it has varying efficacy.  Even so, it is at least present and presents the 
opportunity to influence project outcomes.  As Caldeira and Holston observe, “the 
interconnections between democratic and neoliberal rationalities of government are intricate, yet 
still under-investigated” (Caldeira and Holston, 2008, 411).  Therefore, in exploring these 
dynamics, this research seeks to fill the existing gap in the literature discussing interplays 
between the privatization of urban planning and mandatory participatory planning.  In Brazil, 
and as exemplified by the São Paulo case, these two modes of planning and urban governance 
are not an “either/or” option, but rather are both employed in planning and development 
processes. 
 
 
183 
Additionally, this research offers an example of the varied ways city builders attempt to 
redevelop downtowns in a globalized world of cities, furthering the growth of both literatures on 
and understandings of urbanism as it occurs in varying contexts.  Specifically, it highlights a case 
of how participatory planning bodies can and cannot be incorporated into public-private 
partnerships for redevelopment.  In doing so, it reveals insights into the emergence of new 
redevelopment strategies as these manifest themselves differently at the local level throughout 
the world.  Similarly, this research presents an opportunity to increase perspectives of how social 
and political systems can and do influence planning in cities not just in Brazil, but also 
comparatively with other urban contexts.   
 
Cities as Assemblages  
By reframing our understandings of cities as assemblages (McCann and Ward, 2011; 
Farias and Bender, 2010; McFarlane, 2011; Deluuze and Guttari, 1987; Allen and Cochrane, 
2007; Olds and Thrift, 2005) of policies from distinct origins and researching those contexts in 
which they emerge, the failures of democratic governance and privatized urban planning are not 
due to their inherent incompatibility or oppositional nature, but rather in the ways that they have 
been assembled together in specific urban development projects.  Some of the shortcomings in 
understanding the dynamics of contemporary urban redevelopment and civil society come from 
an under-elaborated framing of how cities are formed as “static arrangement of a set of parts” as 
McCann and Ward (2011) suggest has been the conventional mode.  Understanding cities as 
assemblages emphasizes the local level—the politics and practices (Olds and Thrift, 2005)—and 
the how, where, why and consequences of the assemblages of elements by urban actors (McCann 
and Ward, 2011).  Shifting our understanding to cities as assemblages of urban policies—from 
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local, national, and international sources---and understanding the pathways and contexts from 
which these polices emerge, we gain new insights on the city.  For my research project, this 
reframing allows for a new understanding of privatized urban planning and democratic 
governance—one that breaks from the oppositional dichotomies present explicitly and implicitly 
in other accounts.   In recognizing this, these issues can be identified and provide for the future 
success of these to governance modes together. 
Therefore, new and emerging approaches are necessary to understanding present-day 
global urbanism generally and the dynamics of São Paulo more specifically.  Even more 
precisely, however, I suggest that some of the shortcomings in understanding the dynamics of 
contemporary urban redevelopment and civil society come from an under-elaborated framing of 
how cities are formed.  By shifting our understanding to cities as assemblages of urban 
policies—from local, national, and international sources---and understanding the pathways and 
contexts from which these polices emerge, we will gain new insights on the city.  For my 
research project, this reframing allows for a new understanding of privatized urban planning and 
democratic governance—one that breaks from the oppositional dichotomies present explicitly 
and implicitly in other accounts.    
 In Brazil, both the participatory turn and privatization turn emerged from the same 
historical context.  Social movements gained momentum during the waning years of the military 
dictatorship and helped institutionalize new forms of participation in the new Constitution of 
1988.  Also, the new democratic governments of the early 1990s inherited significant 
government debt and economic stagnation from the 1980s and the latter days of military rule.  
The new governments, mostly under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s leadership, engaged in 
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widespread fiscal reforms, monetary restructurings, privatizations of state industries, and 
bureaucratic reform and decentralization.   
 Over time, each set of governance styles and institutions evolved and was incorporated in 
varying formats at the different spheres of government in Brazil.  At the same time in São Paulo 
(in the early 2000s during Marta Suplicy’s administration) stringent fiscal regulations greatly 
restricted government spending on new projects and new public housing mechanisms in the form 
of ZEIS were implemented.  Along with this latter instrument, management councils comprised 
of municipal government and civil society representatives were required for each public housing 
project implemented in the new zones.   
 The two trajectories came back together directly in the Nova Luz project, albeit in a 
piecemeal way and without full consideration of the larger policy contexts, trajectories, and 
assemblages that did so.  And as a result of the changing dynamics of centrality(ies) in the city 
over the previous century.  The superposition of the Nova Luz perimeter over the preexisting 
ZEIS zoning created what the public sector initially treated as a project within a project, delaying 
when it formed the ZEIS management council and attempting to only address public housing 
related concerns within it.  They soon discovered, through their own realizations and through 
civil society’s insistence, that the two projects could not be treated separately.  Had they come to 
this realization earlier, some of the outcomes may have been different.  As this example—and 
that of multiple redevelopment projects and intramuncipal competition—show, cities and 
neighborhoods are impacted by multiple and overlapping assemblages of different policies, each 
with their own contexts and trajectories that must be considered. 
Lastly, the policy assemblages regarding Nova Luz may be continuing.  Recent rumors 
have suggested that the CEPAC instrument—pioneered in the Faria Lima Operação Urbana and 
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also in use in the Agua Espraiada Operação Urbana, is in discussions for use in the Nova Luz 
project area.  However, with one distinction:  after its widespread use in São Paulo, the city of 
Rio de Janeiro employed it with some structural modifications in its Porto Maravilha old port 
area redevelopment efforts.  Leaders in São Paulo have met with project coordinators in Rio 
about using this modified CEPAC format in São Paulo and restarting the Nova Luz project using 
this format.  Only time will tell if this holds true, but the policy assemblages and reassemblages 
continue. 
 
New Redevelopment Forms 
 The Nova Luz project represents both a continuity and departure of earlier projects in the 
old downtown region of the city.  This continuity is explicit in the use of funding from them for 
the planning stages of Nova Luz and preliminary eminent domain activities; it is also implicit in 
the ongoing interest in redeveloping portions of the old downtown region.  However, new 
redevelopment mechanisms were necessary for new types of projects.  The previous projects’ 
funding expired in the 2000s and those projects were more punctual in nature.  They emphasized 
historic preservation, urban design and streetscape improvements, and cultural facilities; they 
were not comprehensive, neighborhood-wide redevelopment actions, however.  The 
comprehensive redevelopment of what was to grow to be a 45-block area in a central, downtown 
region of a Brazilian city was not only unprecedented in São Paulo but in all of Brazil.  The 
differences of this project in comparison with the precedent redevelopment projects in the area, 
as well as with the Faria Lima/Berrini projects and redevelopment instruments are summarized 
in Table 8.  
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Table 8:  Summary Comparison of Redevelopment Projects (design by Joshua Shake) 
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Another factor became very apparent in the incentives-based redevelopment attempt and 
refers to the public sector’s capacity to carry out a project of such scale.   Decentralization and 
economic restructuring occurred in the 1990s and 2000s following redemocratization, and these 
two dynamics indeed influenced the city government’s capabilities in the Nova Luz attempts.  
The private sector grew impatient and began to lose confidence in the public sector’s capacities 
to complete the necessary steps.  The eminent domain proceedings were very delayed, as well.  
As they were seeking new mechanisms, city officials acknowledged that the private sector may 
be more financially and logistically capable of completing the project.  In interviews, city 
officials also recognized that many departments and secretariats had no ongoing plans for the 
Santa Ifigenia/Nova Luz region, as they could not comprehensively plan for all parts of such a 
large city.  
While traditionally city governments turn to entrepreneurial urbanism and privatized 
urban planning due to fiscal constraints (Shatkin, 2008; Jessop and Sum, 2000; Harvey, 1989; 
Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Hackworth, 2007), the case of São Paulo suggests deficiencies in 
government capacity may also be a motivating factor.  The Nova Luz project had an optimistic 
15-year completion schedule, but the administrative change was a decisive factor in its lack of 
continuity.  In this case, and in countless cases across Brazil, administrative changes in the 
political party in power result in the cancelation of numerous projects and contracts.  São Paulo 
city officials were still trying to contract the project completion phase even in the final days of 
their administration.  Thus, their actions show they were seeking to insulate the Nova Luz project 
from the four or eight year political cycles to ensure its completion by the private sector, which is 
not barred by such cycles.  This would also allow the private sector to proceed at a quicker pace, 
without the bureaucratic encumberments of the public sector.  I conclude that—along with 
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financial considerations—cities may turn to privatized urban planning because of a lack of 
internal capacity to complete a development project. 
Finally, the project, in its current form, failed for two reasons.  The new administration 
officially acknowledged the problems with the participatory process.  However, deeply tied to 
this factor is that of politics.  As mentioned above, political power shifts can deeply influence 
urban planning in São Paulo and Brazil.  Cognizant of this, the civil society groups took 
advantage of the elections and attempted to ensure the Nova Luz project would not be completed 
in its proposed form.  The Nova Luz project itself became a political instrument, representative 
of the previous administration; the new mayor (Haddad) quickly spoke out and ended it shortly 
after taking office.  In its place, he suggested projects would be developed with ample 
participation, highlighting this as a departure from the previous administration’s approaches.  
The second reason only becomes clear when this project is placed in the larger context of urban 
redevelopment and centralities in São Paulo.  This issue, of intramunicipal competition, is 
discussed below. 
 
New Forms of Participation 
Democratic forms of governance emerged at about the same historical moment as 
entrepreneurial forms of governance in Brazil.  That is, in the 1980s and 1990s as Brazil was in 
the process of redemocratization.  We saw the entrepreneurial shift in previous chapters due to 
hyperinflation, other economic issues, and the desire to decentralize the central military 
governments rule.  On the other hand, the various forms of participatory governance emerged 
from the growth of social movements calling for direct elections and the end of the dictatorship.  
With the passage of the new constitution and subsequent laws and regulations, these institutions 
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became structural components within the new democracy.  Yet, these two governance 
strategies—although both present—evolved on different paths and only recently were brought 
back together.  This, however, occurred almost by happenstance, due to the overlapping 
regulatory frameworks for Nova Luz.  Recall that the redevelopment mechanisms were 
developed specifically for this project, and should the project area not have had public housing 
zoning (ZEIS), this entire story could have been very different.  It was the existence of this 
zoning that required the management council.  
In this case, one can conclude that participatory governance and the institutions and 
actors that make it up are still works in progress.  This example in São Paulo was the first time a 
project specific municipal council was used in all of Brazil, and the most active civil society 
groups actually just formed in opposition to the project—rather than being longstanding 
community based associations as seen in other arenas.  Contrary to other research, the civil 
society actors that were most active were not explicitly those that were most politically 
connected but rather those that were most visible.  Yet, an aversion to this possibility was indeed 
present in the dynamics between AMOALUZ and ACSI.  ACSI perceived that AMOALUZ’s 
engagement with the municipal council was legitimizing the project.  Rather, it was the only 
possible way to minimize the possible impacts of the project and effectively renegotiate some of 
its components. 
Additionally, the specific types of participation engagement in this example differ from 
those observed in other contexts.  Tatagiba (2011) noted that in other participatory bodies, the 
political orientation of the party in power dictates the type of participation that occurs: in left 
leaning governments, civil society actors tend to participate directly while in right leaning 
governments they tend to be more confrontational.  In this case, the dynamics between ACSI and 
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AMOALUZ provide a different conclusion.  The two groups were able to work able to cooperate 
to some extent following the initial disagreements, but both took different approaches throughout 
the process.  AMOALUZ and other civil society groups saw their best means of engagement as 
through the ZEIS council while ACSI’s interactions with the state were less direct.  In this sense, 
these groups simultaneously participated both collaboratively—through the project council—and 
combatively—through court actions barring the project and the accord signed by the mayoral 
candidates. 
This dynamic also occurred in part due to the structure of the ZEIS council, which only 
dealt with housing issues and those issues within the 11 blocks under this designation.  Although 
they were able to provide some feedback to the wider Nova Luz project area, most of these 
remained as suggestions rather than changes in policy.  Other interested and active parties—like 
ACSI—were effectively excluded from the only formalized participatory body.  The project 
wide municipal council was not formed since legislatively that was only required to occur once 
the project was in the implementation phase.  This, along with the sometimes strained relations 
between the city government and civil society actors in the ZEIS council, raise questions about 
the intent of the council(s); others have noted that the inclusion of civil society actors—rather 
than the extent of their participation—serves as the legitimizer of the process (Pupo and Bueno, 
2012).  At least in the eyes of some public sector and consortium employees, this may be true in 
this case as well.    Additionally, two other facts put the legitimacy of all of the participatory 
forums in question.  The private sector consortium organized and directed many of the public 
meetings.  Similarly, many of the sectorial meetings occurred not by their initiative, but through 
that of the civil society actors themselves.  A public participation process directed by private 
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sector planners raises many issues regarding the larger trend of privatizing urban planning and 
indeed undermines the legitimacy of the process. 
It was indeed the combination of both the simultaneous collaborative and combative 
forms of civil society engagement that ensured the project did not continue.  All of the groups 
initially viewed this as a victory, as well.  However, to date no concrete activities or plans have 
taken place in the neighborhood.  And, the civil society and council momenta that were 
championed have all but disappeared.  The council has been disbanded, there are no interactions 
between or within the various civil society groups, and many of their websites have either 
expired or not been updated since the end of the project.  In follow-up interviews, both city 
officials and civil society leaders expressed concern that this was happening.  Additionally, the 
civil society leaders were beginning to retrospectively observe that some attention is better than 
no attention.  That is, despite the problems with Nova Luz, the Santa Ifigenia region was at least 
the subject of debate and planning processes—which have all but disappeared today.  
Consequently, the community groups won the battle against Nova Luz, but in doing and without 
realizing at the time, also lost the war for public action and necessary improvements to their 
neighborhood in the near future. 
 
Intramuncipal Competition and the Context of Redevelopment in São Paulo 
One of the most obvious differences between the Berrini/Faria Lima projects and the 
Nova Luz attempts, one of the most obvious differences is the redevelopment mechanisms 
employed.  In the old downtown, multiple attempts at using Operações Urbanas never served to 
stir the necessary private sector real estate interest to provide for significant redevelopment of the 
region.  The city and state governments also attempted multiple “culture led” redevelopment 
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programs; while they did provide for a rich network of museums and performance spaces, 
nonetheless did not provide a significant development instigator in the region.  On the other 
hand, the Berrini and Faria Lima projects were initiated through major road projects in areas that 
already had some internal inertia of private sector real estate interest.   
Both project areas also differ in their land development mechanisms and resulting 
neighborhood changes.  Public sector eminent domain activities and private sector incentives 
were enough to transform primarily middle and upper class neighborhoods to high end office 
towers, hotels, and shopping centers in the Berrini/Faria Lima region, although the costs incurred 
by the public sector to facilitate such development were not fully recouped through the Operação 
Urbana structure.  Conversely, the Nova Luz attempt using urban concessions was a completely 
different model for development.  It emerged from the growing costs of public sector takings and 
project delays in the incentives attempt there, but would have—at least on paper—preserved all 
of the neighborhood’s historic features and allowed for some of its lower income residents to 
remain.  In this sense, although neighborhood change would have occurred, it likely would not 
have been to the extent experienced by the other example. 
Another important point of comparison is the role of the private sector in each.  In Agua 
Espraiada, the private sector development interests took the lead and proposed the favela 
relocation project at their cost.  In Nova Luz, the incentives attempt provided a structure under 
which private sector actors would redevelop parts of the neighborhood on a building-by-building 
basis, through the use of tax breaks and other financial incentives.  In the larger redevelopment 
effort, the municipal government sought out the private sector for both developing a complete 
redevelopment plan for the 45-block area as well as the completion of the entire project, both 
completed or to be completed by a single firm or consortium of firms.  In both cases, however, it 
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is clear that the municipal government wanted, needed, or relied on the private sector’s lead for 
completing the favela removal or large redevelopment project.  This points to issues of public 
sector capacity in completing projects of certain scales and larger trends of the privatization of 
urban planning. 
City builders did at least implicitly learn from the mistakes of the participatory processes.  
The institution of ZEIS participatory management councils during the Suplicy administration 
ensured that the egregious example of Jardim Edith did not occur in Nova Luz.  Although it had 
many internal and external issues, this council provided at least one formal forum for civil 
society in Nova Luz.  No such participatory planning body existed in the Jardim Edith example 
nor Faria Lima.  In the latter examples, both communities struggled to receive any attention from 
the public sector and only one was marginally successful in attaining any project changes.  
Participation in Nova Luz did not result in all of civil society’s demands being met, but many of 
their suggestions were incorporated in latter versions of the project plans.  Similarly, the Nova 
Luz project structure—as a comprehensive redevelopment plan—provided for the incorporation 
of many community benefits, like schools, social service facilities, and nurseries.  The Operação 
Urbana format does not provide for such structure, merely allowing for the profits received by 
the public sector to be spent on whatever deemed necessary in the area.  In exchange for the 
development rights in the Nova Luz area, the firms completing the project would have 
mandatorily completed such features.   
On a related note, electoral politics in general indeed play a significant role in many of 
the differences between the two efforts outlined herein.  Between the municipal administrations 
in São Paulo which completed or proposed the various projects discussed herein exists 
significant differences in urban project priorities, stances on informal settlements and informal 
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settlement upgrading programs, and civil society, just to name a few.  Additionally, some of the 
administrations responsible for the above projects have been marred by international corruption 
scandals that may have directly or indirectly influenced their municipal priorities.   
Finally, and most significantly, is the dynamic I refer to as “intramunicipal competition.”  
Interurban competition is a well-known occurrence in economic development in which 
neighboring municipalities compete with one another through different packages of development 
opportunities, tax breaks, land provisions, and other incentives.  intramunicipal competition I 
argue, is a similar phenomenon that can only be recently observed in geographically large cities 
that have undergone neighborhood specific processes of growth and decline.  In it, a city tries to 
develop or redevelop multiple areas simultaneously using a different package of incentives for 
each.  This splits private sector interests between them as they seek the best combination of low 
development costs and high profit possibilities.   
City builders were planning the Nova Luz project was being planned at the same time the 
Faria Lima/Berrini region was being completed as a new business district.  The comparatively 
high outlays of redeveloping Nova Luz—including those identified by the city government in 
ending the project, irregular land parcels, high number of property owners, and even time in 
confronting a very mobilized civil society—proved to be too costly for the project to continue.  
Developer and private sector attention was (and still is) very interested in the Faria Lima/Berrini 
region and was not completely sold on the prospect of the Nova Luz project. 
 As Fix (2012b) noted, for some time in the 2000s much of the newly completed office 
space in the Faria Lima/Berrini region sat vacant.  Only some time later did it become rented out.  
This, however, was precisely the same time that the Nova Luz efforts were taking off, first under 
the incentives approach.  For its part, it was poorly defined and slow to progress—which stymied 
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any potential development interests.  On a citywide scale, however, real estate markets were still 
“catching up” with the flooded market in the new centrality to the southeast.  Additionally, many 
of the companies that expressed interest in the incentives approach had recently invested in 
office space in the Faria Lima/Berrini region, as it concentrates many multinational, tech sector, 
and service sector companies.  In insisting on redeveloping the Nova Luz region, planners and 
city leaders failed to recognize these dynamics at a citywide scale, however.  The development 
of new centralities in São Paulo has traditionally happened on multiple-decade long cycles, not 
immediately following the consolidation of the previous.  Even if Nova Luz was not an attempt 
at recreating part of the old downtown as an emerging centrality, it still attempted to reverse the 
real estate development inertia that had been in a different region of the city for some time.  No 
amount of incentives was able to reverse this (through the incentives approach or the Operação 
Urbana Centro) and the concessão urbana format served to be politically, financially, and 
logistically very costly. 
 
Implications for the Practice of Urban Planning 
This research also offers a number of detailed lessons for planning practice, both in and 
outside of Brazil.  Specifically, it reveals the possibilities and perils of attempting to conduct 
large-scale redevelopment projects under demands for public participation and necessities for 
collaborating with the private sector.  This case should not be read as one arguing that public-
private partnerships and democratic governance cannot work together.  In a country with a rich 
tradition of participatory planning and budgeting, this is the first instance the two governance 
structures have coincided to such an extent.   
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Learning from this case and the policy trajectories, contexts, and histories that the two 
strategies have passed through—and with special attention to the ways in which these two forms 
come together in specific projects—will continue to inform perspectives and provide for their 
successful employment in future projects.  Even so, this case illustrates that these two modes of 
governance are not incompatible as conventional understanding suggests, but rather must be 
brought together in very specific ways in order to function and realize the potential mutual gains 
of public-private partnerships and participatory planning.  Yet, as public-private partnerships 
become ever more popular both in Brazil and around the world as an important risk management 
mitigation measure and method for efficient project completion, this case demonstrates that their 
structuring can actually create more risk if not done carefully. 
Secondly, it addresses the necessity of participation requirements throughout project 
development and participation from all interested parties, not merely those specific to a 
component of a project.  In this case, participation was only required after draft plans were 
completed and only for public housing provision, both reducing the amount of public input 
possible in plan elaboration and restricting non-housing (business) association’s access to 
participatory forums.  Planners must also be cognizant of questions of legitimacy in participatory 
processes.  While in some projects the private sector planners may have some advantages to 
managing participatory processes, this easily undermines the entire process; when active civil 
society perceives that it is not being heard, it will seek out other mechanisms—be them direct or 
indirect—at participation and for voicing concerns, as some of the actors did in the Nova Luz 
case. 
Additionally, it demonstrates the importance of understanding how private sector interest 
in redevelopment may vary based on the strategy employed by the public sector, as previous 
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culture-led attempts at increasing property values and interest did not result in city officials’ 
expected outcomes.  To complete any form of a public-private partnership redevelopment 
project, sufficient private sector interest is essential.  It also suggests the possibility for the public 
sector to use its capacities for large-scale interventions with the institutional capacities of the 
private sector for development plan creation.  That is, attention must be paid to the capacities for 
multi-sectorial planning within the public sector in order to create comprehensive development 
or redevelopment plans.  Likewise, project timelines and political change can significantly 
influence the extent to which projects become completed; or if they are able to be completed.  
The private sector does offer some advantages when it comes to this, but decisions to contract 
out planning functions come with tradeoffs that must be fully and publically addressed. 
Finally, it stresses the need for practicing planners to understand cities as assemblages of 
various policies and projects.  In São Paulo, planners and city officials failed to put the Nova Luz 
project in the context with other recent redevelopment efforts occurring in other parts of the city, 
creating the situation of intramunicipal competition for private sector real estate development 
interest between the regions.  Had this taken place, the strategies employed in Santa Ifigenia may 
have been different; or, at least the city officials may not have been so insistent on attempting 
large-scale redevelopment there.  Cities are intersections of a number of different networks, 
dynamics, and systems that overlap in varied ways.  Care must be taken to understand how these 
overlapping structures at urban scales impact project proposals at a neighborhood level. 
Similarly, the participatory turn and privatization turn both emerged from the same 
historical context in Brazil, but departed on different trajectories.  They came together once again 
in the Nova Luz project, however haphazardly.  By understanding cities as assemblages, planners 
can better contextualize the issues facing new projects.  It is clear that that at least to some extent 
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the municipal council participation only occurred in Nova Luz due to the existence of the ZEIS 
zoning distinction within the larger project perimeter.  At the beginning, city planners attempted 
to manage this project within a project separately from the larger redevelopment efforts; civil 
society and later internal realizations demonstrated that there were too many overlaps between 
the two and they must be treated comprehensively.  Had this assemblage been recognized earlier, 
some of the outcomes may have been different for Nova Luz.  At a minimum, the participatory 
democracy and privatization paths could have been addressed simultaneously instead of as two 
separate but concurrent activities.  In the end, this case shows that—although limited in Nova 
Luz—there is great potential and possibility for the inclusion of participatory processes in 
public-private partnerships for urban development. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
CREATION OF THE URBAN CONCESSIONS REDEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENT 
Law No. 14,917, FROM 7 MAY 2009 (Bill No. 87/09, the Executive approved in Substitute of 
the Legislature) 
 
Article 1. The urban concession is a structural urban intervention instrument destined to the 
completion of urbanization or urbanization of a part of the municipal territory for the 
improvement of urban infrastructure and the reorganization of urban space, founded in a specific 
urban plan for an Urban Operation or Urban Intervention Area for the completion of objectives, 
guidelines, and established priorities in the Strategic Master Plan. 
urban structural urban intervention instrument for the realization of urbanization or 
redevelopment of part of the municipal territory the object of rehabilitation of urban 
infrastructure and reorganization of urban space based on specific urban design in urban area of 
operation or urban area of intervention for achievement of objectives, guidelines and priorities 
established by the law of the strategic master plan. 
Single paragraph. Are guidelines that can justify making urban intervention by the urban 
concession: 
I - raising the quality of the urban environment, through the conservation of natural 
resources and protection of historical, artistic, cultural, urban, archaeological and 
landscape heritages; 
II - rationalizing the use of existing infrastructure, particularly the road system and 
transportation, avoiding its overload or obsolescence; 
III – promoting and making more efficient, in social, environmental, urban and economic 
terms, public and private sector investments; 
IV - preventing distortions and abuses in the economic fulfillment of urban property and 
curbing speculative land use as a store of value, to ensure the fulfillment of the social 
function of property; 
V - allowing private participation in actions related to the process of urbanization; 
VI - recuperating damaged or degraded areas aimed at improving the environment and 
living conditions; 
VII - to encourage restructuring and urban redevelopment to better use of areas endowed 
with infrastructure, stimulating investment and reversing the process of population or 
housing emptying; 
VIII - encouraging densification of areas already provided with services, infrastructure 
and equipment, in order to optimize the utilization of the installed capacity and reduce 
costs; 
IX – urbanizing in order to suit the needs arising from new technologies and ways of life; 
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X – allowing the occurrence of different architectural typologies and facilitating the 
recycling of buildings for new uses. 
Article 2. For purposes of this law , urban concession is the administrative contract whereby the 
grantor, through competitive bidding, delegates the legal person or consortium of companies 
performing urban works in the public interest, under the financial risks and obligations of the 
concessionary company, so this investment is paid and amortized through the exploitation of 
property destined for private use under the concession agreement, based on previous specific 
urban plans and the fulfillment of objectives,, policies, and priorities of the Strategic Master 
Plan. 
Single paragraph. The concessionary company will get their remuneration, at their own risk, as 
established in the bidding documents and contract, among other documents, though the sale or 
lease of real estate, including the expropriated properties and real estate units to be built, the 
direct or indirect holding of public land in the area covered by the urban intervention, or any 
other form of alternative, complementary, or ancillary revenue, as well as revenue from 
associated projects. 
 
Article 3. The urban concession may address, among other structural interventions, projects 
related to modification of the road system, land tenure, urban facilities and equipment, including 
public transportation systems, and the location of public facilities, demolition, renovation, 
expansion or construction of buildings under terms established in the specific urban design plans. 
§ 1. The area resulting from urbanization or urban redevelopment through urban 
concessions shall be provided with, as appropriate, drinking water supply, proper sewage 
disposal, electricity distribution and public lighting system infrastructures, storm water 
management , public passenger transport and public roads with proper pavement, as well 
as meet accessibility standards and preferably with proper drainage, telecommunications 
networks, piped gas networks and community facilities for education, culture, health, 
safety, sport , leisure and social interaction. 
§ 2. The necessary reparcelling for implementing the specific urban plan shall observe the 
general rules of national and local legislation applicable to the division of land for urban 
purposes, the strategic master plan and the law of joint urban operations, or the strategic 
project in which the object of the urban area grant is inserted. 
§ 3. Depending on the needs of each case, the desired urban intervention, according to the 
specific urban design referred to in art. 8 of this Act, may be subjected to more than one 
urban concession. 
§ 4. It is possible to integrate, within the urban concession, urban land use, as well as 
subsoil and airspace projects, including the deployment of underground garages and 
management of metropolitan network infrastructure installed in municipal areas. 
 
Article 4. The urban concession is subject to the legal regime of public concessions governed by 
Federal Law No. 8,987, of February 13, 1995, with the additions contained in this Act, and 
sponsored concessions provided for in the Municipal Law No. 14.517, of October 16, 2007, and 
Federal Law No. 11,079, of December 30, 2004, without prejudice to the application of 
standards compatible with it the laws related to it. 
§ 1. Also applicable are the legal regime of public concessions and the relevant and 
compatible parts of Federal Law No. 8666 of June 21, 1993, and No. 10,257 standards, 
July 10, 2001 and the Municipal Law 13,278, of January 7, 2002. 
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§ 2. If the contract award establishes collaboration on the part of the Municipal 
Government with funding from financing or donations coming from an official agency 
for technical cooperation or another multilateral financial institution that Brazil is a 
member, it may be outlined in the bidding conditions under agreements, protocols, 
conventions or treaties approved by Congress, as well as the rules and procedures of 
those entities, including the criterion for selecting the most advantageous tender for the 
Administration, which may include, in addition to price, other evaluation factors provided 
by them required to obtain financing or donation, and which does not conflict with the 
principle of objective judgment and are subject to motivated order of the executing 
agency of the contract, order this ratified by the next higher authority. 
 
Article 5. Every urban concession must be authorized by a specific law that will establish the 
applicable urban parameters, and can only have the purpose of a continuous urban area for 
intervention based on the strategic master plan, even though there is no need to change the urban 
parameters and other applicable legal provisions. 
§ 1. Each legislative authorization, under its specific law, shall contain the specific scope 
and specific guidelines for urban concession authorized by it, to guide the desired urban 
transformation in the region, according to its features and possibilities. 
§ 2. The Legislature may halt the legislative authorization under this article if the urban 
concession does not note the authorized specific scope and specific guidelines. 
 
… 
 
Article 7. The authorization to open bids for the concession will be preceded by urban studies 
and measures under the responsibility of the grantor in which the definition of objectives, 
guidelines and parameters of specific public interest for the development of the specific urban 
design intervention to be performed by concession, comprising at least the following: 
I - economic studies, market feasibility, and land title situations in the area; 
II - environmental impact studies; 
III - report detailing the main contents of the studies conducted and the measures to be 
implemented with detailed quantitative and qualitative costs and social, urban and 
environmental benefits of the urban intervention to be performed; 
IV - conducting a public hearing in the central area of the City and in each Subprefecture 
where urban interventions will take place, allowing interaction with owners, residents, 
permanent users and potentially interested private investors. 
 
… 
 
Article 11. The City shall make the declaration of public utility and social interest of the 
properties to be subject to expropriation for the implementation of the specific urban plan under 
the urban concession, as authorized in item " i" of art. 5 of Decree -Law No. 3,365, of June 21, 
1941, and in art. 44 of Federal Law No. 6,766, of December 19, 1979. 
§ 1. The concessionary, based on art. 3 of Decree -Law No. 3,365, of June 21, 1941, and 
the statement to which this article refers, shall promote judicial or amicable expropriation 
of identified properties, paying and fully negotiating their compensation, as well as taking 
ownership of the respective properties, as well as promote registry changes necessary for 
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the realization of real estate development and implementation of the specific urban plan, 
as under the urban concession contract. 
§ 2. Expropriation, once possession is obtained, will be irreversible and irrevocable, and the 
municipal government or the concessionaire will not be able to give up or waive the rights and 
obligations relating thereto. 
 
… 
 
Article 36. The Municipal Urban Development Secretariat- SMDU shall coordinate the activities 
of the urban concession, subject to compatibility with the Master Plan and coordination with 
other existing urban plans, must also draft the specific law, studies, terms of responsibility for the 
grantor and the specific urban project, as set forth in arts. 5, 7 and 8 of this Act, and requesting 
the cooperation of other city agencies, according to their specific expertise. 
 
Article 37. The Municipal Urban Construction and Infrastructure Secretariat- SIURB is 
responsible for granting the urban concession under this law and the specific concession law, 
subject to the provisions, objectives, guidelines and priorities established in the Strategic Master 
Plan, as well as other municipal laws, and is responsible for the opening of the bidding, 
contracting, supervision and monitoring of grant. 
 
Article 38. For each urban concession, the Executive will create a Management Council of joint 
composition between the Municipality and civil society representatives, in order to facilitate the 
participation of interested citizens, including residents, owners, users and entrepreneurs. The 
Management Council will conduct the necessary inspection, verification and compliance 
monitoring with the guidelines for the urban intervention and related concession arrangements. 
§ 1. The Management Council referred to herein this Article shall be instituted after the 
conclusion of the urban concession contract. 
§ 2. Member of the Board, 50 % (fifty percent) are representatives of the Executive and 
50 % (fifty percent) shall be representatives of civil society, given the City Council 
Urban Policy - CMPU. 
§ 3. The Executive shall indicate the Council Presidency. 
§ 4. Publicity of the acts of the Managing Board, including through the publication of the 
minutes of regular and special meetings in the Official Gazette of the City and on the 
official website of the Municipality of São Paulo will be guaranteed. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
AUTHORIZING THE EXECUTIVE TO APPLY THE URBAN CONCESSION IN NOVA 
LUZ 
Law No. 14,918, of 7 May 2009 (Bill No. 158 / 09, the Executive approved as Substitute the 
Legislature) 
 
Gilberto Kassab, mayor of São Paulo, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by law, 
points out that the City Council, at its meeting of April 22, 2009, decreed and promulgates the 
following law: 
 
Article 1. The Municipal Executive is authorized to apply the Urban Concession in the area 
bounded by the Nova Luz perimeter, in the manner and according to the rules laid down in 
specific municipal legislation. 
Sole Paragraph - For the purposes of this law, Nova Luz is considered all of the urban 
interventions required to implement the specific urban project within the perimeter defined by 
avenues Casper Libero, Ipiranga, São João Duque de Caxias and Maua Street in Republica 
District. 
 
Article 2. The specific guidelines for the urban concession authorized by this law: 
I - Conservation and restoration of existing historical, cultural and artistic heritage 
in the region;  
II – A balance between housing and economic activity in order to provide for the 
sustainability of the intervention;  
III - Implementation of housing units intended for low-income, according to 
planning regulations applicable to Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS);  
IV - Encourage the maintenance and expansion of current economic activities, 
especially in sectors related to technology; and,  
V - Implementation of specific planned and progressive urban design in order to 
avoid the aggravation of social problems and minimize the negative impacts 
resulting from them during the implementation period. 
§ 1. The specific guidelines set out herein will guide the development of the specific 
urban concession project, monitoring by the grantor, and implementation of the urban 
concession contract. 
§ 2. In order to facilitate the specific guidelines, set forth herein, the Municipal Executive 
will complete the registration of residents and economic activities installed within the 
perimeter of the urban concession, identifying, in particular, the housing conditions and 
the presence of jobs and tax generating establishments. 
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§ 3. It is entirely up to the specific urban project to define, among buildings located 
within the perimeter of the concession, those which will be subject to expropriation, 
demolition, renovation or construction, taking into account the following aspects: 
I - restrictions arising from historic preservation designation; 
II - costs of intervention on the building; 
III - economic feasibility of the intervention; 
IV - attention to the social function of property, especially with regard to the 
quality of the building and installed use, including in relation to compliance with 
municipal ordinances; 
V - compatibility with surrounding properties designated in the plan. 
§ 4. Preferably in dispossession, the licensee shall make arrangements with the property 
owner for eventual amicable compensation, in which relevant legal institutions may be 
employed, including the real estate consortium referred to in art. 46 of Federal Law No. 
10,257, of July 10, 2001. 
§ 5. Pursuant to the to-be-defined specific urban project terms, the gradual 
implementation of the urban concession will give priority to interventions for unoccupied 
buildings, those who have the least consolidated occupation, and properties that somehow 
cause losses to the appropriate city fruition, as much as possible. 
§ 6. When interventions are necessary on buildings where registered economic activities 
are occurring in the gradual implementation of the urban concession, in the cases where a 
reasonably compatible market value property, for rent or purchase, is not offered to the 
establishment owner for temporary or permanent relocation, the concessionary will be 
solely responsible for damages related to the expropriation of the establishment. 
 
Article 3. As applicable, Law No. 12,349, of June 6, 1997 – Operação Urbana Centro, especially 
its. 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 9th articles, applies to areas within the perimeter of the Nova Luz 
Project. 
§ 1, Within the perimeter of the Nova Luz Project, urban design parameters of the 
Operação Urbana Centro may be adopted, pursuant to Law No. 12,349, 1997, being 
granted to the Executive Branch the consideration of financial compensation as 
understood in the projects carried out realization of the project or any amount paid to the 
grantor for the granting of the urban concession. 
§ 2. The conditions in Item I herein of art. 4th and § 1 of Art. 6 of Law No. 12,349, 1997 
do not apply to the Nova Luz Project. 
 
Article 4. The Municipal Executive is required to establish the Nova Luz Management Council 
with joint composition between the Municipality and representatives of civil society, in order to 
facilitate the participation of interested citizens, including residents, owners, users, and 
entrepreneurs; the Management Council shall be responsible for the necessary inspection, 
verification, and monitoring the compliance with the general and specific guidelines for the 
urban intervention and the urban concession contract arrangements . 
§ 1. The Management Council referred to in this Article shall be instituted after the 
conclusion of the urban concession contract. 
§ 2. Regarding the members of the Council: 50 % (fifty percent) are representatives of the 
Municipal Executive and 50 % (fifty percent) shall be representatives of civil society, 
indicated by the Urban Policy Municipal Council - CMPU. 
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§ 3. The Municipal Executive shall appoint the Chair of the Management Council. 
§ 4. The publicity of the acts of the Managing Council shall be guaranteed, including 
through the publication of the minutes of regular and special meetings in the Official 
Gazette of the City and on the official website of the Municipality of São Paulo. 
 
Article 5. This law shall enter into force on the date of its publication. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
NOVA LUZ TERMS OF REFERENCE GUIDELINES 
 
Macro Guidelines: 
Enhance and recuperate the built, cultural and intangible heritages; Promote better use of 
the constructive potential planned for the area with an increased population density; 
Prioritize walking and cycling, universal accessibility and use of the public transport 
system; Implement public facilities that support the predicted population growth; Unify 
the urban environment; Provide opportunities for the permanence of current residents and 
attraction of new ones; Strengthen economic activities and attract new businesses; 
Promote multifunctional occupation; Improve adequacy and planning of infrastructure 
and public services; Implement the project based on sustainable development standards. 
 
Specific Guidelines: 
• Expansion of territorial proportions between public and private areas; 
• Expansion of public areas for plazas and conviviality, without compromising road 
connections; 
• Stimulation of the functional diversity of the area as well as promotion of tertiary 
activities related to the culture, leisure and entertainment sectors. 
• Promote the value of the local context, giving identity to the area through 
appreciation of sightlines and historically protected buildings; 
• Facilitate the recuperation of properties designated by preservation agencies through 
the urban concession, allocating them to uses consistent with the intervention 
proposal; 
• Promote the creation, expansion, and rehabilitation of green areas and open spaces for 
public use to function as sites of coexistence and social relations, increasing the 
permeability and green area per inhabitant rates; 
• Promote the widening of sidewalks and creating appropriate conditions for 
movement, including people with disabilities and reduced mobility; 
• Raise the quality of existing and proposed public walkways, indicating solutions in 
street furniture, street lighting, vegetation, and architecture that make these inviting 
spaces and allow for the movement of people in a pleasant, safe, and comfortable 
way; 
• Improve general mobility conditions in the region, as appropriate to the proposed 
uses, through harmonizing the interaction between different modes of circulation and 
prioritizing public transport; 
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• Propose an articulated parking policy, based on the desired uses and population 
densities, the public transport system, and the road system in the region; 
• Improve and valorize access to the existing and proposed public transportation 
network and institutional resources; 
• Encourage the use of techniques and technologies focused on sustainability during 
project development, implementation, and completion phases; 
• Develop solutions aimed at optimizing the consumption of water and energy in 
buildings and public and private open spaces; 
• Encourage increased levels of soil permeability and storm water retention, in 
consideration of the performance of the drainage network; 
• Promote the improvement of conditions relating to environmental comfort, both for 
open spaces and for built-up areas; 
• Propose densities and building volumes that create adequate environmental comfort 
conditions; 
• Promote optimal and intensive use of land for residential and non-residential 
purposes, compatible with the installed infrastructure networks; 
• Promote the intensification of residential uses considering the paradigm of the 
compact city, using the population density of 350 inhabitants/ha as a reference for the 
area; 
• Encourage a diversity of housing typologies, to meet varied resident incomes and 
profiles, complementing public housing, and prioritizing the current resident 
population and the rehabilitation of buildings in poor housing conditions; 
• Encourage the installation of public housing units with an area close to the maximum 
limit set by law (50sqm), when destined for families; 
• Implement institutional equipment compatible with the anticipated increases in 
population; 
• Provide for the installation of local-level commercial activities and services to meet 
the needs of the resident population; 
• Ensure compatibility between spaces for public use with those destined for residents’ 
use, to create harmony between them at the block level; 
• Encourage redevelopment and rehabilitation of buildings through retrofitting; 
• Organize and optimize existing economic activities in the area, particularly with 
regard to their spatial distribution, constructive typology, and compatibility with other 
uses and spaces; 
• Attract new economic activities by leveraging existing vocations, especially those 
related to technology, and establish new activities, detailing how to induce their 
development; 
• Promote a mix of uses so that a diversity of activities that develop in the region, 
including during the day, at night, and on weekends, including the location and 
characteristics of specific projects; 
• Promote access to entertainment and leisure activities in the area and its immediate 
surroundings; 
• Improve the urban landscape through appropriate building volumes, with regard to 
relationships with the historically designated buildings, and those suitable for retrofit; 
• Enhance the pedestrian scale creating suitable relationships with the ground-level of 
buildings; 
 
 
209 
• Define referential elements in the landscape, highlighting areas or existing/proposed 
buildings; 
• Promote the development and enhancement of the electronics and computer 
technology sectors’ economic activities, in place along the Rua Santa Iphigenia 
commercial axis, inserting them in a high quality urban area; 
• Provide differentiated treatment in relation to the urban landscape, circulation, more 
intensive land uses, and the higher concentration of activities, building densities, and 
structural benchmarks, especially along specific north-south and east-west corridors. 
• Ensure compatibility between the proposed intervention programs with the projects 
and actions planned or in force in the area, harmonizing them or suggesting 
adjustments in order to make them compatible and complementary. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Guidelines for the Urban Plan of ZEIS 3 C 016 
Approved by the Management Council on July 27, 2011 
LEGEND: 
• Guidelines proposed by the PMSP 
• Guidelines proposed by the civil society members in the Management Council 
 
1. Finish, revise or redo the REGISTRATION of all residents and merchants present in the 
perimeter of the Nova Luz Project, whether tenants or owners, based on the following criteria: a. 
Provide proof of registration to the registered; 
b. Identify in all profiles families and residents seeking future housing assistance: as 
families or individuals who share the same housing and require separate houses; 
c. Ensure the completeness of the registry via documents such as water and electricity 
bills and property tax records (IPTU); 
d. Adequacy of the HABI registry record with the reality of shops and homeless 
individuals; 
e. General Explanation to the community about the need the registration. 
Note: Only with the disclosure of the Registration will the Management Council be able 
to analyze in depth each of the guidelines established below. 
 
2. Promote linkages between interventions in ZEIS, so that functional and social diversity may 
represent the balance that we seek to make a quality and socially sustainable neighborhood: 
a. Articulate the elements of interest surrounding the ZEIS and Nova Luz with those 
inside the project area; 
b. Integrate existing and proposed dwellings with proposed public facilities for the area. 
 
3. Prioritize, in project phasing, the production of social housing over other interventions and 
begin the process of transformation principally on empty and underutilized areas. 
 
4 Definition of areas and properties that will be subject to urban concession and the proposed 
interventions program, indicating those essential to the development of PUZEIS:  
a. Revision of the criteria for defining the properties to renovate and remain, defined by 
the Specific Project, subject to relevant legislation, in order to not only consider 
constructive elements, but also the existing productive activity and uses that represent the 
history of the neighborhood and the region; 
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b. Definitions of the activities for the indicated renovation areas within the Specific 
Project Plan, following review of the intervention criteria redefined by the Management 
Council program. 
 
5. Analyze the PUZEIS and implementation of the intervention criteria block by block. 
 
6. Reuse of the maximum of the existing structures, when possible, to reduce the impacts from the 
urban remodeling. 
 
7. Setting the number of housing units by type of development: 
a. Indicate the lot and proposed developments for properties to be renovated, following 
the criteria defined in the previous item; 
b. Perform volumetric study to quantify built area of every new development; 
c. Consider mixed use, pursuant to law, for new projects, prioritizing the maintenance of 
existing commercial uses at the ground floor of buildings, and enabling the creation of 
lofts for installing outlets and services that contribute to the generation of income of the 
residents, respecting the applicable legislation. 
 
8. Creation of instruments that can guarantee the performance of the building stock as a different 
activity: a. Evaluate mechanisms to indicate the target of public housing and low income market 
rate housing, under the requirements provided by law; 
 
9. Creation of instruments to guarantee the permanence of the resident population in the area of 
intervention of the Nova Luz Project, under the following priorities: 
a. Residents of houses demolished in the area of ZEIS; 
b. Residents of dwellings demolished the rest of the perimeter of the Nova Luz Project; 
c. Residents of homes that will change use in the perimeter of the Nova Luz Project; 
d. Tenants of buildings that will undergo the process of valorization and can no longer 
afford the high rents. 
 
10. Creation of instruments inhibiting the commodification of social housing produced in ZEIS, 
so that with the future of real estate valuation process in the region, the subsidies for the low-
income population are not directed to the middle class through the sale of homes. 
 
11. Creation of instruments ensuring the relocation of residents from their current housing only 
when the permanent housing is ready, without having to go to interim housing, prioritizing the 
production of social housing over other interventions and beginning the process of 
transformation principally in empty and underutilized areas. 
 
12. Creation of instruments which guarantee the permanence of merchants and service providers 
on the ground floor of the new developments if they have their establishments demolished and / 
or transformed, following applicable legislation. 
 
13. Creation of instruments for economic, financial, and security guarantees for property 
owners, renters, and business owners in the event of expropriation and / or agreements for 
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exchanges in the area, through banks and insurers issuing policies for everyone, without 
exception, as following applicable legislation. 
 
14. In the case of expropriation of the property, creation of instruments that ensure sending 
notices in writing via letter with the property tax registration number to all owners and renters, 
with a minimum of 24 months from the start of each phase. 
 
15. Creation of instruments ensuring the owners of commercial and residential properties, in the 
event of expropriation, compensation for the fair value of real estate and not only by market 
value, paid in local currency and in full, following relevant legislation. 
 
16. Creation of instruments that guarantee tenants of commercial property, in the event of 
expropriation of the leased property, the compensation, at fair market value, as stated in 
relevant legislation, considering the values of: 
a. Its customers; 
b. Start time of activities; 
c. The monthly bills and profits; 
d. The contract time and schedule for its completion; 
e.  Projection of net profits within the estimated period; 
f. ' ascertainable and achievable outgoing ' lease. 
 
17. Creation of instruments to ensure that all projects, without exception, will not be stopped by 
order of any nature, subject to contractual penalties and securities policies. And that the 
demolitions are only initiated when the expected start of projects in order to fulfill the social 
function of property and not enlarge the empty areas of the neighborhood. 
 
18. Identification of properties of preservation interest that must be restored and the properties 
that should be the object of intervention in order to restore the facades or the relevant features, 
identifying the aspects to be preserved and / or highlighted:  
a. Identify properties to be restored which are preserved by heritage agencies 
b. Identify properties to preserve that are not protected by heritage bodies, but 
nonetheless possessing unique characteristics, not only taking into account the 
architectural features, but uses and functions which are significant to history and the 
memory of the neighborhood, ie , properties that represent the Intangible Heritage in the 
Nova Luz project area. 
 
19. Definition of incentive, exemption, and funding criteria, as applicable in relevant legislation, 
for the recovery of the buildings to remain, whether designated historic or not, with support 
through technical advisory services, micro – credit, and training of professionals involved. 
 
20. Characterization of the type of housing unit by resident profile, ensuring compliance to all 
residents and families displaced by the Nova Luz Project, following the prioritization: a. Propose 
typologies of housing units, compatible with the family composition profiles and incomes of 
future residents. 
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21. Family composition and income of residents occupying housing in ZEIS should be identified 
in the registry and profiles that are beyond the standard traditional family (parents and children) 
should also be considered:  
a. Couples without children; 
b. Singles; 
c. Single person households (one person); 
d. Extended families (composed of members with varying degrees of relationship: son, 
daughter, brother, etc.); 
e. Households headed by members without spouses. 
 
22. Characterize the intended uses for the property that will be subject to concession, including 
specific projects, with estimates of new jobs to be achieved through the intervention:  
a. Characterize the desired non-residential uses for new ventures;  
b. Consider jobs in the proposed new developments. 
 
23. Prioritize the generation of employment and vocational training for local population, from 
the definition of tools to ensure that this provision prioritizes, based on the registry:  
a. Unemployed; 
b. Informal workers; 
c. Homeless population; 
d. Recyclable material collectors; 
e. Addicts (after undergoing appropriate treatment and assisted housing, in partnership 
with the Centro Legal Program). 
 
24. Develop collective housing programs for the homeless population, thereby reversing the 
closure of shelters in central Sao Paulo. 
 
25. Characterization of public and private spaces for collective use and definition of spaces and 
referential elements / quality of public spaces:  
a. Characterize the interventions proposed for existing public spaces; 
b. Characterize the proposed public spaces; 
c. Characterize private spaces with proposed collective uses. 
 
26. Define planning for the most serious problems encountered in the Nova Luz Project area, 
such as the precariousness of garbage collection, drainage systems, street lighting, safety, and 
universal accessibility. 
 
27. Implement accessibility programs for the local population to increase access to leisure and 
culture resources, which today are just frequented by elites, and even with free admission, are 
intimidating the population with lower income. 
 
28. Analyze the Mobility Plan proposed for the region, in order to minimize the negative impacts 
of proposed major projects, such that pedestrian and public space are prioritized to the 
movement of cars, which have alternative parking and circulation to avoid conflict with other 
uses. 
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29. Guarantee the permanence of the characteristics of the neighborhood, so there are no 
changes in nomenclature that represent the identity of the neighborhood, such as the names of 
streets, avenues and buildings, or changes in the characterization of local trade. 
30. Promotion of the socioeconomic integration of the population to be served in the projects of 
social interest (HIS and HMP):  
a. Suggest mechanisms for socioeconomic integration of current and future residents of 
ZEIS and Nova Luz, for example, the use of ground floors of buildings and lofts for 
generating income and employment and vocational training programs. 
b. Promote Human Development of the local population through cultural activities and 
training. 
 
31. Develop a system of post-occupancy social monitoring and popular education, especially for 
the low income population through shared management between government and housing 
movements in order to ensure adaptability to new housing, condo living and economic 
emancipation. 
 
32. Development of alternative policies to the personal home model, (like Social Lease) for the 
0-3 mw population housing, which is the majority in the area and cannot afford the formal 
financing system. 
 
33. Characterization of public facilities necessary to meet the expected population (anchor), 
prioritizing social needs of the fragile local population including drug users, the homeless, and 
informal workers: a. Estimate the necessary public facilities to serve the local population, 
considering the future scenario. 
 
34. Definition of PUZEIS management mode, which should be participatory and include the 
resident population: a. Promote the monitoring of the implementation of the ZEIS Urbanization 
Plan through its Management Council. 
 
35. Establishment of a local office for the management of ZEIS in Nova Luz, which will 
centralize information and relations between city hall and the population:  
a. With the detailed urban and social plan available; 
b. With availability of various laws and documents related to the project (legal, urban 
planning, social, budgetary, etc.); 
c. Articulator of various social policies in the area (health workers, income generation 
programs, vocational training, care for the elderly and vulnerable children and youth, 
among others), both developed by the government as by local social organizations; 
 
36. The Nova Luz project management, in debate with this Management Council, should start 
parallel work IMMEDIATELY to the development of the 'Project' to: promote the acceleration of 
the quality of life of local populations and improve public services in the region, such as public 
health, safety, waste disposal, drainage, lighting, among others, since the quality of life in the 
region is getting worse, making the daily lives of its residents and workers difficult. 
 
37. The Nova Luz project, with a 20-year deployment horizon, can begin to be implemented at 
once, with the improvement of basic services that are the direct responsibility of the government.  
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
SUBPRODUCT 6.1  
Title: Licensing and Public Hearings 
Date: 08/24/2012  
Revision 01: 18/09/2012 
 
Project Review Objectives  
Interactions with civil society and technical bodies, from the numerous hearings, elicited a 
significant set of improvements to be incorporated, as well as suggestions to be observed in the 
development of the Nova Luz Project, in its final edition. 
The preceding chapters punctuated dialogues and interactions in order to observe the 
considerations brought up in the process. 
This chapter intends to compile the suggestions, which will be taken into account to complete the 
project plans. 
 
Regarding Housing: 
1. The Nova Luz Project shall indicate the need for future building projects in ZEIS seek to 
maximize the supply of housing units considering the existing constraints in land use law 
and restrictions related to historic preservation; 
2. Regarding Housing Units proposed for ZEIS - 3 C 016 (Se), the Final Project and related 
studies should indicate the allocation of at least 80 % of the total housing units, produced 
in the perimeter subject to the ZEIS urbanization plan ZEIS C016 - 3 (Se), for Social 
Housing and a maximum 20 % of that total supply of units for low income market rate; 
3. It was still expected to incorporate a set of buildings for which there was publication of 
Decree of Social Interest, located in the area called Nova Luz outside the area ZEIS C016 
- 3 (Se). These buildings will be rehabilitated and are expected to produce affordable 
housing and low income market rate, with allocation of spaces located on the ground 
floor for non-residential uses. 
4. Whereas the maintenance of road alignments at Avenida Duque de Caxias, the possibility 
of implementing a bus corridor in the Contra-Rotula, from the interest of transportation 
agencies, as well as the limitation of templates provided in the CONDEPHAAT 
instructions was amended prior allocation of proposed residential uses for tax blocks 060 
and 068 Sector 008 Generic Plant Securities. 
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Regarding Historic Preservation: 
1. The possibility of keeping plaques on natural stone indicating the existing alignments and 
record the occupation of this area will be assessed, as pointed out by Councillor 
CONDEPHAAT in its opinion. 
 
Regarding Streetscapes: 
1. With respect to bus shelters: Project should adjust the nomenclature currently used to 
Passenger Shelters, present model specifications to be used, including the material to be 
used stainless steel or anodized aluminum. Along the stretch of Avenida Rio Branco in 
the Nova Luz Project Area, the standard shelters used throughout this corridor will be 
retained. 
2. With respect to the bollards: Project will present the detailed specification of parts and 
models. 
3. With regard to benches: revisions will take place to ensure a diversity of models, (with 
and without backrest, with and without armrests) and with side open areas, especially for 
those to be used in rain gardens. 
4. The Project will take into account the use of stainless steel as base material of public 
benches, because of durability and less interference and shall present a breakdown of 
parts or specifications of the models; 
5. The Project will provide free sites next to benches for wheelchair users. 
6. With respect to the bike racks: the nomenclature PARACICLO will be used. The Project 
shall submit specifications and models for antitheft protection against broken bikes, 
assessing in particular the suggestion to use the model developed by SPTrans and 
approved through Resolution SMDU.CPPU/009/2011 CPPU. This alternative model 
should follow the same standards. 
7. With respect to the collars of trees: Project will observe the nomenclature currently used- 
ARVOREIRAS-and also present details of parts or specifications of the models. 
8. With respect to lampposts: defined criteria alignments of the fixtures will be in bays and 
bus stops, parking spaces, with detailing that fulfills criteria of distance and alignment; 
the installation of lighting poles and shared pedestrian lighting will be considered, to be 
detailed in future projects, which may also consider the installation of audible traffic 
signals. 
9. Regarding the trashcans: Project is expected to just use litter bins, for which the model 
specifications with protection from rain water should be presented so as to prevent the 
accumulation of liquids. 
10. With regard to public telephones and mailboxes:  Project should indicate the 
recommended placement thereof, so as to allow the presence of such equipment in all 
blocks. 
11. With respect to the positioning of street furniture: The Project will review the insertion of 
pieces of street furniture in order to avoid conflicts between proposed equipment, trees, 
and lighting, from the adjustments made herein; 
12. The positioning of street furniture will be revised considering the appropriate distances of 
each object according to their size; 
13. The Project will strengthen the identity of the corners, observing location criteria 
according to the size and influence and eliminating obstructions of visibility, as defined 
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by Brazilian Traffic Code, the ABNT NBR 9050 1994, or superseding official technical 
standards which may replace it; 
14. The Project will indicate the minimum distances of equipment with respect to the gutter 
and other components, and seek to standardize the distances between “families" of urban 
elements, arranged for driveways, pedestrian pathways, squares, corners, roads, 
walkways, etc.; 
15. The minimum distance of 0.5 m from roads, in order to facilitate the movement of 
emergency vehicles, will be indicated. 
16. With regard to identification and horizontal and vertical traffic signs: The Project will 
meet all demands in accordance with the Brazilian Traffic Code - CBT and to the 
specified rules. 
17. With regard to traffic lights: Project will consider the installation of audible traffic 
signals. 
 
Regarding Accessibility and Mobility:  
1. With regard to bike lanes: The Project will review the proposed bike lanes in order to 
reconcile these with access to lots and with loading and unloading areas, especially along 
Rio Branco Avenue; 
2. the proposed bike lanes for Ipiranga and São João avenues will be removed; 
3. Bike lanes along Avenida Duque de Caxias and Maua Street will be deployed in the 
stretch where there is no movement of buses in order to avoid conflicts between bike 
lanes and bus stops. 
4. With respect to loading and unloading areas: Shall be revised in order to ensure universal 
accessibility. 
5. With respect to parking bays: Project shall indicate the wheelchair accessible places 
(along the accessible routes, with estimated additional range of movement and lowered 
curbs for handicapped access) without obstructing open lanes. 
6. With respect to the drainage system grills along accessible routes: They shall state that 
the final design ensures maximum spacing of 1.5 cm. 
7. With respect to the materials applied to crossings and walkways: Project will review the 
materials to be used, in order to avoid judder as well as the effect of unevenness. 
8. With respect to directional floors and alerts: directional and warning signs shall be 
installed on the sidewalks, crosswalks, and obstacles, as foreseen in the ABNT Technical 
standards related to accessibility. Whenever possible, elevated crosswalks will be used. 
9. With respect to the tactile tiling: Project will ensure the presence of directional tactile 
paving, leading mainly to ramps and crossing points of interest (bus and subway), as well 
as the stationary obstacles (mailboxes and telephone booths). 
10. With regard to crosswalks: The Project will restructure all those without an island and 
those which are misaligned; 
11. In places where it is not possible to raise the crosswalk, the following should be used: 
crossing ramps, the width of the crosswalk and 8.33 % slope, and tabs for areas located 
beyond the range of the crossing. Continuity will be provided in the guide lines 
(directional tread or other distinctive flooring) through squares and other buildings in 
remote lots. 
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12. Regarding the levels of the passageways and ground floors of the buildings considered 
permeable blocks: They are to be at street level through use of ramps or with a maximum 
disalignment of 1.5cm between the loading/unloading areas and passageway. 
13. With regard to the alignment of roads: The Project will maintain the current alignment of 
Maua Street and Avenida Duque de Caxias to "ensure the ability and conformation of the 
lanes of the current Avenida Duque de Caxias / Maua Street for future compatibility with 
projects for the region, such as the connection of Avenida Ribeiro de Lima/ Avenida 
Duque de Caxias below Jd. Luz - PDE / PRE 2012; Arco Norte; and the Airport Express 
project"; 
14. The Project will eliminate the proposed elevation at intersections of arterial roads and the 
mini-ring road proposed for internal circulation in the area, for security reasons, as 
highlighted by the technical body; 
15. The Rio Branco Corridor has a SPTrans specific project, aimed at paving high traffic 
areas: "on Avenida Rio Branco, rigid pavement will be deployed in the left lanes, which 
will remain under their jurisdiction. 
16. With regard to the lowering of gutters: Lowering will occur according to the 
determinations of the Brazilian Traffic Code, along with the guidelines specified by the 
CPA, SEMPED, ABNT NBR 9050 1994 using type II, or in the impossibility of 1.2 m 
spacing on the sidewalk, type III can be used under determinations 15.442/2011 Law 
(Article 8 ) "; 
17. With respect to specific "nodes" Rua Vitória x Rua Barão de Limeira; Rua Conselheiro 
Nébias, Rua Guaianases, Avenida Rio Branco, Rua Santa Ifigênia, Rua dos Andradas, 
Rua do Triunfo; Rua dos Gusmões x Rua do Triunfo: the project will indicate the needed 
detailed minimum distances of the various streetscape features following their spacing on 
Rua Vicoria. 
 
Regarding interventions: 
1. With respect to the property at Maua Street # 342 and # 360: Project will comply with the 
request of the Management Council of ZEIS C016 - 3 (Se), indicating the building to be 
maintained and excluding it from the Urban Concession. 
2. The implementation schedule will be revised to change the allocation of uses in blocks 
075 and 076, Sector 008 for the reallocation of public areas, for social facilities, as well 
as considering the request of the Management Council of ZEIS C016 - 3 (Se), that blocks 
065 and 073 Sector 008 be included in the first phase of intervention; 
3. For Bar Léo: Maintaining the property will be incorporated in the terms established by 
the Management Council of ZEIS C016 - 3 (Se). 
4. Similarly, under the terms established by the Management Council of ZEIS C016 - 3 
(Se), the properties at: Rua Aurora nº 580-588, Casa Aurora; Rua Aurora nº 187, Casa del 
Vecchio Ltda; Rua General Osório nº 46, Contemporânea Instrumentos Musicais; annex 
of Rua General Couto de Magalhães nº 172, Padaria Cascatinha, will be maintained. 
5. Regarding blocks 075 and 076: guidelines for intervention in these blocks will be 
presented, considering the proposed changes in uses and areas for installation of public 
social facilities, as proposed by the ZEIS C016 - 3 (Se) plan. 
6. Block 084: The previously proposed use and objectives will be reviewed in order to 
create an open space for public use, preferably for the purposes of recreation and leisure, 
and allowing for local cultural and social events. 
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7. Interventions proposed in phase 6 (six) under the urban concession will be reviewed 
under the criteria specified. 
 
Regarding Social Resources: 
1. Proposed social facilities will be revised following collaboration with the Social Welfare, 
Culture, Education, and Health Secretariats. 
2. Public social facilities shall primarily located in blocks 067, 068, 075 and 076, Sector 
008, as compatible with the demands presented by the municipal secretariats, in 
properties suitable to those activities. 
3. Regarding existing social facilities like Creche Esperança, the project maintains the 
proposed intervention on the property, but recommends the establishment of a partnership 
between the managing body of the NGO and the Secretary of Education to establish 
mechanisms that will enable this institution to manage one of the new proposed daycares. 
 
Regarding Building Uses: 
1. Public housing and low income market rate housing to be built in the ZEIS - 3 C 016 (Se) 
region shall have mixed residential and nonresidential uses, at least 80 % and at most 20 
% of computable total built area respectively, following current legislation, and seeking 
where possible to use the maximum permissible limit for non- residential uses located on 
the ground floor. 
 
The revisions are compiled herein, upon which the project team will be working on this final step 
in order to place the project in the desired level to support the process of the Nova Luz Urban 
Concession. 
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